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Framework	 for	 Disaster	 Risk	 Reduction,	 accord	 a	 central	 role	 to	 the	 state,	
which	is	assumed	to	be	clearly	organized	and	capable.	This	contrasts	with	the	
reality	of	the	hybrid	nature	of	post-conflict	governance	that	is	in	institutional	




post-conflict	 ‘scenario’	 of	 disaster	 response.	 I	 started	 the	 research	 with	 a	
review	of	current	literature,	which	was	complemented	by	an	exploratory	study	
in	Burundi,	to	create	a	theoretical	framework	based	on	literature	from	conflict-
,	 disaster-	 and	 humanitarian	 studies.	 I	 then	 selected	 three	 cases:	 the	 2015	
earthquakes	in	Nepal,	 the	2017	Regent	 landslide	and	floods	in	Sierra	Leone,	
and	the	2016	storm,	Hurricane	Matthew,	in	Haiti.	Over	twelve	months	of	in-




deeper	 understanding	 of	 the	 research	 problem	 and	 the	 construction	 of	 the	
post-conflict	scenario.	
In	the	first	case,	Nepal	(chapter	4),	I	focus	on	the	more	traditional	aid–
state	 relationship,	 finding	 that	 the	 main	 point	 of	 friction	 concerned	 the	
contradiction	 between	 post-conflict	 statebuilding	 and	 international	
humanitarian	 response.	 This	 resulted	 in	 what	 might	 be	 described	 as	 the	
‘wheeling	 and	dealing’	 of	 aid;	 aid	 actors	 creatively	 complied	with	 the	 state-






each	 other	 for	 a	 larger	 role	 in	 the	 response,	 as	 a	 result	 of	which	 there	 are	
limited	 roles	 for	 local	 authorities	 and	 community	 stakeholders.	 In	 the	 third	
case,	Haiti	 (chapter	6),	 I	 take	a	more	bottom-up	perspective,	 finding	that	—	
humanitarian	commitments	for	a	more	locally	led	response	notwithstanding	
—	the	space	for	societal	actors	in	disaster	response	remains	limited	due	to	the	






and	 their	 consequences;	 ‘the	 local	 as	 locale’,	 which	 ignored	 local	 power	
dynamics;	‘the	local	as	governance’,	where	local–national	relations	and	intra-

















what	 humanitarian	 commitments	 and	 disaster	 policies	 preach	—	 namely	 a	








on	 the	post-conflict	 and	post-disaster	 nexus,	with	 its	 inherent	 tensions	 and	
paradoxes.	 Further,	 it	 advocates	 for	 a	more	nuanced	understanding	 in	both	
disaster	and	humanitarian	policies	and	frameworks	of	how	aid,	state	or	locally	
led	 governance	 is	 socially	 negotiated	 in	 practice.	Moreover,	 throughout	 the	
research,	it	was	my	goal	to	translate	theory	in	order	to	contribute	to	practice	
by	engaging	with	different	humanitarian	practitioners	and	policy-makers	 in	
workshops	 and	 meetings,	 producing	 research	 briefs	 of	 the	 case	 studies,	































van	 rampen	 en	 conflicten	 in	 de	 wetenschappelijke	 literatuur	 steeds	 meer	
wordt	 onderkend,	 zijn	 beleid	 en	 praktijk	 van	 de	 rampenrespons	 zelden	
afgestemd	op	de	bestuursdynamiek	in	de	nasleep	van	conflicten.	Deze	worden	




rampen,	 zoals	het	Sendai	Framework	 for	Disaster	Risk	Reduction	 van	de	VN,	
wordt	een	centrale	rol	toegekend	aan	de	overheid,	in	de	veronderstelling	dat	
deze	 goed	 georganiseerd	 en	 competent	 is.	 Dit	 staat	 haaks	 op	 het	 hybride	
karakter	van	de	bestuurlijke	werkelijkheid	 in	de	nasleep	van	conflicten,	die	
wordt	 gekenmerkt	 door	 institutionele	 flux	 en	 (interne)	 strijd.	 In	 dit	
proefschrift	 is	 een	 empirische,	 actorgerichte	 benadering	 gekozen	 en	 wordt	
beschreven	 hoe	 hulpverleners,	 overheids-	 en	 maatschappelijke	 actoren	
onderhandelen	 over	 het	 bestuur	 van	 rampenbestrijding	 in	 de	 nasleep	 van	
conflicten.	
In	 dit	 onderzoek	 is	 met	 een	 kwalitatieve,	 meervoudige	 casestudy	 met	







maanden	 veldonderzoek	 zijn	 273	 kwalitatieve,	 semigestructureerde	
interviews	 en	 18	 focusgroepdiscussies	 binnen	 gemeenschappen	 gehouden.	
Elke	 casestudy	 was	 gericht	 op	 een	 specifieke	 bestuurlijke	 relatie:	 tussen	
internationale	en	nationale	actoren,	binnen	de	overheid	en	tussen	de	overheid	
en	 de	 samenleving.	 Hierdoor	 ontstond	 meer	 inzicht	 in	 het	







tussen	 staatsvorming	 na	 een	 conflict	 en	 internationale	 humanitaire	







de	 overheid	 in	 de	 praktijk.	 Overheidsactoren	 op	 verschillende	 bestuurlijke	
niveaus	 beconcurreren	 elkaar	 om	 een	 grotere	 rol	 in	 de	 rampenbestrijding,	
waardoor	 er	 een	 beperkte	 rol	 is	 weggelegd	 voor	 lokale	 authoriteiten	 en	
belanghebbenden	uit	de	gemeenschap.	In	de	derde	casus	(Haïti,	hoofdstuk	6),	
is	een	bottom-up	benadering	gekozen.	Hierin	bleek	er	bij	de	rampenbestrijding	




maatschappelijke	 actoren	 zich	 tegen	 bepaalde	 hulpverleningspraktijken	 en	
zoeken	ze	naar	alternatieve	vormen	van	solidariteit.		
Ten	 slotte	 waren	 overeenkomsten	 tussen	 deze	 casussen	 met	
betrekking	tot	de	rol	van	'het	lokale'	aanleiding	om	de	meervoudige	dimensies	
van	 het	 lokale	 in	 de	 rampenbestrijding	 in	 de	 nasleep	 van	 conflicten	 te	




nationale	 verhoudingen	 en	 intra-nationale	 strijd,	 en	 waarbij	 lokale	 actoren	




Op	 basis	 van	 de	 analyse	 van	 de	 casestudy's	 en	 de	 multilokale	
vergelijking	 is	 er	 in	 dit	 onderzoek	 een	 scenario	 opgesteld	 voor	
rampenbestrijding	 in	 de	 nasleep	 van	 conflicten.	 Hiermee	 wordt	 het	
	 XI	
proefschrift	 afgesloten.	 Volgens	 dit	 scenario	 leidt	 de	 convergentie	 van	
verschillende	vormen	van	bestuur	tot	drie	belangrijke	spanningsvelden:	1)	een	
disbalans	 tussen	 staatsvorming	 en	 humanitaire	 hulpverlening;	 2)	 een	
misverstand	 over	 staatshybriditeit	 en	 het	 multilokale	 en	 3)	 beperkte	
mogelijkheden	 voor	 maatschappelijke	 actoren	 om	 deel	 te	 nemen	 aan	
bestuurlijke	 structuren	 voor	 rampenbestrijding.	 Actoren	 binnen	 de	




	 De	 resultaten	 van	 dit	 onderzoek	 geven	 aanleiding	 om	 de	 sociale	
constructie	 van	 'fragiliteit'	 in	 de	 nasleep	 van	 conflicten	 en	 de	
machtsverhoudingen	 tussen	 mondiale,	 nationale	 en	 lokale	 actoren	 in	 het	
omgaan	 met	 rampen	 ter	 discussie	 te	 stellen.	 Om	 ervoor	 te	 zorgen	 dat	
humanitaire	 verplichtingen	 en	 het	 beleid	 voor	 rampenbestrijding	
daadwerkelijk	 in	 de	 praktijk	 worden	 gebracht,	 en	 de	 overheid	 en	 lokale	
partijen	 dus	 gezamenlijk	 leidinggeven	 aan	 de	 rampenrespons,	 moeten	
hulpverleners	 deze	 constructies	 beter	 begrijpen	 en	 moeten	 deze	 tot	
uitdrukking	komen	in	mondiale	beleidslijnen	en	kaders	zoals	het	Sendai-kader	
en	 de	 Grand	 Bargain,	 een	 internationale	 overeenkomst	 tussen	 donoren	 en	
humanitaire	organisaties.		
	 	Met	 dit	 onderzoek	 over	 het	 dwarsverband	 tussen	 de	 nasleep	 van	
conflicten	 en	 van	 rampen,	 met	 de	 bijbehorende	 spanningen	 en	 paradoxen,	
wordt	een	leemte	opgevuld	in	de	humanitaire	literatuur.	Verder	wordt	in	dit	
proefschrift	 gepleit	 om	 in	 beleid	 en	 denkkaders	 op	 het	 gebied	 van	 zowel	
rampen	als	humanitaire	hulpverlening	genuanceerder	te	kijken	naar	hoe	in	de	
praktijk	 wordt	 onderhandeld	 over	 hulp,	 overheids-	 of	 lokaal	 bestuur.	
Daarnaast	is	in	dit	onderzoek	steeds	getracht	om	de	theorie	naar	de	praktijk	te	
vertalen	 door	 middel	 van	 workshops	 en	 bijeenkomsten	 met	 verschillende	
humanitaire	 hulpverleners	 en	 beleidsmakers,	 onderzoeksverslagen	 van	 de	
casestudy's,	 advieswerk	 in	 praktijkgericht	 onderzoek	 en	 een	 gratis	



















































What	 are	 the	 ingredients	 for	 effective	 disaster	 response	 in	 a	 post-conflict	
scenario?	In	Sierra	Leone,	a	research	participant	working	for	an	international	







response	 and	 the	 conditions	 and	 outcomes	 of	 aid.	 Each	 actor	 brings	 along	
different	visions	and	motivations	for	what	the	response	could,	or	should,	look	








get	 entangled;	 in	 responding	 to	 a	 disaster,	 humanitarian	 governance	 often	
finds	 itself	 in	 competition	 with	 existing	 governance	 arrangements	 and	
practices.	When	a	disaster	unfolds	in	a	post-conflict	scenario,	another	layer	of	
complexity	 is	 added,	 because	 these	 settings	 are	 usually	 characterized	 by	 a	
transitional	 governance	 space	 and	 a	 high	 level	 of	 institutional	 uncertainty,	
which	results	in	a	particular	blending	of	ingredients.	
This	 thesis	 centres	 around	 the	 investigation	 of	 a	 paradox	 in	 the	
governance	of	disaster	response	in	a	post-conflict	setting3;	while	state-centred	
disaster	 response	 policies	 presume	 the	 homogeneity	 of	 the	 state,	 and	
humanitarian	 commitments	 work	 towards	 a	 uniformly	 locally	 led	 disaster	
 
2	A	disaster	is	defined	as	‘a	serious	disruption	of	the	functioning	of	a	community	or	a	society	due	to	hazardous	
events	 interacting	 with	 conditions	 of	 vulnerability	 and	 exposure,	 leading	 to	 widespread	 human,	 material	
economic	and	environmental	losses	and	impacts’	(UNISDR,	2015b).	Hazards	can	be,	for	example,	earthquakes,	








governance	 that	 is	 in	 institutional	 flux	 and	 (internally)	 contested.	 Violent	




capacity	 of	 state	 institutions,	 societal	 organization	 or	 the	 high	 influx	 of	 aid	
actors.	Each	of	these	may	have	a	different	vision	of	the	future	and	how	to	shape,	
and	 govern,	 the	 post-conflict	 period.	 With	 the	 aid	 of	 the	 multidisciplinary	
approach	 of	 this	 research,	 I	 especially	 aim	 to	 contribute	 to	 humanitarian	
studies,	 policies	 and	practices,	 through	drawing	 from	both	 the	disaster	 and	
post-conflict	literatures.		
Why	is	it	important	to	study	the	governance	of	disaster	response	in	a	
post-conflict	 setting?	 The	 academic	 literature	 has	 increasingly	 argued	 that	
challenges	 for	 disaster	 response	 and	 conflict-specific	 issues	 become	 inter-
related.	Caso	 (2019)	has	 shown	 that	—	calculated	as	a	yearly	average	 from	
2009	 to	2018	—	78	per	cent	of	disasters	occurred	 in	 countries	with	armed	
conflicts.	Another	study	found	that	50	per	cent	of	disaster	casualties	and	30	
per	cent	of	people	affected	by	disasters	are	living	in	countries	listed	as	the	30	
most	 fragile	 and	 conflict-affected	 states	 (Katie	 Peters	 &	 Budimir,	 2016).	
Further,	 conflict,	 or	 a	 history	 of	 conflict,	 is	 often	 seen	 to	 increase	 people's	
vulnerability	to	disasters	(Bankoff	et	al.,	2004;	Wisner,	2012)	and,	conversely,	
disasters	have	been	seen	 to	 increase	 the	risk	of	conflict	and	political	unrest	
(Drury	&	Olson,	 1998).	 In	 those	 cases	where	 disasters	 have	 contributed	 to	
peace	processes	(Billon	&	Waizenegger,	2007;	Slettebak,	2012),	these	effects	




of	 conflict	 contexts?	 Disaster	 governance	 frameworks	 such	 as	 the	 Sendai	
Framework	 (UNISDR,	 2015a)4	 focus	 on	 Disaster	 Risk	 Reduction	 and	 other	
technocratic	 approaches	 to	 disasters,	 and	 tend	 to	 leave	 politically	 sensitive	
issues	 such	 as	 conflict	 out	 of	 the	 discussion.	 Similarly,	 humanitarian	






exceptionality,	 resulting	 in	 top-town	 centralized	 interventions	 by	
international	 actors.	 Current	 frameworks	 and	 commitments,	 such	 as	 the	
localization	 agenda	 (The	 Grand	 Bargain,	 2016),	 promote	 locally	 led	
humanitarian	 governance,	 but	 do	 not	 actively	 address	 the	 power	 relations	
involved	and	 fail	 to	distinguish	between	post-conflict	and	other	governance	
contexts	 in	 which	 localization	 is	 envisioned	 to	 take	 place.	 While	 the	
humanitarian	 field	 is	 forever	 changing	 (Hilhorst,	 2018),	 and	 conflict	 and	
disasters	share	an	inextricable	bond,	the	post-disaster/post-conflict	nexus	has	
received	 little	 attention.	 This	 is	 problematic.	 The	 goals,	 roles	 and	
responsibilities	 of	 aid,	 state	 and	 societal	 actors	 engaged	 in	 the	 response	 to	
disasters	will	be	different	in	different	periods,	whether	in	a	conflict	setting,	or	
quieter	times.	One-size-fits-all	approaches	to	disaster	response	are	completely	
inadequate,	 particularly	 where	 post-disaster	 meets	 post-conflict.	 When	
compounded	by	disasters	that	are	seen	as	critical	junctures	or	turning	points	
for	socio-political	change	(Gawronski	&	Olson,	2013),	 the	situation	becomes	
even	more	 complex,	 as	 interrelationships	 between	 actors	 shift	 through	 the	
politicization	 of	 the	 response	 (Olson,	 2000),	 and	 existing	 state–society	
disarticulation	is	exposed	or	increased	(Pelling	&	Dill,	2010;	Siddiqi	&	Canuday,	
2018).	What	happens	when	the	idea	of	this	exceptionality	encounters	the	pre-




after	 Hurricane	 Matthew	 in	 2016,	 and	 Sierra	 Leone	 after	 the	 2017	 Regent	
landslide	and	 floods.	Each	case	 is	 studied	so	as	 to	contribute	 to	 the	general	
research	question,	thereby	helping	to	build	a	‘scenario’	of	post-conflict	disaster	
governance	that	can	be	used	as	guidance	for	humanitarian	practice.	Through	
the	 main	 findings	 in	 each	 of	 the	 cases,	 a	 number	 of	 interrelated	 themes	
emerged	that	are	important	in	this	setting,	such	as	the	difficulties	of	localizing	
the	governance	of	disaster	response	in	a	post-conflict	state,	the	hybridity	and	
heterogeneity	 of	 the	 different	 response	 actors,	 and	 the	 unbalanced	 power	
relations	between	them.		





approach	 and	methodology;	 a	 literature	 review	 including	 a	 pilot	 study;	 the	
three	empirical	case	studies;	a	comparative	chapter;	and	the	conclusions.	The	
small-N	 case	 study	 research	 builds	 on	 a	 multidisciplinary	 literature	 and	
contributes	to	a	post-conflict	scenario	of	disaster	response,	in	which	the	three	
cases	probe	into	the	main	relational	governance	challenges	that	typified	the	
response	 in	 that	 country.	 This	 means	 that	 different	 case	 studies	 centre	 on	
specific	relations	and	shift	the	actor-focus;	the	first	case	interprets	the	more	
traditional,	 contentious	 aid–state	 relations,	 the	 second	 case	 examines	 the	










As	 noted	 above,	 the	 post-conflict	 setting	 is	 seldom	 taken	 into	 account	 as	 a	
separate	 category	 in	 statistics	 on	 disasters	 and	 conflict.	 But	 what	 is	 so	
particular	about	the	post-conflict	environment?	In	this	thesis,	I	understand	the	
concept	 of	 ‘post-conflict’	 not	 as	 an	undisputed	 and	 singular	 reality	 but	 as	 a	




that	 often	 persist	 (Brinkerhoff,	 2005).	 From	 literature	 and	 practice,	 it	 is	
possible	to	distinguish	different	constructs	of	post-conflict:	as	a	temporal	state	
—	a	place	and	time	different	from	others;	as	a	set	of	conditions	—	starting	from	
a	 peace	 agreement;	 or	 as	 a	 governance	 discourse	 —	 legitimizing	 certain	
practices.		
As	 a	 temporal	 state,	 post-conflict	 is	 determined	 and	delineated	by	 a	
preceding	 period	 of	 violent	 conflict,	 or	 conflicts,	 that	 have	 been	 (partly)	
resolved	or	subdued	in	the	present.	That	is	not	to	say	that	this	condition	is	final,	
as	 the	risk	of	recurrent	conflict	remains	(Collier	et	al.,	2008;	Nathan	&	Toft,	








violence	 to	 recur.	 Further,	 local	 conflicts	 may	 also	 be	 present,	 as	 well	 as	













place,	 or	 taking	 place.	 The	 term	 ‘post-conflict’	 was	 coined	 by	 UN	 Secretary	
General	Boutros	Boutros-Ghali	 in	An	agenda	for	peace,	where	he	provided	a	
framework	for	‘post-conflict	peace-building’	after	the	Cold	War	(Boutros-Ghali,	
1992).	 This	 framework	 guided	 the	 subsequent	 professionalization	 of	
international	 humanitarian	 action,	 specifically	 in	 countries	 where	 peace	
agreements	 or	 settlements	 were	 reached	 or	 declared.	 There	 were	
recommended	steps	 that	would	be	 internationally	 supported:	disarmament,	
restoration	 of	 order,	 repatriation,	 capacity-building	 of	 security	 personnel,	
monitoring	of	elections,	promoting	human	rights,	reforming	or	strengthening	
governmental	 institutions,	 and	 promoting	 formal	 and	 informal	 political	









post-conflict	 practices	 predicated	 on	 externally	 designed	 and	 driven	
peacebuilding	and	statebuilding	to	strengthen	institutions	and	reduce	the	risk	
of	renewed	conflict	(Collier	et	al.,	2008;	Nathan	&	Toft,	2011;	Walter,	2004),	as	
a	 mostly	 'imagineered'	 process,	 where	 an	 imaginative	 goal	 or	 vision	 is	
engineered	 through	 technocratic	 processes	 (Monk	 &	 Mundy,	 2014).	 These	
interventions	have	been	criticized	 for	 their	 top-down,	 liberal	approach,	 and	
alternative	 discourses	 and	 practices	 have	 emerged	 (Chandler,	 2013;	
Heathershaw	&	Lambach,	2008;	Mac	Ginty,	2010;	Paffenholz,	2015).	Still,	the	
linking	 of	 top-down	 and	 bottom-up	 interventions	 and	 processes	 has	 been	
difficult	(Hilhorst	et	al.,	2010).	
In	the	construction	of	post-conflict	as	a	governance	discourse,	most	of	
the	 different	 steps	 and	 policy	 recommendations	 concern	 external	
interventions,	even	though	post-conflict	societies	themselves	also	undergo	a	
process	 of	 change	 and	 recovery.	 As	Moore	 (2000)	 argues,	 the	 post-conflict	
discourse	can	be	used	as	a	way	 to	 legitimize	an	 interventionist	governance,	





changing	 their	 interventions	 from	 short-term	 humanitarian-based	 to	 long-
term	 development-based	 activities.	 Jabri	 (2016)	 connects	 this	
institutionalization	 of	 ‘the	 international’	 directly	 to	 post-colonial	 power	
structures	and	their	impact	on	modern-day	practices.	Rather	than	the	often-
used	 term	 'post-conflict	 reconstruction',	 governance	 in	 the	 post-conflict	
context	can	be	seen	as	being	‘constructed’,	often	on	international	terms,	and	
followed	by	 interventions	that	have	been	criticized	 for	 their	neoliberal,	 top-
down	 approach	 (Balthasar,	 2017;	 Chandler	 &	 Sisk,	 2013;	 Heathershaw	 &	
Lambach,	2008;	Sabaratnam,	2017).	Politics	within	the	post-conflict	space	can	
be	considered	as	a	process	that	 is	both	fluid	and	structured,	and	that,	while	
being	 influenced	 by,	 and	 shaping,	 temporal	 and	 spatial	 dimensions,	 is	 not	
strictly	bounded	by	them.	To	understand	the	spatial	and	temporal	dimensions	
of	 the	post-conflict	scenario	 in	disaster	governance	requires	a	multi-layered	








a	 ‘positive	peace’	 that	 is	more	constructive	and	focuses	on	the	relationships	
between	all	actors	(Addams	et	al.,	2007;	Galtung,	1996).		
	A	 post-conflict	 scenario	 may	 therefore	 be	 seen	 as	 a	 socially	 and	
politically	 constructed	 imaginative	 distinction	 that	 is	 followed	 by	 certain	
policies,	reshaping	institutions	and	transforming	contentious	politics	between	




shift,	 buffeted	 by	 complexity	 and	 contradiction.	 Political	 governance	
transitions	may	 include	 adopting	new	 constitutions	 or	 organizing	 elections,	
but	the	space	itself	is	not	transitional,	and	while	vertical	and	horizontal	power	
structures,	and	international	and	national	actors,	have	different	authority,	they	
are	 also	 co-constitutive.	As	Heathershaw	and	Lambach	 (2008,	p.	 270)	note:	
post-conflict	spaces	are	‘complex	figurations	of	networks	and	authorities	and	
shifting	local–global	relationships’.	They	can	be	seen	as	spaces	where	power	
relations	are	 important	 in	negotiating	 the	authority	 and	 legitimacy	of	 these	
actors,	and	where	these	are	continuously	challenged.	An	intervention	that	fails	
to	 understand	 how	 this	 web	 of	 relationships	 takes	 shape	 when	 a	 disaster	
unfolds	 risks	 creating	 further	 tensions	 and	 power	 struggles	 between	 and	







and	 disaster	 governance.	 The	 emerging	 concept	 of	 disaster	 governance	 has	
become	 increasingly	 important	 in	 disaster	 studies,	 building	 as	 it	 does	 on	
changing	 paradigms	 in	 the	 humanitarian	 literature	 that	 have	 centred	 on	
relations	 of	 power	 as	 opposed	 to	 a	 solely	 technocratic	 understanding	 of	
disaster	 risk.	Disaster	 governance	 connects	with	 the	way	 that	 disasters	 are	
socially	 constructed	 and	 the	 way	 that	 governance	 relations	 are	 shaped	 by	
politics	between	actors	across	global–local	scales,	placing	disaster	governance	
When	disaster	meets	post-conflict	 9	
within	 existing	 societal	 governance	 systems.	 As	 Tierney	 (2012,	 p.	 344)	
explains:	 ‘disaster	 governance	 consists	 of	 the	 interrelated	 sets	 of	 norms,	
organisational	and	institutional	actors,	and	practices	(spanning	pre-disaster,	
trans-disaster,	 and	 post-disaster	 periods)	 that	 are	 designed	 to	 reduce	 the	
impacts	 and	 losses	 associated	 with	 disasters	 arising	 from	 natural	 and	
technological	agents	and	from	intentional	acts	of	terrorism’.	Disaster	response	
is	 thus	 a	 temporal	moment	of	 this	 governance	process	 that	 is	 embedded	 in	
governance	systems	and	power	relations	between	different	actors.		
Traditionally,	 disaster	 studies	 have	 been	 —	 and	 continue	 to	 be	 —	
strongly	 connected	 to	 the	 ecological	 and	geo-sciences.	There	 is	 a	prevailing	
tendency	to	focus	on	technocratic	considerations	in	the	context	of	disasters,	
situated	 within	 ecological	 systems	 theories	 and	 centred	 around	 a	 hazards	
paradigm	 (Burton	 et	 al.,	 1993).5	 Challenging	 this	 apolitical	 approach	 to	




2004;	 Blaikie	 et	 al.,	 1994;	 Cannon,	 1994)	 and	 the	 resilience	 paradigm	
(Alexander,	 2013;	 Paton	 &	 Johnston,	 2006)	 that	 centred	 on	 strengths	 and	
capabilities.	 Political	 ecology	 has	 continued	 to	 develop	 spatialized	 and	
temporal	 dimensions	 of	 the	 socio-political	 and	 economic	 impact	 on	
environmental	 processes,	 with	 scholars	 arguing	 for	 a	 ‘decolonized	 ecology’	
(Ferdinand,	 2019).	 But	 contrary	 to	 literature	 on	 the	 politics	 of	 disaster	
response	 (Hilhorst,	 2016;	 Mascarenhas	 &	 Wisner,	 2012;	 Olson,	 2000)	 and	
current	scholarship	in	disaster	studies	which	understands	disasters	as	being	





become	part	of	 the	governance	of	 the	 response	along	with	 the	multitude	of	
state	 institutions	 and	 (civil)	 society	 actors	 that	 are	 also	 part	 of	 the	 picture.	
 
5	Cf.	Wisner	(2015,	p.	59)	on	the	‘technocratic	and	modernist	biases’	in	‘natural	hazards	geography’.	
6	 Not	 all	 disasters	 attract	 aid	 actors	 or	 humanitarian	 aid;	many	 everyday	disasters	 are	 responded	 to	 by	 the	
affected	communities,	civil	society	groups	and/or	state	institutions.	This	thesis	specifically	focuses	on	those	





Humanitarian	 governance,	 defined	 by	 Barnett	 (2013,	 p.	 379)	 as	 ‘the	
increasingly	 organized	 and	 internationalized	 attempt	 to	 save	 the	 lives,	
enhance	the	welfare,	and	reduce	the	suffering	of	the	world’s	most	vulnerable	
populations’,	has	generally	revolved	around	international	actors,	and	has	been	
characterized	 by	 a	 top-down,	 externally	 centralized,	 apolitical,	 paternalistic	
approach	 (Barnett,	 2017;	 Donini,	 2012;	 Hilhorst,	 2018).	 Although	 it	 can	 be	
seen	as	a	type	of	global	governance	encompassing	different	domains	such	as	
development,	 emergencies	 and	 peacebuilding	 (Barnett,	 2013),	 this	 thesis	




other	 conflict	 settings.	 High-intensity	 conflict	 settings	 are	 often	 seen	 as	
complex	emergencies	or	as	a	state	of	protracted	crisis,	exhibiting	moments	of	
large-scale	 violence,	 high	 rates	 of	migration,	 and	 a	 concurrence	with	 other	
humanitarian	crises	(Mena,	2018).	Humanitarian	governance	in	these	settings	
encounters	challenges	of	security,	access	and	humanitarian	needs	that	cannot	
be	met,	 all	 of	which	means	 the	 triage	 of	 aid	 (deciding	who	will	 or	will	 not	
receive	support)	becomes	a	highly	political	process	(Mena	&	Hilhorst,	2020).	
Low-intensity	conflict	settings	in	authoritarian	states	exhibit	a	lesser	degree	of	
violence,	 with	 fewer	 casualties,	 but	 involve	 structural	 violence	 being	
committed	against	marginalized	groups	 (Desportes	et	 al.,	 2019).	This	poses	
challenges	 to	 humanitarian	 governance,	which	 is	 purposely	 depoliticized	 to	
balance	humanitarian	mandates	and	needs	with	 the	political	engagement	of	
the	authorities	(Desportes,	2019).	
Disaster	 response	 in	 a	 post-conflict	 environment	 combines	 different	
governance	systems;	humanitarian,	disaster	and	post-conflict	governance.	As	
disaster	response	does	not	focus	solely	on	humanitarian	actors,	but	includes	
collaborative	 humanitarian	 action,	 it	 becomes	 increasingly	 important	 to	
address	the	power	relations	between	these	actors	and	to	take	a	longer-term,	
historical	perspective,	both	as	to	a	disaster’s	causes	and	the	way	in	which	it	is	
responded	 to.	 This	 understanding	 has	 been	 embodied	 by	 ‘resilience	
humanitarianism’	 (Hilhorst,	 2018;	 Ilcan	 &	 Rygiel,	 2015)	 that	 builds	 on	 the	
disaster	 literature’s	understanding	of	 the	 resilience	of	 local	 institutions	and	
communities,	 in	 recognition	of	 the	 roles	 that	national	 and	 local	 actors	have	
always	had	in	disaster	governance	frameworks	(Harvey	et	al.,	2009)	but	not	in	
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humanitarian	 governance.	 In	 order	 to	 translate	 these	 disaster	 policies	 into	
effective	 humanitarian	 practices,	 the	 focus	 on	 inclusive	 and	 collaborative	
governance	 has	 also	 become	 increasingly	 important	 in	 humanitarian	
governance,	as	seen	for	example	in	the	localization	commitment	of	the	World	




Governing	 disasters,	 therefore,	 is	 not	 only	 about	 controlling	 the	




























The	 research	 has	 adopted	 an	 actor-oriented	 approach	 and	 is	 largely	
influenced	 by	 a	 constructivist	 paradigm,	 in	 order	 to	 make	 sense	 of	 the	
multidisciplinary	 nature	 of	 the	 post-disaster	 and	 post-conflict	 nexus.	 In	
constructivism,	‘realities	are	apprehendable	in	the	form	of	multiple,	intangible	













understood	 differently	 by	 different	 actors	 and	 changing	 over	 time.	 While	
structural	 factors	may	be	 ‘observed’	by	external	 and	other	parties,	 they	are	





formulating	 their	 objectives,	 deploying	 specific	 modes	 of	 action	 and	 giving	
reasons	for	their	behaviour’	(Long,	2001,	p.	18).	Agency	can	be	seen	in	the	way	






represented	 in	 the	 idea	of	 the	humanitarian	 arena.	The	 thesis	 sees	disaster	
response	 as	 social	 practice	 where	 discourses	 are	 being	 constructed	 and	
reconstructed	 by	 agents	 and	 power	 relations	 are	 renegotiated	 through	 the	
response.	
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in	 this	 research	 are	 actors	 with	 a	 specific	 humanitarian,	 development	 or	
emergency	assistance	mandate,	such	as	local,	national	and	international	non-
governmental	organizations	(INGOs),	the	International	Federation	of	the	Red	
Cross,	 various	 United	 Nations	 (UN)	 agencies,	 donor	 agencies	 and	 other	
organizations	responsible	for	humanitarian	assistance.	State	actors	are	part,	
either	 formally	 or	 informally,	 of	 state	 institutions	 on	 different	 governance	
levels.	 Societal	actors	comprise,	but	are	not	 limited	 to,	 a	multitude	of	 social	
groups,	 civil	 society	 actors,	 media,	 the	 private	 sector	 and	 citizens.	 Actor	
identities	 across	 these	 categories	 are	 continuously	 in	 flux,	 with	 members	
contesting	 group	 boundaries,	 switching	 between	 groups	 or	 being	 part	 of	
multiple	ones.		
	 The	 humanitarian	 arena	 (Hilhorst	 &	 Jansen,	 2010)	 provides	 an	
analytical	lens	to	study	interactions	between	state	and	non-state	actors;	in	the	
context	of	 the	 thesis,	 it	 limits	 the	 focus	of	 the	research	 to	 those	governance	
processes	that	directly	relate	to	the	post-disaster	aid	response.	The	concept	of	




times	guessing	 to	 further	 their	 interests’	 (Bakewell,	2000,	pp.108-109).	The	



















forms	 of	 politics	 that	 centre	 on	 issues,	 organizations	 and	 structures,	 as	
Kerkvliet	 (2009,	 p.	 232)	 explains:	 ‘Everyday	 politics	 involves	 people	




the	 humanitarian	 arena,	 especially	 at	moments	when	 different	 actors	 exert	




state	 and	 societal	 actors	 exercise	 their	 power	 to	 claim	 legitimacy	 and	 to	
provide	 humanitarian	 assistance.	 Power	 has	 a	 ‘transformative	 capacity’	 to	




only	 considered	 as	 normative,	 but	 also	 as	 symbiotic	 and	 multidimensional	
(Beetham,	2013;	Lamb,	2014).	It	is	seen	as	the	‘worthiness	of	support’,	a	sense	
that	something	is	right	and	should	be	morally	endorsed.	Further,	 it	 is	 in	the	
eyes	of	the	beholder,	with	legitimacy	changing	depending	on	the	one	who	is	
evaluating	 it	 (Lamb,	2014).	Power	 is	produced	and	reproduced	 through	 the	
relationships	between	actors	(aid–state–society);	it	is	both	a	medium	and	an	
outcome,	both	constraining	and	enabling.		
Governance	 is	 another	 complex	 term	 that	 refers	 to	 this	 process	 of	
interactions	between	the	different	actors	involved	in	the	response.	It	does	not	
describe	 a	 system	 that	 revolves	 around	 the	 state,	 but	 a	 process	 that	 is	
continuously	 negotiated	 between	 state	 and	 non-state	 actors,	 formal	 and	
informal	authorities,	and	is	much	shaped	by	the	forms	of	communication	used	
or	 denied;	what	 is	 referred	 to	 as	 ‘real	 governance’	 in	 practice	 (Titeca	&	 de	
Herdt,	2011).	As	Colebatch	(2014,	p.	314)	asserts,	 ‘governing	involves	many	
hands,	 is	 grounded	 in	 interaction	 rather	 than	direction,	 and	 is	 a	 continuing	
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process	marked	 by	 indeterminacy	 and	 ambiguity’.	 Governance	 is	 therefore	
inherently	 collaborative,	 albeit	with	 contestation,	 and	hybrid,	with	different	
forms	 of	 authority	 and	 a	 blurring	 of	 roles	 between	 them	 being	 part	 of	 the	
process.	Especially	in	post-conflict	contexts,	this	is	an	important	distinction,	as	
formal	 and	 informal	 governance	 structures	 are	 often	 in	 flux	 and	 legitimacy	
given	 shape	 through	 contestation	 and	 collaboration.	 This	 is	 further	
compounded	by	the	multitude	of	actors	involved	in	the	governance	of	disaster	
response,	 who	 operate	 on	 different	 levels	 and	 need	 to	 socially	 negotiate	
governance	 arrangements.	 However,	 this	 hybridity	 (Albrecht	 &	Moe,	 2015;	
Boege	et	al.,	2009),	multiplicity	of	institutions	(van	der	Haar	&	Heijke,	2013)	
and	the	way	actors	‘assemble’	divergent	institutional	arrangements	(Cleaver,	
2002;	 Cleaver	 &	 De	 Koning,	 2015)	 are	 barely	 reflected	 in	 humanitarian	





In	 terms	 of	 theory,	 this	 research	 seeks	 to	 reduce	 an	 identified	 gap	 in	 the	
humanitarian	 literature	 where	 disasters	 coincide	 with	 post-conflict,	 which	
frequently	fails	to	differentiate	post-conflict	settings	from	other	humanitarian	
contexts,	 and	 ignores	 the	 particular	 challenges	 and	 contradictions	 of	 post-
conflict	disaster	response.	The	disaster–conflict	nexus	has	only	recently	begun	




mostly	 focused	 on	 either	 top-down	 or	 bottom-up	 relations	 among	
international,	state	and	community	actors.	But	this	research	shows	that	 it	 is	
essential	to	also	look	at	the	relations	within	the	different	actor	categories	and	
between	 different	 levels.	 The	 lack	 of	 conceptualization	 of	 the	 ‘local’	 is	 a	









whereby	 power	 relations	 are	 socially	 negotiated	 and	 relational	 conditions	
contested;	this	applies	not	only	to	the	early	post-conflict	years,	but	can	still	be	
true	many	years	later,	as	in	the	intra-state	tensions	in	Sierra	Leone.	And	it	is	











and	 state–society	 governance	 challenges,	 and	a	better	understanding	of	 the	
impact	of	their	practices	on	other	actor	relations.		
To	 inform	 policies	 and	 practices,	 I	 have	 sought	 to	 engage	 with	
practitioners	and	policy-makers	throughout	the	research.	Within	the	project	
‘When	Disaster	Meets	Conflict’,	I	have	organized	(often	with	colleagues	from	
the	 team)	 discussions,	 workshops	 and	 brown-bag	 meetings	 with	 aid	
organizations	in	The	Hague,	Brussels	and	Geneva;	engaged	in	consultancies	for	
Partners	 for	 Resilience	 and	 the	 Core	 Humanitarian	 Standard	 Alliance;	 and	
supported	the	development	of	a	free	massive	online	open	course	(MOOC)	that	
is	geared	towards	practitioners	from	all	over	the	world,	based	on	our	collective	
project	 findings.	 I	 have	 translated	 the	 findings	 of	 this	 PhD	 trajectory	 into	






























































































































































































































other	 studies	 examining	 the	 disaster–conflict	 nexus.	 Previous	 studies	 have	
either	focused	on	single	cases,	some	of	which	were	conducted	in	post-conflict	
settings	 such	 as	 Mozambique	 (Artur	 &	 Hilhorst,	 2012)	 but	 where	 broader	
theorization	 is	 limited;	or	 large-N	 research	 (Brancati,	 2007;	Nel	&	Righarts,	
2008)	where	different	conflict-affected	countries	were	clustered	to	establish	
general	linkages	without	understanding	the	processes	that	underlie	them	and	















study,	 where	 relationships	 are	 explained	 and	 characteristics	 described	
(Khagram	et	 al.,	 2010,	p.	 390).	Explanations	of	 each	 case	 feed	 into	 a	wider,	








account	of	 the	 time	constraints	of	 the	 research	project.	The	selection	of	 the	











which	 helps	 to	 develop	 knowledge	 on	 the	 research	 phenomenon	 and	 to	
contribute	 to	 theory	on	 the	post-disaster	and	post-conflict	nexus	 (George	&	
Bennett,	 2005;	 Lund,	 2014).	 This	 is	 achieved	 through	 a	 more	 in-depth	
investigation	into	the	common	findings	of	the	three	cases	(see	chapter	7),	and	
by	situating	the	findings	in	relation	to	the	research	questions	(see	chapter	8).		
Although	 scenario-building	 is	 more	 commonly	 used	 as	 a	 strategic	
planning	 tool	 in	 the	 military	 or	 in	 business	 development	 to	 deal	 with	
uncertainties,	 it	 has	 also	 become	 a	 learning	 tool	 for	 development	 policy	
(Kosow	&	Gassner,	2007)	and	humanitarian	practice	(Kirshbaum,	2019).	It	is	
part	of	an	approach	called	‘Futures	Thinking’	—	to	create	an	informed	image	













Disasters	 and	 conflict	 are	 both	 dynamic	 realities	 and	 a	 certain	 degree	 of	
flexibility	was	needed	in	the	research	design.	The	cases	were	selected	in	three	
stages.	First,	a	pre-selection	took	place	in	2016,	and	a	matrix	of	post-conflict	















absence	 of	 high-intensity	 violence.	 Indexes	 used	 for	 this	 matrix	 were:	 Fragile	 States	 Index	 2015	
(http://fsi.fundforpeace.org);	World	Risk	Index	2015	(http://www.worldriskreport.org);	Global	Peace	Index	




















Angola	 2002	 Yellow	fever,	floods	 High	warning	 Medium	 2020	 Low	 1.3	




warning	 High	 2063	 Low	 47.1	
Burundi	 2000-2004	 Floods,	landslides	 Alert	 Very	high	 2323	 Low	 16.7	
Cambodia	 1991	 Floods,	storms	 High	warning	
Very	
high	 2161	 Medium	 1.3	
Chad	 2002-2007	 Drought	 High	alert	
Very	
high	 2429	 Low	 206.3	
Colombia	 2016	 Earthquakes,	floods,	landslides	
High	
warning	 Medium	 2764	 High	 58.7	











high	 2270	 Medium	 12.9	
Haiti	 1994-2004	 Earthquake		 High	alert	
Very	
high	 2066	 Low	 63	
Lebanon	 1989	 Floods,	potential	earthquake	
High	
warning	 Low	 2752	 High	 1300	
Liberia	 2003	 Ebola,	floods	 Alert	 High	 1963	 Low	 248.9	
Mali	 2015	 Floods,	drought	 Alert	 High	 2310	 Low	 119	
Mozambique	 1992,	2014	 Floods,	drought	 High	warning	 High	 1960	 Low	 15.8	
Nepal	 2006	 Earthquakes,		landslides	 Alert	 Low	 1882	 Low	 541.8	
Rwanda	 1993	 Floods,	landslides	 Alert	 High	 2420	 Low	 57.8	
Sierra	Leone	 2002	 Ebola,	floods	 Alert	 Very	high	 1864	 Low	 28.8	





High	 3269	 Low	 652.7	
Timor-Leste	 1999	 Floods,	storms,	tsunami	 Alert	 Very	high	 1897	 Medium	 2.9	
Zimbabwe	 2008	 Drought,	floods,	 High	alert	 High	 2322	 Low	 12.4	
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For	 the	 second	 stage,	 additional	 conditions	were	 defined.	 From	 the	
matrix,	potential	cases	needed	to	fulfil	a	number	of	requirements:	1)	a	political	
settlement	 (either	 officially	 or	 unofficially);	 2)	 a	 degree	 of	 ‘fragility’;	 3)	 a	
medium	to	high	risk	of	disasters;	4)	a	low	development	index;	5)	medium	to	
high	 humanitarian	 funding.	 To	 ensure	 that	 the	 countries	 could	 not	 be	





was	 to	ensure	 the	 feasibility	of	 the	research	—	which	entailed	 interviewing	
different	actors	who	were	present	during	the	response	—	and	to	avoid	new	
developments	 influencing	 the	 way	 the	 response	 was	 viewed.	 As	 the	
phenomenon	being	studied	is	the	disaster	response	in	a	post-conflict	setting,	it	
is	 both	 temporally	 and	 spatially	 bounded,	 the	 disaster	 response	 extending	
from	 the	 initial	 relief	 phase	 to	 approximately	 the	 first	 six	months	 after	 the	
disaster.		
At	 the	 start	 of	 the	 research,	 an	 exploratory	 study	was	 conducted	 in	
Burundi,	 which	 was	 considered	 a	 post-conflict	 setting	 when	 small-scale	
disasters	 unfolded	 across	 the	 country	 as	 a	 result	 of	 the	 torrential	 rains	 of	
2014/2015.	 This	 exploratory	 study	 helped	 me	 to	 further	 develop	 my	
theoretical	framework	and	to	combine	the	disaster	literature	and	post-conflict	
literature	in	a	systematic	and	applied	manner	that	did	not	formerly	exist.	I	had	
previously	 worked	 with	 a	 development-oriented	 international	 non-




Third,	 this	 being	 a	 project	 of	 analytical/explanatory,	 descriptive	
















country	 with	 a	 history	 of	 low-intensity	 conflict,	 especially	 the	 insurgency	
contesting	the	state.	Although	the	new	constitution	had	not	been	adopted	in	
2015,	 the	 country	met	 the	 requirement	 of	 having	 experienced	 at	 least	 two	
democratic	 elections	 of	 the	 constituent	 assembly.	 The	 second	 case,	 Sierra	





the	 third	 category:	 a	more	 contested	post-conflict	 country	with	a	history	of	





























a	 broad	 focus	 so	 that	 major	 themes	 could	 emerge,	 each	 case	 study	 was	






























































































































































































the	 literature	 review	and	exploratory	 study	are	presented	 in	 chapter	3.	For	
each	case	study,	an	additional	focused	literature	review	was	conducted	with	
both	academic	publications	and	grey	literature	(Lawrence,	2012).	Data	were	




interviews	 per	 type	 of	 actor	 in	 each	 country.	 I	 conducted	 the	 in-depth	
interviews	with	research	participants	who	were	involved	in	the	response	to	
the	 particular	 disaster,	 and	 whom	 I	 had	 categorized	 as	 either	 aid,	 state	 or	
societal	 actors.	 While	 the	 interviews	 were	 partially	 structured,	 they	 were	
conducted	 in	 such	 a	 way	 that	 the	 interview	 ‘flows	 conversationally	 and	
accommodates	digressions,	which	may	well	open	up	new	avenues	of	inquiry	
that	 the	 researcher	had	not	 originally	 considered’	 (Angrosino,	 2007,	 p.	 11).	
Probe-questions	allowed	for	a	conversational	approach	and	a	build-up	to	more	
sensitive	 questions.	 The	 interviews	 provided	 ‘depth,	 detail	 and	 individual	
perspectives	to	complex	events’	(Brouneus,	2011,	p.	145).		
The	 selection	 of	 the	 participants	 was	 initially	 based	 on	 the	
identification	of	aid,	state	and	societal	responders	who	were	at	the	core	of	the	
response.	The	reliefweb.int	website	provided	an	overview	of	large	responders	
and	I	 initially	searched	 for	more	 information	online.	After	 the	 first	round	of	
interviews,	a	number	of	actors	were	often	mentioned.	As	more	nuances	in	the	
type	of	responders	became	clear,	and	the	contact	networks	expanded,	more	






(INGOs),	 20	 international	 organizations	 (IOs),	 12	 non-governmental	 organizations	 (NGOs),	 seven	 private-






contrast	 them	 with	 the	 centralized	 response.	 This	 selection	 was	 based	 on	
regions	and/or	communities	that	were	most	affected	by	the	studied	disaster.		
Periods	 of	 participant	 observation	 further	 allowed	 me	 to	 become	
aware	of	the	less	overt	dynamics	between	the	research	participants.	In	Nepal,	
for	 example,	 I	 joined	 a	monitoring	 visit	 by	one	of	 the	 state	 institutions	 and	
closely	 observed	 interactions	 and	 discussed	 the	 inter-actor	 particularities.	







Focus	 group	 discussions	 were	 held,	 ranging	 from	 participatory	 to	
group	interviews,	within	the	selected	communities	of	 the	case	studies,	most	




the	 participatory	 focus	 groups,	 it	 was	 important	 to	 be	 aware	 of	 the	 power	
balance	 and	 bias	 against	me	 as	 an	 outsider,	 that	 could	 affect	 the	 degree	 to	
which	I	was	accepted.	In	each	case,	a	co-researcher	took	a	leading	role	in	the	
focus	groups	(see	below)	and	allowed	for	a	more	in-depth	discussion	to	unfold,	
both	 enabling	 and	 challenging	 participants.	 We	 were	 sensitive	 to	 power	
relations	and	tensions	and	adjusted	the	scope	and	method	of	the	focus	group	
depending	 on	 the	 context.	I	 often	 engaged	 my	 co-researcher	 in	 reflections	
about	 the	 emerging	 narratives	 to	 place	 the	 discussions	 in	 a	 larger	 context.	
When	particular	themes	emerged,	I	made	sure	to	include	an	additional	probing	













continuous	cycle	of	 action	and	reflection	 (Kindon	et	al.,	2007)	 to	 select	and	
adapt	the	tools	and	questions	to	the	specific	group.	Also,	the	techniques	and	






coding	 to	more	 theoretical	 coding	 (Braun	&	Clarke,	 2006;	Glaser	&	Strauss,	
1967).	These	codes	were	initially	based	on	the	structure	of	the	interviews	and	
were	 collaboratively	validated	by	 the	project	 team	of	 ‘When	Disaster	Meets	






was	 based	 on	 an	 understanding	 that	 data	 are	 highly	 dependent	 on	 the	
interpretations	and	framings	of	participants,	and	uncovering	how	these	frames	




After	 the	 initial	 analysis,	 validation	 sessions	 were	 held	 in-country	
where	possible.	 In	Nepal,	 I	discussed	 the	 research	with	a	group	of	 students	
(some	of	whom	work	with	the	Nepali	security	 forces	or	government)	at	 the	
Institute	of	Crisis	Management.	In	Sierra	Leone,	Prof.	Dr.	Dorothea	Hilhorst	and	
















and	 the	 safety	 of	 the	 research	 participants	 and	 facilitators	 were	 essential.	
Expectations	of	participants	needed	to	be	managed	in	a	meaningful	way,	and	
the	 co-researchers’	 role	 towards	 ensuring	 that	was	 vital.	When	 there	were	
incidents	that	indicated	that	the	research	participants’	privacy	and	anonymity	
could	 be	 violated,	 or	 tensions	 existed,	 I	 took	 steps	 to	 mitigate	 these	 or	
discontinued	that	element	of	the	research.	In	Haiti,	for	example,	I	intentionally	
limited	 the	 time	 and	 participatory	 nature	 of	 the	 focus	 groups	 due	 to	 the	
security	 context;	 I	 also	 discontinued	 two	 group	 interviews	 when	 a	 crowd	
started	gathering,	which	posed	a	risk	to	the	safety	of	the	participants,	my	co-
researcher	 and	 myself.	 The	 research	 methods	 and	 implementation	 were	
inspired	by	my	own	previous	experience	in	conflict-affected	countries	and	the	
manuals	 of	 other	 researchers	 (Hilhorst	 &	 Jansen,	 2005;	 Höglund	 &	 Öberg,	
2011;	Stallings	&	International	Research	Committee	on	Disasters,	2002;	van	
der	Haar	et	al.,	2013).		
In	 each	 of	 the	 case	 studies,	 I	 collaborated	 with	 a	 student	 or	 young	
professional	as	a	co-researcher	for	the	community-based	research.	In	Nepal,	
Prakriti	Praks	was	recommended	to	me	by	Dr.	Ram	Thapaliya,	a	professor	at	
the	 Institute	 of	 Crisis	 Management	 in	 Kathmandu.	 I	 visited	 the	 Institute,	
delivered	a	guest	lecture,	and	Dr.	Thapaliya	facilitated	access	to	government	
and	 military	 personnel	 to	 interview.	 Prakriti	 was	 a	 bachelor	 student	 at	
Tribhuvan	 University	 at	 the	 time	 and	 assisted	 the	 research	 in	 the	
Sindhupalchok	 and	 Gorkha	 districts.	 In	 Sierra	 Leone,	 one	 of	 the	 IDP	 camp	
managers	directed	me	to	Santigie	Bangura,	who	was	a	student	at	Limkokwing	
University	at	the	time;	he	himself	was	affected	by	the	landslide	and	temporarily	
living	 in	 the	 camp.	 Santigie	 facilitated	 the	 research	 in	 the	 IDP	 camps	 and	
affected	 communities	downstream	of	 the	Regent	 landslide.	 In	Haiti,	 I	was	 a	
guest	 at	 a	 community-based	 organization	 called	 Haiti	 Communitere,	 where	


















the	 affected	 communities	 that	 were	 included	 in	 the	 research.	 This	 gave	 a	
greater	 sense	 of	 distance	 from	 the	 research	 participants	 who	 saw	 us	 as	
relatively	 objective	 outsiders	 to	 local	 politics;	 in	 Nepal,	 the	 mixed	 caste	
background	of	the	co-researcher	provided	an	open	space	for	all	participants	to	
voice	 their	 views,	 and	 in	Haiti	 the	 co-researcher’s	 non-involvement	 in	 local	




level,	 and	 in	 Haiti,	 due	 to	 limited	 direct	 contacts,	 we	 relied	 more	 on	
snowballing	and	improvised	interviews.		
In	Sierra	Leone,	the	co-researcher	was	himself	heavily	affected	by	the	
disaster	 and	had	previously	been	 living	 in	one	of	 the	affected	 communities.	
Therefore,	 more	 care	 was	 needed	 in	 our	 collaboration.	 Firstly,	 because	
involvement	 in	 the	 research	 and	 interviewing	 other	 affected	 people	 could	
impact	his	own	trauma,	I	made	sure	to	speak	openly	and	regularly	about	our	
collaboration	 and	 the	 boundaries	 of	 that	 collaboration.	 The	 project	 team	
provided	support	when	I	had	questions	about	how	to	proceed.	Secondly,	his	
personal	 relationships	 (either	 directly	 or	 indirectly)	 with	 the	 research	




it	 was	 recognized	 that	 these	 relationships	 could	 also	 have	 had	 a	 negative	
impact.	However,	since	the	co-researcher	did	not	hold	a	position	of	authority,	
and	 since	 the	 interviews	were	 not	 too	 politically	 sensitive	 concerning	 local	
dynamics,	this	risk	was	mitigated.		
In	all	cases,	we	also	discussed	academic	authorship	and	the	possibility	









we	had	during	our	 time	 in	Haiti	 and	continued	online	afterwards.	Although	
most	of	writing	and	the	theoretical	discussion	was	done	by	myself,	partly	due	
to	 language	 constraints,	 Mikel	 Jean	 provided	 valuable	 contributions	 to	 the	
planning	 of	 the	 chapter	 and	 its	main	 arguments,	 the	 empirical	 section	 and	
revisions	of	the	text.	
I	 would	 further	 like	 to	 reflect	 on	 the	 impact	 of	 my	 own	 personal	
background	 and	 being	 on	 the	 research,	 the	 participants	 and	 the	 findings.	 I	
generally	 had	 good	 access	 to	 international	 actors,	 being	 a	white	woman.	 In	
Sierra	Leone,	my	access	to	state	officials	was	most	likely	increased	because	of	
my	 Dutch	 background;	 when	 I	 spoke	 to	 Sierra	 Leonean	 counterparts,	 they	




organizations,	 as	 they	 often	 operated	 below	 the	 international	 radar.	 These	
experiences	 contributed	 to	 evolving	 reflections	 on	 disaster	 research	 and	
humanitarian	action	over	time,	which	become	especially	visible	in	chapter	6	
on	Haiti	and	chapter	7	on	‘the	local’.	
Another	 consideration	 that	 I	 needed	 to	be	 aware	of	 is	 that	 research	
participants,	much	 like	 the	 researcher,	might	 have	 their	 own	 agenda	when	
speaking	to	me;	as	my	looks	are	representative	of	the	average	INGO	worker,	








held	 for	 an	 extended	 time,	with	 people	who	were	 just	 recovering	 from	 the	
disaster,	we	decided	to	provide	a	small	remuneration	for	their	time.		
	 In	some	cases,	 research	 fatigue	and	outsider	bias	was	present,	often	
quite	 entangled,	 particularly	 in	 Haiti.	 After	 a	 large-scale	 disaster	 external	
assistance	is	often	stepped	up,	which	can	be	seen	as	invasive,	and	consultants	
and	 researchers	 follow.	 Sometimes,	 this	 led	 me	 to	 feel	 I	 was	 ‘part	 of	 the	
problem’,	especially	in	places	such	as	the	epicentre	of	the	Nepal	earthquake,	
Barpak,	where	this	was	a	much-voiced	critique	of	aid	actors	and	other	external	
groups	 that	 came	 in,	 took	 photographs	 or	 information,	 and	 left	 again.	 My	
research	tried	to	find	niches	of	new	knowledge	and	reflection	of	the	research	
participants	that	allowed	space	for	participants	to	share	what	they	found	most	
important;	 this	 is	 also	 visible	 in	 each	 case	 study	 chapter.	 Acceptance	 was	
partially	gained	through	the	co-researcher	in	each	country,	through	spending	
time	 with	 the	 participants	 and	 staying	 in	 the	 villages	 and	 cities,	 grabbing	
windows	of	opportunity	and	gentle	probing	(Chakravarty,	2012).	 I	reflected	














research	 aimed	 to	 contribute	 to	 uncovering	 the	 different	 elements	 that	
characterized	disaster	governance	in	this	nexus.	However,	this	also	meant	that	
the	 research	 started	 out	 in	 a	 more	 general	 and	 broad	 sense	 to	 allow	 the	
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challenges	 and	 practices	 to	 emerge	 from	 the	 interviews	 and	 focus	 groups	
instead	 of	 guiding	 the	 responses.	 Therefore,	 the	 research	 identified	 and	
uncovered	a	variety	of	elements,	but	it	was	not	able	to	go	into	greater	depth	
for	all	of	them.		
This	 broadness	 also	 impacted	 a	 more	 gender-sensitive	 approach.	
Although	I	actively	pursued	a	gender	balance	among	the	research	participants,	




limited	 to	 the	 research	 participants	 that	 formed	 part	 of	 this	 group.	 I	
nonetheless	ensured	the	focus	groups	were	diverse	and	portrayed	a	variety	of	
opinions.		




was	 able	 to	 achieve	 more	 depth	 in	 interactions	 with	 international	







in	 this	 case?	 Although	 I	 tried	 to	 collaborate	 with	 national	 researchers	 and	
actors	 in	 each	 case	 study,	 and	 the	 focus	 of	 the	 research	 questions	 changed	
according	to	the	interactions	that	I	had,	the	research	agenda	was	mostly	set	






























































































further	 compounded	 by	 the	 socio-economic	 and	 political	 context	 of	 these	
societies	 and	 the	 engagement	 of	 a	 complex	 web	 of	 actors.	 To	 respond	 to	
disasters,	aid,	state	and	societal	actors	enter	the	humanitarian	arena,	where	
they	 manoeuvre	 in	 the	 socio-political	 space	 to	 socially	 negotiate	 power	
relations	and	gain	legitimacy	to	achieve	their	goals	by	utilizing	authoritative	
and	 material	 resources.	 Post-conflict	 settings	 such	 as	 Burundi	 present	 a	































Between	 2004	 and	 2014,	 58	 per	 cent	 of	 deaths	 from	 disasters	 occurred	 in	
countries	 listed	 in	 the	 top	 30	 of	 the	 Fragile	 States	 Index	 (Katie	 Peters	 &	
Budimir,	2016,	p.	5).	Therefore,	it	is	crucial	to	recognize	the	compounding	risk	










Disasters	 in	 conflict-affected	 countries	 add	 a	 layer	 of	 complexity	 to	















aid,	primarily	 food	aid,	and	short-term	solutions	 focusing	on	saving	 lives	(OCHA,	2011,	p.	4).	Disasters	are	






response	phase	 is	particularly	valuable.	Disaster	 response	 is	highly	political	
(Olson,	2000),	and	occurs	within	an	intricate	socio-political	context	that	affects	
the	 implementation	 of	 the	 response	 by	 different	 aid,	 state	 and	 society	
responders.	The	multitude	of	actors	 in	 the	 ‘humanitarian	arena’	 (Hilhorst	&	
Jansen,	 2010)	 use	 the	 space	 opened	 by	 the	 disaster	 to	 advance	 their	 goals,	
whether	 by	 competition	 or	 cooperation.	 Different	 actors	 deploy	 different	
discourses	 as	 a	 strategy	 in	 their	 search	 for	 resources	 and	 authority,	 and	 to	
assert	 their	power,	gain	 legitimacy	and	socially	negotiate	 the	arena’s	values	
and	structures.	Post-conflict	countries	can	prove	to	be	especially	challenging	
environments	in	this	regard.	While	the	conflict	is	assumed	to	have	been	largely	
resolved,	 the	 legacy	 of	 violent	 conflict	 and	 underlying	 conflict	 dynamics	
continues	to	have	an	impact	on	both	social	and	political	processes.		
Post-conflict	 settings	 often	 undergo	 an	 uncertain	 transition	 that	 is	
characterized	by	continuous	political	and	societal	changes,	while	relationships	
are	still	 rooted	 in	 their	conflict	history.	However,	existing	disaster	response	
frameworks	 do	 not	 distinguish	 between	 different	 governance	 contexts	 and	
therefore	 risk	 increasing	 tensions	 between	 response	 actors.	 This	 chapter	
presents	a	literature	review,	illustrated	with	findings	from	initial	fieldwork	in	
Burundi,	on	disaster	response	in	post-conflict	societies.	The	transitional	nature	
of	 the	 state	 and	 the	 fragility	 of	 governance	 in	 these	 settings	 pose	 specific	
challenges	in	the	context	of	disaster	response	by	a	range	of	actors.	
This	chapter	explores	the	role	of	aid,	state	and	societal	actors13	who	
manoeuvre	 in	 the	 humanitarian	 arena,	 and	 identifies	 several	 challenges	 to	
disaster	 response	 in	 post-conflict	 settings.	 These	 challenges	 call	 for	 a	 new	
















This	 chapter	 is	 based	 on	 a	 literature	 review	 of	 peer-reviewed	 articles	 and	
books	 from	 the	 humanitarian	 aid,	 disaster	 response	 and	 (post-)conflict	
literatures.	 It	 further	 includes	 reports	 from	 humanitarian	 agencies	 and	
knowledge	 institutes	 focusing	 on	 humanitarian	 aid.	 The	 chapter	 combines	
literature	and	data	collected	until	December	2016,	using	primarily	WorldCat,	
Google	Scholar,	Scopus	and	sEURch.14		
In	 addition	 to	 the	 literature	 review,	 a	 three-week	 pilot	 study	 was	
conducted	 in	 Burundi	 in	 August	 2016,	 as	 an	 analytical	 application	 and	
illustration	of	the	framework	discussed	above.	This	was	needed	since	there	is	






(international	 non-governmental	 organizations),	 NGOs	 (national	 non-
governmental	 organizations),	 national,	 regional	 and	 local	 humanitarian	
agencies,	relevant	national,	regional	and	local	state	representatives,	religious	
institutions,	 affected	 communities	 and	 representatives	 of	 IDP	 (internally	
displaced	persons)	 camps.	These	 semi-structured	 interviews	 included	open-
ended	questions	on	the	organization	of	the	response,	coordination	with	other	
actors	and	the	main	challenges	encountered.		
The	 interviews	 focused	 on	 the	 response	 to	 the	
2014	 flood	 in	 Bujumbura	 and	 the	 2015	 floods	 in	
Rumonge	and	Bujumbura.	Data	were	analysed	with	




















Although	 disasters	 in	 conflict-affected	 countries	 are	 strongly	 linked	 to	
vulnerabilities,	the	main	policy	frameworks	do	not	include	a	direct	relation	to	
the	(post-)conflict	context.	The	disaster	management	cycle	is	an	organizational	
















with	 conflict	 compounding	 the	 effects	 of	 disasters,	 leaving	 people	 more	
vulnerable	 to	 hazards	 and	 weakening	 institutional	 response	 capacities	
(Wisner	et	al.,	2012).	Nel	and	Righarts	(2008)	found	that	disasters,	especially	
those	 caused	 by	 rapid-onset	 hazards	 in	 low-	 and	middle-income	 countries,	
significantly	increase	the	risks	of	recurring	civil	conflict.	A	history	of	conflict	
also	leaves	tears	in	the	societal	fabric	and	mutual	mistrust,	which	negatively	














contexts,	 each	 with	 a	 specific	 interpretation	 of	 its	 characteristics	 (Bankoff,	
2001;	Brauch,	2005;	Hilhorst	et	al.,	2004;	van	Voorst,	2016;	Wisner,	2016).	In	
this	 chapter,	 vulnerability	 is	 seen	 as	 a	 socio-political	 concept	 in	 relation	 to	
natural	 hazards.	 Factors	 influencing	 vulnerability	 are	 often	 related	 to	 the	




gender	 strongly	 affect	 the	 vulnerability	 of	 disaster-affected	 groups	
(Ariyabandu	&	Fonseka,	2009).	As	Wisner	et	al.	(2012,	p.	27)	show,	root	causes	
linked	 to	 political,	 economic	 and	 social	 structures,	 including	 gender	





three	 dimensions:	 human	 ecology	 (the	 environmental	 risk	 in	 relation	 to	
people’s	 resources),	 social	 entitlements	 (and	 the	 way	 they	 are	 secured,	 or	
expanded),	 and	 the	 structural	 characteristics	 of	 the	 macro-structure	 of	
political	economy	in	which	the	first	and	second	dimensions	are	situated	(Bohle	




reproduced	 by	 external	 actors	 in	 the	 present.	 In	 post-conflict	 settings,	





at	 risk	 of	 disasters;	 however,	 the	 concept	 of	 resilience	 has	 become	 a	
meaningless	 buzzword	 in	 both	 the	 disaster	 and	 humanitarian	 sectors.	 The	





which	 emphasizes	 victimhood	 and	 needs.	 However,	 as	 Paton	 (2006,	 p.	 7)	
argues,	 'bouncing	 back'	 does	 not	 reflect	 the	 reality	 of	 a	 disaster,	 where	




different	 social	 groups.	 In	 post-conflict	 societies,	 where	 inequalities	 and	
marginalization	 are	 often	 widespread,	 bouncing	 back	 would	 legitimize	
unequal	 pre-conditions.	 Therefore,	 a	more	 transformative	 interpretation	 of	
resilience	is	necessary.	
The	aspiration	to	‘build	back	better’	has	been	an	attempt	to	better	link	
relief,	 rehabilitation	 and	 development,	 and	 address	 the	 root	 causes	 of	
inequalities	and	marginalization.	Disaster	response	does	not	just	require	quick	
recovery	efforts,	but	improvements	to	the	previous	state.	However,	different	
actors	 have	 their	 own	 interest	 agendas,	 questioning	whose	 ‘better’	 is	 being	
built	 (Fan,	2013).	On	a	 local	 level,	 strengthening	 capacities	 and	 focusing	on	






On	 a	 more	 relational	 level,	 'strengthening	 capacity'	 requires	
addressing	 the	 social,	 political	 and	 economic	 root	 causes	 of	 vulnerability,	
which	can	be	challenging,	not	only	 for	 the	states	which	are	signatory	 to	 the	
Sendai	Framework,	but	also	for	humanitarian	agencies	in	post-conflict	settings	
as	 they	 aim	 to	 stay	 neutral	 and	 impartial	 as	 part	 of	 their	 humanitarian	
principles.	The	IFRC	(2016)	recognizes	that	addressing	resilience	in	conflict-
affected	settings	goes	against	the	humanitarian	principles	of	impartiality	and	
neutrality.	 In	a	post-conflict	setting,	 the	question	arises	as	 to	whether	 these	




the	 importance	 of	 a	 more	 holistic	 approach.	 The	 social	 construction	 of	
disasters	and	multi-actor	practices	during	the	pre-disaster,	trans-disaster	and	
The	fragile	state	of	disaster	response	 43	
post-disaster	 periods,	 requires	 an	 integrative	 and	 collaborative	 governance	
approach.	 Different	 norms	 and	 frameworks	 are	 socially	 negotiated	 across	
global	 and	 local	 scales	 and	 guide	 the	 practices	 of	 both	 state	 and	 non-state	
actors	 in	 reducing	 the	 impact	 of	 disasters	 (Tierney,	 2012).	 The	 actor	
constellations	and	relationships	in	disaster	governance	are	highly	dependent	






peaceful	 period.	 However,	 this	 assumption	 is	 contradicted	 by	 the	 reality	 of	
most	post-conflict	societies,	where	tensions	and	even	violence	continue.	Since	




Secretary	 General	 Boutros	 Boutros-Ghali	 in	 1992	 in	 An	 Agenda	 for	 Peace.	
Boutros-Ghali	 defined	post-conflict	 peace-building	 as	 ‘action	 to	 identify	 and	
support	structures	which	will	tend	to	strengthen	and	solidify	peace	in	order	to	
avoid	a	relapse	into	conflict’	(Boutros-Ghali,	1992,	para.	21).	At	the	request	of	
the	 Security	 Council,	 Boutros-Ghali	 presented	 recommendations	 on	 how	 to	























in	 emergency	 response	 after	 a	 disaster.	However,	 these	 armed	 actors	were	
usually	involved	in	the	conflict,	affecting	the	trust	between	them	and	disaster-
affected	communities.	This	problematizes	their	involvement	in	the	response.		
After	 a	 conflict,	 different	 state	 and	 non-state	 actors	 shape	 the	
formation	 of	 the	 state.	 As	 governance	 systems	 and	 other	 pre-conflict	
conditions	were	 themselves	among	 the	drivers	of	 the	conflict	and	 ‘fragility’,	
reconstruction	 often	 includes	 reforms	 and	 the	 redistribution	 of	 rights	 and	
entitlements,	promoting	an	agenda	of	change	(Brinkerhoff,	2005).	Much	of	the	
external	 reconstruction	 effort	 centres	 around	 the	 state,	 which	 has	 strong	
implications	for	the	scope	and	type	of	interventions,	where	the	emphasis	is	on	
statebuilding	 to	 prevent	 a	 ‘relapse’	 and	 build	 stronger	 and	 more	 effective	
governance	 institutions	 to	 provide	 services	 and	 protection	 to	 citizens.	




The	 state	 is	 often	 seen	 in	 a	 centralized	 way	 along	 the	 lines	 of	 the	
Weberian	notion	of	the	state,	which	has	a	monopoly	on	the	use	of	legitimate	
physical	force	in	a	defined	territory	(Weber,	1978,	p.	164).	However,	in	many	







fragile	 states.	 In	 its	 original	 usage,	 fragile	 states	 denoted	 a	 threat	 to	
international	 security	and	regional	 stability,	making	 them	a	priority	 in	both	












these	 capacities	 (Putzel,	 2010,	 p.	 2).	 Brinkerhoff	 (2016)	 underlines	 the	
importance	 of	 recognizing	 the	multidimensional	 character	 of	 fragile	 states,	
that	states	are	not	uniformly	fragile	but	can	have	stronger	and	weaker	aspects,	
and	 that	 both	 structural	 conditions	 and	 agency	 influence	 fragility.	 State	
institutions	often	 continue	 to	operate,	 in	 one	 form	or	 the	other,	 in	 times	of	
crises	and	‘significant	pockets	of	capacity’	remain	functional	(Brahimi,	2007,	p.	
16).	This	also	adds	a	temporal	dimension	to	the	fragility,	which	could	increase	
and	decrease	 in	 certain	periods.	To	determine	 the	extent	of	 fragility,	Rocha	
Manocal	(2013)	identifies	capacity,	authority	and	legitimacy	as	the	three	key	
dimensions	of	the	state	and	argues	that	‘fragile	states’	often	have	weaknesses	
in	one	or	more	dimensions	 (Rocha	Monocal,	 2013,	p.	 389).	Call	 (2011)	 and	
Brinkerhoff	 (2016)	 identify	 similar	 ‘gaps’.	 In	 disaster	 response,	 some	 state	
institutions	might	be	more	capable	and	resourceful	than	others.	Furthermore,	
certain	institutions	could	use	the	response	itself	to	strengthen	their	capacity	
through	 the	 influx	 of	 aid	 and	 their	 authority	 and	 legitimacy	 by	 providing	
assistance	to	the	disaster	response.		
As	 these	 dimensions	 are	 relational,	 in	 disaster	 response	 they	 are	
affected	by	the	relationship	between	state,	aid	and	society.	The	complexity	and	
degrees	 of	 fragility	within	 a	 post-conflict	 state	 pose	 a	 challenge	 to	 disaster	
response.	Weaknesses	in	different	state	institutions,	and	their	development	in	
the	transitional	period,	affect	both	their	capacity	to	respond	and	the	strategies	
that	 other	 actors	 adopt	 to	 deal	 with	 them,	 often	 seen	 in	 the	 degree	 of	
collaboration	or	competition	with	the	state	in	the	humanitarian	arena.		
Another	challenge	in	disaster	response	in	post-conflict	states	is	that	the	
state	 is	 not	 a	 uniform	 entity,	 but	 rather	 a	 composition	 of	 state	 institutions,	








interdependency	 in	 complex	 organizational	 forms	 (Colebatch,	 2014).21	
Nevertheless,	 the	 concepts	 of	 state	 and	 political	 hybridity	 are	 analytically	
useful,	 as	 they	 show	 the	 power	 dynamics	 between	 different	 actors	 and	 the	













without	 collaboration,	 and	 pursuing	 their	 own	 and	 common	 goals	 and	
interests.		
When	a	disaster	strikes,	the	responsibility	of	the	state	to	respond	is	a	
core	 tenet	 of	 the	 DRR	 frameworks.	 In	 a	 context	 of	 transition,	 where	
statebuilding	 is	 ongoing	 in	 an	 atmosphere	 of	 distrust,	 this	 poses	 major	
challenges.	 One	 of	 the	 dynamics	 in	 this	 situation	 is	 that	 pre-existing	 aid	
relationships	with	the	state	come	into	play,	affecting	the	way	and	the	extent	to	
which	humanitarian	actors	cooperate	and	support	the	state	in	the	response.		
This	 relationship	 between	 the	 post-conflict	 state	 and	 humanitarian	
actors	is	partly	shaped	by	the	peace	process.	Peace	agreements	and	political	
settlements,22	or	the	process	towards	them,	are	seen	as	the	starting	points	of	





















the	 consolidation	 of	 peace	 (see	 Barnett	 et	 al.,	 2014;	 Boyce,	 2002;	 Frerks	&	
Klem,	 2006),	 but	 the	 pressure	 of	 ‘deadline	 diplomacy’	 and	 the	 threat	 of	






responsible	 for	 governance	 reforms,	 with	 a	 supporting	 role	 for	 the	
international	agencies	(Brinkerhoff,	2005;	Chandler,	2013).	Local	actors	have	
the	power	 to	 resist,	disregard	or	adjust	 the	peace	processes	and	 to	present	
alternative	forms	of	peace	(Mac	Ginty,	2010).	It	is	important	to	realize	that	the	







actors	 respond	 to	 a	 disaster	 and,	 in	 turn,	 the	 response	 itself	 impacts	 these	
dynamics.	 Vulnerability	 is	 often	 reproduced	 by	 the	 disaster,	 with	 the	
increasing	 needs	 of	 marginalized	 communities	 and	 unsuccessful	 recovery	










are	 strengthened.	 Grievances	 can	 also	 be	 increased	 by	 a	weak	 government	
response	(Drury	&	Olson,	1998;	Gawronski	&	Olson,	2013).		
The	ways	 in	which	these	different	 factors	play	out	 is	affected	by	the	
understanding	and	narratives	that	different	actors	weave	around	them.	These	
narratives	 will	 impact	 both	 response	 implementation	 and	 the	 relations	












As	 a	 system,	 a	 network	 of	 complementary	 parts	 consisting	 of	 UN	
agencies,	 INGOs,	 NGOs,	 donors	 and	 other	 (local)	 actors	 functions	 by	 the	
guidance	 of	 an	 internal	 logic	 of	 principles,	 standards,	 norms,	 values	 and	
interests	 (ALNAP,	 2015).	 Although	 there	 is	 a	 type	 of	 systems	 logic	 to	
humanitarian	assistance,	 in	practice	this	 'systems	 logic'	 is	questionable.	The	
complementarity	of	agencies,	including	coordination	mechanisms,	falls	short.	
Values,	given	the	variety	of	local	and	international	actors	and	donors,	are	often	
at	 odds	 with	 each	 other,	 particularly	 in	 post-conflict	 settings,	 where	 the	
transitional	 period	 signifies	 profound	 changes	 in	 policies	 and	 standards	
guiding	the	response	on	both	national	and	local	levels.		












down	 structure.	 It	 ignores	 the	many	ways	 in	which	 aid	 gets	 translated	 and	




large	 influx	 of	 aid	 and	 organizations	 often	 poses	 a	 serious	 challenge	 to	
coordination	and	control.	Moreover,	there	is	often	no	central	governance	and	
organizations	 are	 self-regulating,	 creating	 a	 ‘network-based	 governance’	 in	
practice,	without	an	overarching	‘empire’	(ODI-HPG,	2016,	p.	62).		
Neither	 the	 system	 nor	 the	 empire	 perspective	 give	 sufficient	
consideration	 to	 the	 complexity	 of	 changing	 relations	 and	 (post-conflict)	
contexts,	or	to	the	reflexivity	of	the	actors	involved.	Humanitarian	governance	
can	be	better	understood	as	an	arena.	This	concept	brings	out	that	multiple	




determined	 solely	 by	 humanitarian	 agencies;	 rather	 all	 actors	 shape	
humanitarian	 action.	 Power,	 in	 this	 theoretical	 approach,	 is	 given	 and	
performed	 by	 the	 actors	 involved,	 legitimizing	 their	 response.	 Without	
denying	 the	 importance	of	power	 inequalities,	where	especially	 local	 actors	
face	 barriers	 when	 it	 comes	 to	 financing	 and	 partnerships,	 this	 approach	
emphasizes	that	all	actors	manoeuvre	in	the	arena.		
The	arena	perspective	on	humanitarian	governance	also	dovetails	with	
developments	 in	 humanitarian	practice,	which	 is	 slowly	moving	 away	 from	
classical	 humanitarianism	 towards	 resilience	 humanitarianism	 following	
global	changes	(Dijkzeul	&	Sandvik,	2019;	Hilhorst,	2018).	The	exceptionality	
of	 the	 humanitarian	 mandate	 with	 its	 international	 gaze	 and	 paternalistic	
approach	 are	 increasingly	 questioned	 (Barnett,	 2017).	 The	 World	
Humanitarian	Summit	in	2016	came	at	a	pivotal	point	in	time,	and	generated	
various	commitments,	such	as	The	Grand	Bargain,	which	promised	changes	to	
address	 these	 critiques	 and	 culminated	 in	 a	 localization	 agenda	 for	
 






humanitarian	 aid.	The	Grand	Bargain	 reiterated	 ‘the	need	 to	work	 together	
efficiently,	 transparently	and	harmoniously	with	new	and	existing	partners,	




Grand	 Bargain,	 2016,	 p.	 1)	 to	 include	 affected	 people	 in	 decision-making	
processes.	 This	 inclusion	 of	 local	 and	 national	 actors	 in	 humanitarian	
governance	is	particularly	important	for	post-conflict	settings,	where	a	long-
term	governance	approach	 is	 taken.	However,	 this	 ‘shift’	 in	power	has	been	




In	 the	 humanitarian	 arena,	 humanitarian,	 state	 and	 societal	 actors25	 have	
various	claims	to	legitimacy,	capacity	and	authority	to	respond	to	disasters.	In	
humanitarian	 assistance	 for	 disaster	 response,	 international	 law,	 tools	 and	
standards	 are	 important	 to	 gain	 access	 to	 an	 area	 and	 distribute	 aid	
effectively.26	However,	actors	also	need	to	have	the	power	to	do	so.	Disaster	
response	in	post-conflict	contexts	is	defined	by	the	interrelations	between	the	
different	 responders	 and	 the	 way	 in	 which	 they	 exert	 their	 power	 to	
manoeuvre	in	the	arena	and	legitimize	their	actions.	
Often,	 power	 is	 understood	 in	 the	Weberian	 sense	 of	 coercion	 and	
authority	 (Weber,	 1978).	 However,	 power	 is	 complex,	 interrelational	 and	
performed	 in	 discourses,	 actions	 and	 resistance,	 and	 strengthened	 by	 both	





often	 problematic	 to	 identify	 them	 as	 separate	 entities	 in	 practice.	 However,	 as	 DRR	 roles	 are	 generally	
different	 for	 aid	 agencies,	 states	 and	 societal	 actors,	 this	 distinction	 is	 upheld	 to	 facilitate	 analyses	 of	 the	
processes	within	and	relations	between	different	groups	of	actors	in	the	humanitarian	arena.	
26	While	international	humanitarian	law	is	applicable	to	armed	conflict	and	occupation,	disaster	response	does	
not	 have	 an	 overarching	 legal	 framework.	 Instead,	 it	 relies	 on	 various	 multilateral	 treaties,	 resolutions,	
declarations,	guidelines	and	bilateral	agreements	as	instruments,	known	as	‘international	disaster	response	
laws,	 rules	 and	principles’	 (IDRL)	 (IFRC,	 2007,	 p.	 15).	 In	 practice,	much	depends	 on	 the	 individual	 state’s	






outcomes.	 Its	 embeddedness	 in	 social	 relations	 also	 means	 that	 power	
relations	between	actors	are	co-constitutive	and	reinforced	through	practices.	
As	 Giddens	 (1984)	 argues,	 people	 construct	 their	 social	 reality.	 Structural	
power	 relations,	 in	 this	 sense,	 are	 not	 unchangeable,	 but	 they	 are	 often	
internalized	 and	 reproduced	 through	 discourses	 and	 institutions	 (Berger	&	
Luckmann,	1991).	
Aid,	state	and	society	actors	are	both	autonomous	and	dependent	on	




a	 ‘space	 for	 negotiation	 on	 the	 values	 and	 structures	 of	 society’	 is	 opened	
(Pelling	&	Dill,	2010,	p.	27).	Aid,	state	and	societal	actors	renegotiate	within	
this	 vacuum,	 and	 power	 can	 be	 redistributed.	 In	 post-conflict	 settings,	 the	
political	stakes	may	be	more	complex	and	often	higher,	as	this	space	for	social	
negotiation	 coincides	 with	 and	 affects	 the	 ongoing	 reshaping	 of	 power	






Humanitarian	 agencies	 also	 rely	 on	 their	 material	 resources	 to	 provide	
humanitarian	 assistance.	 The	 extent	 to	 which	 the	 state	 is	 autonomous	 or	
dependent	on	another	actor	for	control	over	services	indicates	its	capacity	and	
level	of	power	in	the	arena.	All	the	actors	can	influence	the	resources	of	others.	




aid.	 And	 as	 Hilhorst	 and	 Jansen	 (2010)	 have	 shown,	 local	 authorities	 and	
affected	 populations	 can	 also	 strengthen	 their	 material	 resources	 by	
manoeuvring	within	the	humanitarian	arena.	They	can,	 for	example,	control	
the	list	of	beneficiaries	and	‘define’	the	rules	of	aid	allocation.	They	can	block	






Authority	 is	 another	 resource	 that	 actors	 use	 to	 manoeuvre	 in	 the	
humanitarian	 arena.	 Authoritative	 resources	 in	 relation	 to	 the	 state	 can	 be	
seen	as	the	security	and	‘the	extent	to	which	the	state	controls	its	territory	and	
national	law	is	recognized’	(Rocha	Monocal,	2013,	p.	389).	These	resources	are	




to	 negotiate	 safe	 access	 for	 humanitarian	 assistance,	 while	 societal	 actors	
exercise	control	over	different	social	groups,	by	controlling	who	interacts	and	
negotiates	with	humanitarian	agencies	and	the	state	after	a	disaster.	They	hold	




who	have	 access	 to	 information	while	 others	 are	 restricted	 also	have	more	
control	over	the	type	of	information	that	is	shared.		
With	authoritative	and	material	resources,	actors	can	manoeuvre	and	











pertain	 to	 the	 state,	 but	 also	 to	 other	 organizations,	 institutions	or	 entities.	
Lamb	(2014)	emphasizes	that	not	only	the	entity	of	perceived	legitimacy,	or	






legitimacy	 appropriately,	 depending	 on	 the	 legitimacy	 which	 the	 entity	
attributes	to	the	referee.	A	state	or	humanitarian	agency	might	act	differently	
towards	one	societal	group	than	another.	Humanitarian	agencies	often	grant	






case	 study	 of	 Burundi,	 a	 country	 recovering	 from	 a	 civil	 war	 that	 formally	
ended	in	2005	when	Pierre	Nkurunziza	was	sworn	in	as	president.27	Burundi	
has	also	been	affected	by	different	types	of	disasters	and	is	considered	to	be	a	




floods,	 landslides,	 torrential	 rains	 and	 earthquakes.	 On	 9	 February	 2014,	
torrential	 rains	 caused	 flooding,	 mud-	 and	 landslides	 in	 five	 communes	
(districts)	 in	 the	 capital	 of	 Bujumbura,	 killing	 64	 people	 and	 leaving	 an	



















people;	 3)	 coordinating	 the	 response;	 and	 4)	 ensuring	 a	 conducive	 legal	
environment	(Harvey	et	al.,	2009,	p.	6).	These	roles	are	part	of	the	rules	of	the	
game	within	 the	 humanitarian	 arena,	 but	 the	 way	 they	 are	 given	 shape	 in	
practice	 can	 be	 contested	 by	 the	 different	 actors,	 particularly	 in	 conflict-
affected	 countries	 such	 as	 Burundi.	 In	 each	 of	 these	 roles,	 material	 and	
authoritative	 resources,	 and	 the	way	 in	which	 the	different	actors	use	 their	





November	 2015	 Rumonge	 floods,	 there	 was	 no	 emergency	 appeal	 for	 the	
floods	of	29	March	2015	in	Gitaza,	Muhuta;29	instead,	the	president	called	for	
national	 solidarity	 and	 for	 the	 communities	 to	 help	 each	other.30	 The	 likely	
reason	for	this	difference	is	that	the	state	did	not	want	foreign	interventions	in	
the	 highly	 politicized	 pre-election	 period	 (INGO3,	 30	 August	 2016)31,	 with	
contested	elections	held	in	July	that	year.32	
Whether	 an	 emergency	 is	 declared	 and	 an	 appeal	 is	 made	 directly	
affects	 aid	 actors’	material	 and	 authoritative	 resources	 to	 respond	 in	 post-
conflict	settings.	With	the	post-conflict	statebuilding	and	governance	agenda,	
humanitarian	 agencies	will	 find	 it	 difficult	 to	 justify	 assistance	without	 the	
state’s	request.	Resource	mobilization	and	room	for	control	of	the	response	are	
thereby	 limited.	 While	 the	 post-conflict	 agenda	 increases	 the	 authoritative	
resources	of	the	state	in	terms	of	control	over	other	actors,	it	does	not	directly	
benefit	the	state’s	material	resources	and	capacity	to	provide	assistance.	Still,	




29	Previously	part	of	Bujumbura	Rural,	but	became	officially	part	of	Rumonge	after	 the	creation	of	 the	 latter	
province	on	26	March	2015.	
30	 See:	 <http://www.iwacu-burundi.org/gitaza-le-president-nkurunziza-en-appelle-a-la-solidarite-nationale-






















How	 the	 second	 role	 of	 the	 state	 —	 to	 provide	 assistance	 and	
protection	 —	 is	 translated	 into	 practice	 exposes	 the	 evolving	 relations	
between	the	actors	and	their	 levels	of	 legitimacy	in	the	humanitarian	arena.	
The	 state	 does	 not	 always	 have	 the	 capacity	 and	 resources	 to	 respond;	
furthermore,	the	state	is	often	partisan	in	the	conflict	or	responsible	for	social	
inequalities,	 complicating	 the	 principle	 of	 equal	 protection.	 The	 relations	
between	 state,	 aid	 and	 society	 actors	 often	 crystallize	 in	 the	 way	 they	
cooperate	 to	 provide	 assistance,	 using	 their	 different	 material	 and	
authoritative	resources	to	legitimize	their	actions	and	themselves.		
Societal	 actors	 are	 the	 first	 responders	 after	 a	 disaster.	 After	 the	
Bujumbura	floods,	the	affected	people	were	assisted	by	neighbours	and	family	
members	who	provided	clothes	and	 food,	 the	 local	 churches	and	youth	and	
women	groups,	 followed	by	 the	Burundi	Red	Cross	 (SOC4,	25	August	2016;	
FGD	2,	29	August	2016).	Afterwards,	other	community	and	private	initiatives	
were	 organized	 around	 the	 country	 and	 donations	 sent	 to	 Bujumbura.	
However,	 beneficiaries	 of	 aid	 are	 often	 only	 seen	 either	 as	 victims	 and	
vulnerable	people,	or	as	people	who	want	to	profit	from	the	system.		
In	the	humanitarian	arena,	affected	communities	actively	seek	survival	
and	 co-shape	 the	 realities	 of	 aid	delivery,	 even	 if	 their	manoeuvring	power	
might	 be	 limited	 by	 the	 lack	 of	 resources	 or	 organization.	 As	 Hilhorst	 and	
Jansen	(2010)	note,	beneficiaries	actively	seek	out	aid	and	strategize	to	acquire	
it.	They	see	‘the	humanitarian	encounter	as	an	interface	where	aid	providers	
and	 aid-seekers	meet	 each	 other’	 (Hilhorst	 &	 Jansen,	 2010,	 p.	 1122).	 Even	




agency	which	Mats	Utas	 (2005)	calls	 ‘victimcy’.	People	socially	navigate	 the	
humanitarian	arena	by	representing	themselves	in	such	a	way	to	actively	claim	
aid,	using	 their	agency	contextually	 to	 foreground	or	background	aspects	of	
their	 identities	 which	 they	 consider	 most	 appropriate	 or	 effective	 for	 that	
specific	situation,	gaining	legitimacy	as	being	‘worthy	of	support’.	This	can	take	
the	 form	 of	 foregrounding	 ‘vulnerability’	 or	 ‘identity’,	 increasing	 access	 to	
goods	 and	 services	 and	 engaging	 in	 a	 type	of	 ‘forum	 shopping’.	 In	Burundi,	
people	 from	neighbouring	 communities	 presented	 themselves	 as	 victims	 to	
different	 organizations	 in	 order	 to	 access	 aid.	 A	 local	 government	 official	
acknowledged	this	practice	and	accepted	that	all	Burundians	are	vulnerable,	
so	when	 a	 non-affected	 person	 asked	 for	 aid	 during	 the	 distributions,	 they	
would	also	receive	it	(SOC4,	25	August	2016;	GOV2,	22	August	2016).	
State	 institutions	 are	 not	 always	 included	 in	 the	 response	 by	 aid	
agencies.	During	the	civil	war	in	Burundi,	humanitarian	aid	often	bypassed	the	
state	and	depended	on	local	authorities,	who	frequently	took	advantage	of	the	
supplied	 aid,	 weakening	 local	 governance	 and	 consequently	 reinforcing	
patrimonial	systems	(Uvin,	2008).	After	the	flood	of	2014,	local	leaders	were	









Platform	 or	 the	 Burundian	 Croix	 Rouge.	 These	 organizations	 preferred	 to	
distribute	aid	without	cooperating	with	others,	out	of	fear	of	corruption	(SOC4,	
25	August	2016).	Direct	implementation	is	used	as	a	strategy	by	agencies	to	
deal	 with	 the	 lack	 of	 trust	 in	 the	 state	 institutions	 and	 the	 complexity	 of	
institutional	multiplicity	at	the	local	level,	where	different	local	leaders	have	
varying	 relations	 with	 the	 communities.	 Some	 larger	 INGOs	 therefore	








Rouge	 as	 a	 medium	 defied	 the	 state’s	 request.	 The	 majority	 of	 research	
participants	 (both	 organizations	 and	 community	 members)	 expressed	 the	
belief	that	they	could	not	trust	the	Platform	or	the	Croix	Rouge.	This	affected	
both	the	legitimacy	of	the	Croix	Rouge	and	the	government,	as	they	were	not	
considered	 ‘worthy	 of	 support’,	 strengthening	 agencies’	 authority	 over	 the	
response	and	guarding	material	resources.		
Communication	and	information	are	both	an	essential	and	challenging	
part	 of	 disaster	 response.	 They	 directly	 relate	 to	 power	 relations,	 as	
information,	or	the	withholding	thereof,	can	be	a	way	to	control	both	people	
and	material	resources	and	to	include	or	exclude	groups	from	formal	decision-





roles	 are	 not	 always	 clear;	 even	 when	 IGEBU	 has	 information	 about	 an	
impending	hazard,	they	can	only	share	this	information	with	the	state,	which	
has	 the	 responsibility	 to	 act.	 If	 the	 state	 does	 not	 communicate	 this	
information,	warning	becomes	problematic.	
Most	humanitarian	agencies	produce	strong	discourses	on	beneficiary	
accountability.	 In	 practice,	 however,	 beneficiary	 accountability	 is	 often	
challenging,	 and	 gaps	 in	 quality	 information,	 communication	 flows,	 and	 the	




‘responsibility’,	 by	 taking	 ownership	 of	 successes	 and	 failures	 (Serventy,	
2015).	 However,	 as	 Hilhorst	 (2015)	 argues,	 patronizing	 forms	 of	












actors	 themselves.	 Especially	 in	 conflict	 settings,	 the	 way	 in	 which	
participation	is	practised	has	exposed	challenges,	such	as	the	reproduction	of	
existing	 power	 inequalities,	 participants	 who	 do	 not	 have	 a	 real	 voice	 or	




communication	 between	 the	 aid	 agencies	 and	 the	 communities.	 The	 main	
feature	 of	 this	 is	 the	 complaints	 mechanism,	 either	 through	 phone	
communication	 lines,	 suggestion	boxes	 or	 directly	with	 staff	 in	 the	 affected	

















by	 the	World	Food	Programme	 (WFP),	 even	 though	 they	 are	dependent	on	
them	 (FGD3,	 24	 August	 2016;	 FGD4,	 26	 August	 2016).	 As	 humanitarian	
agencies	 try	 to	collaborate	with	 local	structures	such	as	 the	 local	 leaders	as	
focal	 points	 for	 information,	 this	 selective	 information-sharing	 risks	
reproducing	local	inequalities	by	giving	more	resources	to	leaders	who	receive	
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Disaster	 Management,	 which	 falls	 under	 the	 responsibility	 of	 the	 Civil	
Protection	Agency,	and	is	chaired	by	the	Director-General	of	Civil	Protection,	
under	the	Ministry	of	Interior	and	Public	Security.	But	the	ministries	do	not	
have	 autonomy	 over	 their	 own	 funds.	 While	 disasters	 often	 weaken	 state	
capacity,	 they	 further	 increase	 the	 demands	 placed	 on	 the	 state’s	 limited	
resources	(International	Alert,	2015).	To	gain	material	resources,	the	state	is	




important	 part	 of	 the	 reconstruction	 endeavour.	 However,	 humanitarian	
agencies	 do	 not	 always	 fully	 cooperate	 and	 coordinate	 with	 the	 state,	
particularly	if	the	state	is	seen	as	fragile.	In	Burundi,	communities	and	agencies	
expressed	 their	 mistrust	 of	 the	 state	 and	 its	 institutions.	 Humanitarians	
actively	manoeuvre	in	the	humanitarian	arena.	As	Hilhorst	and	Jansen	(2012,	














a	 strategy	 to	 gain	 more	 authoritative	 resources	 through	 coordination.	
Although	the	National	Platform	for	Disaster	Management,	chaired	by	the	head	
of	 the	 Civil	 Protection	 Agency,	 is	 responsible	 for	 inter-agency	 coordination	
together	 with	 the	 line	 ministries	 and	 related	 UN	 agencies,	 the	 UN	 has	
attempted	to	 take	more	of	a	 lead,	as	 they	 felt	 the	government	was	trying	to	
keep	 too	much	 control	 over	 the	 platform,	 despite	 lacking	 the	 resources	 to	
coordinate	and	implement	interventions.	Exercising	their	‘ignorancy’	by	telling	
the	 government	 that	 the	 state	 authorities	 were	 probably	 too	 busy,	 the	 UN	
agencies	gained	more	authority	as	they	were	allowed	to	coordinate	the	sector	
meetings	 with	 the	 ministries	 attending;	 the	 sector	 meetings	 are	 where	
decisions	 are	 made,	 while	 the	 Platform	 meetings	 are	 used	 to	 exchange	
information	(IO2,	27	August	2016).	
Burundi’s	 post-conflict	 state	 and	 its	 relation	 to	 aid	 actors	 and	 the	
affected	 communities	 must	 be	 understood	 through	 its	 conflict	 and	 peace	
history.	As	discussed	above,	the	conflict	period	and	the	peace	process	have	an	






















additional	 premium	 they	 receive.	 After	 political	 changes,	 these	 staff	 are	
exchanged,	which	does	not	benefit	human	resources	(NGO1,	17	August	2016).	
On	 a	 local	 level,	 government	 staff	 of	 technical	 institutions,	 such	 as	 the	
Provincial	 Department	 of	 Agriculture	 and	 Livestock	 (DPAE),	 also	 change	









Platform	 was	 not	 active	 at	 the	 time	 of	 the	 2014	 floods	 in	 Bujumbura.	
Furthermore,	 the	 lack	of	a	separate	budget	 for	 the	Platform	and	the	 limited	
means	 of	 the	 government	 to	 respond	 are	 seen	 as	major	 constraints	 by	 the	
government	(GOV1,	17	August	2016;	GOV3,	18	August	2016).	And	even	though	
the	National	Platform	has	been	decentralized	on	a	provincial	and	district	level,	




of	 humanitarians	 by	 enforcing	 strict	 tax	 or	 visa	 rules,	 or	 restricting	
international	 interventions	 altogether.	 In	 Burundi,	 the	 state	 has	 applied	












shaped	 by	 the	 conflict	 history.	 However,	 the	 embeddedness	 of	 aid	
organizations	in	the	conflict	context	is	not	included	in	their	policy	frameworks.	
Although	each	disaster	and	context	are	unique,	 there	are	specific	challenges	




the	humanitarian	arena,	where	 they	manoeuvre	 in	 the	space	opened	by	 the	
disaster	to	socially	negotiate	power	relations,	using	material	and	authoritative	
resources,	 and	 to	 gain	 legitimacy,	 as	part	 of	 their	 everyday	politics	 and	 the	









Although	 this	 chapter	 is	 limited	 to	 a	 literature	 review,	 the	 Burundi	





how	 different	 actors	 find	 strategies	 to	manoeuvre	 in	 the	 arena,	 using	 their	
material	 and	 authoritative	 resources	 in	 relation	 to	 the	 resources	 of	 others	
affected	 by	 the	 post-conflict	 context.	 The	 response	 roles	 of	 the	 state	 to	 the	
disasters	 have	 been	 contentious	 in	 a	 context	where	 the	 state	 is	 considered	
fragile	and	in	need	of	capacity-building.	This	perceived	capacity	gap	resulted	
in	the	different	actors	taking	on	their	own	strategies	to	deal	with	other	actors,	





makers,	 the	 state	 is	 central	 to	 post-conflict	 statebuilding	 efforts	 and	
















































































































After	 the	 2015	 earthquakes	 in	 Nepal,	the	 response	 was	 nearly	 as	
overwhelming	as	 the	magnitude	of	 the	disaster	 itself.	Tensions	between	 the	
humanitarian	 imperative	 and	 the	 post-conflict	statebuilding	agenda	 soon	
became	 evident.	Many	 actors	 opened	 different	 windows	 for	 responding	
by	creatively	 complying	 to	support	the	 state’s	 approach,	 whereas	 others	
bypassed	 the	 official	 channels	 completely.	In	 post-conflict	 settings	 such	 as	
Nepal,	 the	 situation	 is	 especially	 complicated	 because	 of	 the	contradiction	
between	policies	underscoring	the	importance	of	the	state	in	the	response	and	
the	reality	of	the	fragile	state,	which	often	creates	a	large	role	for	aid	actors.	In	
Nepal,	 the	 post-conflict	 political	 landscape	 shaped	 the	 contours	 of	 the	
response,	 as	well	 as	 how	 actors	 decided	 to	 operate	within	 them.	 Based	 on	
empirical	findings	from	four	months	of	research,	this	chapter	contributes	to	a	


























However,	 the	 Nepali	 state	 needed	 support	 to	 respond	 to	 people’s	
needs.	 The	 immediate	 influx	 of	 international	 humanitarian	 actors	
overwhelmed	 national	 and	 local	 governance.	 Coordination	 and	 cooperation	
between	 the	 different	 actors	 involved	 became	 increasingly	 challenging	
(Boersma	 et	 al.,	 2016),	 and	 the	 response	 further	 crystallized	 existing	
governance	 struggles	 between	 the	 Nepali	 state	 and	 international	 actors	
(Bhatta,	 2013).	 The	 earthquakes	 in	 Nepal	 therefore	 demonstrate	 the	
importance	of	understanding	collaborative	disaster	governance	premised	on	
state–non-state	 collaboration	 (Tierney,	 2012)	 in	 the	 context	 of	 the	 post-
conflict	and	post-disaster	nexus.	
Previous	work	has	shown	a	strong	relationship	between	disaster	and	
conflict	 (Spiegel	 et	 al.,	 2007),	 with	 mutually	 reinforcing	 dynamics	 (Nel	 &	
Righarts,	2008)	underscoring	the	political	nature	of	both	disasters	and	disaster	
response	 (Olson,	 2000;	 Pelling	 &	 Dill,	 2010).	 However,	 little	 research	 has	
examined	 what	 this	 means	 specifically	 for	 post-conflict	 settings,	 which	 are	




by	 the	 end	 of	 10	 years	 of	 armed	 conflict,	 and,	 in	 2015,	 unresolved	 socio-

















In	 Nepal,	 this	 led	 to	 contestation	 over	 control	 of	 the	 response	 and	
tension	 between	 aid	 and	 state	 actors.	 Although	 the	 everyday	 politics	 of	
humanitarian	aid	are	rarely	addressed	in	the	disaster	governance	literature,	
understanding	how	aid	and	state	actors	balance	the	politics	of	strengthening	
the	 state’s	 response	 and	 the	 humanitarian	 imperative	 can	 provide	 valuable	
insight.	This	is	especially	important	given	these	states’	often	limited	capacity	




post-conflict	 and	 post-disaster	 nexus.	 How	 do	 state	 and	 non-state	 actors	
socially	 negotiate	 a	 state-led	 disaster	 response	 in	 a	 contested	 political	









state-centric	 perspective.	 However,	 whereas	 post-conflict	 interventions	 are	
often	 situated	 within	 a	 politics	 and	 statebuilding	 discourse,	 post-disaster	
action	 suggests	 humanitarian,	 apolitical	 practice.	 When	 these	 spheres	
converge	 in	 collaborative,	 consensus-oriented	disaster	governance,	 tensions	
arise.	
Post-conflict	 statebuilding	 primarily	 focuses	 on	 strengthening	 weak	
state	institutions	to	prevent	a	relapse	(Collier	et	al.,	2008;	Doyle	&	Sambanis,	
2000;	 Nathan	 &	 Toft,	 2011;	 Nilsson,	 2008;	 Walter,	 2004).	 These	 state	
institutions	 are	 often	 in	 transition,	 with	 legitimacy	 and	 power	 being	
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continuously	negotiated.	This	period	is	accompanied	by	a	large	influx	of	actors	
and	 resources.	 Post-conflict	 and	 post-disaster	 processes	 are	 mutually	




Post-disaster	 contexts	 are	 often	 characterized	 by	 complexity	 in	
humanitarian	 politics	 and	 in	 non-state	 actors’	 roles	—	 especially	 in	 (post-
)conflict	settings.	In	international	humanitarian	law,	humanitarian	assistance	
revolves	 around	 sovereignty,	 consent	 and	 legitimacy.	 The	 imperative	 to	
intervene	 is	 generally	 accepted	 in	 times	 of	 crisis	 (Bellamy,	 2004).	 Unlike	
international	humanitarian	law’s	legal	framework,	the	‘international	disaster	
response	laws,	rules	and	principles’	rely	on	multilateral	and	bilateral	treaties,	
resolutions,	 declarations	 and	 guidelines	 (IFRC,	 2007).	 While	 significant	
progress	 has	 been	made	 to	 formalize	 international	 disaster	 response	 laws,	
when	the	earthquakes	struck	Nepal	in	2015,	response	actors	were	still	guided	
by	 a	 framework	 that	 was	 mostly	 based	 on	 ‘soft	 law’.	 	 The	 humanitarian	
principles	 legitimize	 and	 guide	 the	 conduct	 of	 humanitarian	 and	 multi-
mandate	organizations	 in	 ‘consented	 space’	 and	are	presented	 as	 apolitical.	
However,	 these	principles	are	not	absolute;	 they	depend	on	context	 and	on	
actors;	for	example,	faith-based	organizations	legitimize	their	actions	through	
a	 religious	 mandate	 (De	 Cordier,	 2009).	 Scholars	 have	 shown	 that	 the	






politics	 in	 the	 humanitarian	 arena	 (Hilhorst	 &	 Jansen,	 2010),	 with	 actors	
continuously	 re-negotiating	 the	 roles,	 legitimacy	 and	 outcomes	 of	
humanitarian	 aid,	 translating	 policies	 into	 practice.	 This	 is	 especially	
important	in	post-conflict	settings	because	of	the	involvement	of	many	multi-
mandate	organizations	that,	in	addition	to	providing	humanitarian	assistance,	












overcome	 this	 imbalance.	Humanitarian	aid	provided	by	non-state	 actors	 is	
often	directed	to	other	non-state	actors.	Western	government	donors	direct	
most	 of	 their	 funding	 to	 multilateral	 agencies	 and	 non-governmental	
organizations	(NGOs);	only	2.5	per	cent	of	this	funding	is	channelled	to	states	
(Development	 Initiatives,	 2016,	 2018),	 compared	 with	 60	 per	 cent	 to	
multilateral	agencies	and	35	per	cent	to	NGOs	(Development	Initiatives,	2018).	






disaster	 governance.	 As	 Harrowell	 and	 Özerdem	 (2018)	 have	 argued,	 the	
politics	 of	 the	 post-conflict	 process	 shaped	 the	 political	 setting	 for	 the	
earthquake	 response.	 Nepal’s	 2006	 comprehensive	 peace	 agreement	 was	
followed	by	a	decade	of	political	reform.	Nevertheless,	the	post-conflict	period,	










during	 the	 conflict	 period	 (Ndikumana,	 2016).	 In	 2014,	 external	 aid	
represented	 around	 20	 per	 cent	 of	 the	 national	 budget,	 and	 there	 were	
approximately	 200	 international	 NGOs	 (INGOs)	 and	 over	 40,000	 NGOs	
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consensus	more	 difficult	 (Bhatta,	 2013).	 The	 Nepali	 state	 and	 society	 have	
been	critical	of	outside	 influences.	A	strong	counter-discourse	on	the	state’s	
sovereignty	 is	 supported	 by	 mistrust	 of	 the	 intentions	 of	 India	 and	 other	
outside	influences	(Adhikari,	2014).	
Second,	 continued	 exclusion	 and	marginalization	 of	 lower	 caste	 and	
non-caste	 groups	 have	 affected	 social	 negotiations	 between	 state	 and	 non-
state	actors	in	the	response.	According	to	the	2011	national	census,	Nepal	had	
126	caste	and	ethnic	groups	(Government	of	Nepal,	2012).	Many	groups	have	
political	 representation,	 but	 the	high	 caste	dominates	power	 in	Kathmandu	
(Lawoti	 &	 Hangen,	 2013).	 The	 earthquakes	 disproportionately	 affected	
marginalized	 communities	 and	 lower	 castes	 and	 the	 politicization	 of	 aid	
created	conflicts	within	communities	(Shah	&	Acharya,	2017).	As	Koirala	and	
Macdonald	(2015)	have	noted,	the	earthquakes	were	most	devastating	in	rural	




reforms	 safeguarding	 equal	 rights	 and	 inclusion	 were	 promised,	 but	 the	




relief	 and	 reconstruction	 materials,	 directly	 affecting	 the	 response	 and	
recovery	activities.		
Moreover,	 because	 the	 earthquakes	 struck	 during	 the	 pre-
constitutional	period,	political	structures	and	institutions	were	operating	in	a	
transitional	 system	 under	 an	 interim	 constitution	 and	 acts	 pre-dating	 the	
conflict,	such	as	the	Local	Administration	Act	of	1971,	which	encouraged	local	
self-governance.	All	the	primary	leadership	positions	were	centrally	appointed	
from	 Kathmandu	 rather	 than	 being	 elected,35	 reproducing	 an	 elitist	
 
35	 In	 this	system,	 the	Chief	District	Officer	(CDO)	was	appointed	by	the	Ministry	of	Home	Affairs	 to	head	the	




governance	 structure	 in	 a	 decentralized	 fashion.	 This	 affected	 the	 response	
because	 the	 District	 Disaster	 Relief	 Committees	 (DDRCs)	 were	 headed	 by	
district	 leaders,	 the	 Chief	 District	 Officers	 (CDOs),	 who	 regularly	 changed	
positions,	largely	following	national-level	political	developments.	Thus,	these	
officers’	party	affiliation	was	important	in	their	role	and	represented	part	of	a	
larger	 system	 in	 which	 the	 central	 government’s	 control	 is	 seen	 in	 a	
decentralized	politics.	
Aid	 actors	 faced	 these	 challenges	 in	 the	 response	 to	 the	 2015	
earthquakes,	 with	 the	 post-conflict	 political	 environment	 strongly	 shaping	
post-disaster	governance	practices.	For	the	state,	legitimacy	partly	depended	






This	 chapter	 is	 based	 on	 fieldwork	 conducted	 in	 Kathmandu	 and	 selected	
Village	Development	Committees	(VDCs36)	 in	Sindhupalchok37,	and	Gorkha38	
districts,	 in	 February	 to	May	 2017.	 Data	were	 collected	 through	 123	 semi-
structured	 interviews39	 and	 eight	 focus	 group	 discussions	 (FGDs),	 with	 10	
participants	in	each,	in	Tauthali,	Mankha,	Laprak	and	Barpak.	A	student	from	
Tribhuvan	University	assisted	in	negotiating	with	gatekeepers	and	acted	as	an	
interpreter.	 A	 collaboration	 was	 formed	 with	 the	 Institute	 of	 Crisis	
Management	 in	Kathmandu	 to	discuss	 the	 findings	 throughout	 the	 research	
period.		
 
Ministry	 of	 Federal	 Affairs	 and	 Local	Development	 appointed	 the	 Local	Development	Officer	 (LDO)	 at	 the	







representatives	 (three	 national-level	 and	 31	 district-	 and	 VDC-level),	 33	 INGO	 representatives,	 20	
international	 organization	 representatives	 (including	 United	 Nations	 agencies	 and	 donors),	 12	 NGO	








visiting	 their	 offices.	 The	 FGD	 participants	 were	 assembled	 by	 each	 VDC’s	
social	mobilizer,	who	generally	facilitates	community	development	activities	
within	 the	 community.	 The	 interviews	 focused	 on	 the	 organization	 of	 the	
response,	 inter-actor	 coordination,	 roles	 and	 responsibilities,	 and	 the	main	




















response,	 the	 reconstruction	 period	 may	 have	 influenced	 the	 participants’	
opinions.	To	the	extent	possible,	I	included	participants	who	were	involved	in	










the	 local	 governance	 level.	 The	 large	 number	 of	 interviews	 allowed	 me	 to	
triangulate	 research	 participants’	 opinions	 and	 cluster	 the	 data	 to	 identify	






Aid	 responders	 had	 diverging	 motives	 and	 sometimes	 bypassed	 official	
channels.	 To	 increase	 control,	 the	 government	 imposed	 a	 one-door	 policy,	
meaning	that	all	non-state	responders	had	to	pass	through	state	institutions	in	
their	response.	In	practice,	however,	this	policy	was	negotiated,	reinterpreted	
and	 sometimes	 circumvented,	 allowing	 the	 provision	 of	 assistance	 through	
multiple	 windows.	With	 response	 resources	 and	 power	mostly	 wielded	 by	
international	 aid	 actors,	 their	 decisions	 regarding	 supporting	 the	 one-door	
policy	 or	 bypassing	 state	 institutions	 through	 multiple	 windows	 had	 a	
profound	 impact.	 The	 Nepali	 state	 preferred	 the	 strengthening	 of	 state	





and	 approaches	 for	 non-state	 actors,	 namely,	 the	 one-door	 policy	 and	 the	
blanket	approach	 to	aid	distribution,	which	are	examined	as	state	 tactics	 to	
control	 non-state	 actors	 and	manage	 the	 impact	 of	 the	 aid	 response	on	 the	
state’s	 legitimacy.	 Next,	 non-state	 actors’	 tactics	 to	 manoeuvre	 within	 or	
outside	the	state	system	are	analysed,	considering	these	tactics	on	a	continuum	
from	 compliance	 to	 alienation.	 Finally,	 discrepancies	 observed	 between	
different	 districts	 and	 VDCs	 are	 discussed	 to	 explore	 the	 intricacy	 of	 the	






assistance	 restrictions.	 Non-state	 actors	 questioned	 these	 motives,	 but	 the	





actors	 involved	 in	 the	 response	 was	 difficult.	 Research	 participants	
representing	state	structures	strongly	critiqued	INGOs’	lack	of	transparency.	
The	state	had	to	balance	the	need	for	aid	with	the	accompanying	influence.	The	








Calamity’	 (Government	 of	 Nepal,	 1982,	 p.	 4).	 In	 the	 relief	 phase,	 there	was	








	 The	 district-level	 translation	 of	 the	 one-door	 policy	 was	 largely	
dependent	on	the	CDO	and	took	different	forms	over	time.	In	some	districts,	
aid	 items	were	 stored	by	 the	 state.	 In	 others,	 a	 state	 representative	 simply	
needed	to	be	present.	This	direct	control	over	aid	items	resulted	in	accusations	
of	 misuse	 by	 both	 state	 and	 non-state	 actors,	 and	 the	 practice	 was	
renegotiated.	An	INGO	officer	explained	this	as	follows:		
In	the	beginning,	the	government	said	NGOs	and	INGOs	who	come	here	
with	 relief	materials	 should	distribute	with	 [the]	 government’s	 one-




NGOs	 and	 INGOs	 were	 not	 transparent	 and	 so	 on.	 They	 said	 the	
materials	and	money	were	misused.	But	the	money	[was]	not	misused	
but	 stuck	 because	 of	 [the]	 lengthy	 process.	 (INGO6,	 12	 February	
2017)40	
Handing	over	aid	 items	to	 the	state	presented	a	dilemma	because	non-state	
















resources	 to	 the	 state	was	 required.	 A	 national	 state	 official	 noted	 that	 the	
policy	 aimed	 to	 ensure	 the	 equal	 distribution	 of	 aid:	 ‘If	we	would	 not	 have	




to	 aid	 distribution,	 wherein	 aid	 would	 be	 distributed	 to	 everyone	 equally	
instead	of	being	targeted	to	specific	groups.	
4.4.1.2.	The	blanket	approach:	A	social	cohesion	measure	or	elitism?	
In	 humanitarian	 aid,	 the	 choice	 between	 targeting	 the	most	 vulnerable	 and	
providing	 universal	 coverage	 is	 often	 made	 after	 analysing	 the	 needs	 and	
vulnerabilities	 of	 specific	 groups.	 Both	 options	 have	political	 consequences.	
The	 Nepali	 state	 aimed	 for	 assistance	 or	 all,	 with	 interviewed	 state	
representatives	reiterating	that	this	would	protect	social	cohesion.	In	contrast,	
many	 organizations	 preferred	 a	 targeted	 approach,	 following	 the	
humanitarian	principles	and	acknowledging	social	groups’	differing	needs.	
	 A	 district-level	 state	 representative	 argued	 that	 targeting	 reflects	
negatively	on	the	state’s	role	in	providing	assistance:		







This	statement	shows	several	 reasons	 for	 the	blanket	approach.	Complaints	
were	 directed	 towards	 state	 institutions	 seen	 as	 unable	 to	 provide	 the	
necessary	 services.	 In	 addition	 to	 impacting	 social	 cohesion,	 this	 also	
influenced	assessments	of	the	state’s	legitimacy.	
	 An	 INGO	 research	 participant	 in	 Sindhupalchok	 explained	 that	 the	






state	 or	 government	 and	 tell	 them	 to	 do	 it	 instead.	 That	 would	 be	
problematic	because	most	of	the	committee	were	the	elite	bodies	in	the	
VDC,	 and	 the	 targeted	 approach	means	 they	would	not	be	 receiving	
anything	 because	 it	 would	 go	 to	 the	 vulnerable	 ones.	 (INGO5,	 16	
February	2017)	
Another	 INGO	 participant	 in	 Kathmandu	 further	 explained	 the	 politics	 of	
universal	aid	versus	targeting:		
Targeting	 drove	 the	 government	 insane.	 […]	 Even	 now,	 studies	 are	
coming	out	that	people	left	behind	are	from	specific	caste	backgrounds.	
It	 is	 not	 surprising,	 but	 those	 are	 the	 people	 the	 state	 never	 really	
supported.	So	humanitarian	logic	flew	in	the	face	of	that.	Also,	why	[do]	
you	see	the	government,	in	many	areas,	declaring	blanket	targeting?	It	
was	 the	 only	 way	 to	 get	 [the]	 political	 compromise	 that	 local	
institutions	 made.	 Even	 if	 a	 house	 is	 standing,	 then	 still	 target	 it,	
because	that	person	is	probably	politically	connected.	(INGO8,	9	May	
2017)	
	 The	 state	 and	 political	 parties	 were	 accused	 by	 some	 research	
participants,	primarily	from	IOs,	of	preferring	a	blanket	approach	because	this	
would	 ensure	 the	 inclusion	 of	 higher	 castes	 and	 politically	 affiliated	
households,	who	tended	to	support	the	elitist	state.	The	state,	however,	argued	






control.	 Some	 restrictions	 allowed	emergency	aid	 for	only	one	month,	 after	
which	 tax	 exemptions	were	 revoked	and	 registration	and	approval	 through	
multiple	 state	 institutions	 became	 mandatory.	 After	 six	 months,	 state	













based	 on	 political	 choices	 aimed	 at	 strengthening	 state	 support	 and	
institutions.	 Actors	 were	 accused	 of	 ‘beating	 around	 the	 bush’	 by	 not	
mentioning	the	political	nature	of	the	conflict	and	tensions	that	were	present,	





























	 On	 the	 non-compliant	 end	 of	 the	 spectrum,	 several	 aid	 actors	 —	
particularly	those	who	were	new	to	Nepal	or	had	small	projects	—	shared	the	








on,	 the	 more	 that	 was	 mandatory.	 In	 the	 beginning,	 everyone	 was	







	 On	 the	 compliant	 end	 of	 the	 spectrum,	 aid	 actors	with	 long-standing	
relationships	 with	 the	 state	 shared	 a	 vision	 of	 cooperation.	 A	 research	
participant	from	an	IO	in	Sindhupalchok	stressed	the	importance	of	complying	
with	 the	 state	 structures:	 ‘Without	 collaboration	 with	 the	 government,	 we	
can’t	do	anything.	I	mean	we	have	to	constantly	keep	local	government	bodies	
informed	 about	 our	 plan.	 […]	 They	 suggest	where	 to	 go	 because	 they	 have	
structure	 up	 to	 the	 ground	 level.	 And	we	have	 to	 go	 through	 that’	 (IO1,	 14	
February	2017).	Although	 these	 two	participants	 seem	 to	express	opposing	
ideas,	 in	 practice,	 there	 were	 varying	 degrees	 of	 compliance,	 even	 within	












Consensus-oriented	 rapprochement	 tactics	 took	 several	 forms,	
including	using	the	right	language.	This	eased	the	mistrust	and	perceived	lack	




government.	 We	 don't	 try	 and	 go	 around	 any	 of	 their	 rules	 and	
regulations.	We	put	a	lot	of	time	and	effort	into	actually	getting	MOUs	
[memoranda	of	understanding]	signed	—	getting	approval,	reporting	
back,	 having	 meetings,	 and	 building	 relations	 with	 those	 different	
people.	(INGO1,	13	February	2017)	
Close	 collaboration	 with	 the	 authorities	 was	 believed	 to	 ease	 governance	
challenges	such	as	obtaining	approvals.	
	 	 To	deal	with	differences	between	humanitarian	objectives	 and	 state	
policies,	 some	 organizations	 adopted	 a	 compromise-based	 tactic	 operating	
through	consortia	and	alliances,	where	agencies	negotiated	as	a	group.	This	




duties	 six	 weeks	 after	 the	 disaster.	 Although	 no	 extension	 of	 the	 tax	
exemptions	 was	 granted,	 the	 process	 for	 applying	 for	 exemptions	 became	
clearer.	When	a	blockade	 resulted	 in	 a	 supply	 shortage,	 these	 ambassadors	
advocated	prioritizing	humanitarian	goods.		







socio-economic	 background,	 in	 contrast	 to	 non-state	 actors’	 targeted	
approach,	which	prioritized	vulnerable	groups.	Some	organizations	involved	
in	this	research	agreed	with	the	blanket	approach,	particularly	during	the	relief	
phase;	others	 insisted	 that	 the	humanitarian	 imperative	requires	a	 targeted	




to	 gain	 rapprochement	 with	 the	 state.	 When	 organizations	 did	 choose	 a	
targeted	 approach,	 mostly	 after	 the	 initial	 relief	 period,	 local	 governance	
structures	were	included	to	avoid	tensions.	
	 	 The	approval	mechanism	presented	a	major	 challenge.	To	deal	with	
this,	 tactics	 of	 flexibility	 and	 partial	 non-compliance	 were	 adopted.	 These	
















The	 government	 was	 suspicious	 of	 all	 faith-based	 actors’	 motives	 because	









that	 they	worked	on	similar	projects	 in	 the	same	VDC,	even	when	both	had	
approval	for	their	projects,	they	often	worked	together	to	find	solutions.	
	 Notably,	 these	 creative	 compliance	 tactics	 required	 significant	 time	
and	resources.	Organizations	and	initiatives	that	were	not	well	established	in	
Nepal	 (and	were	 therefore	 less	 invested	 in	 statebuilding)	 often	 completely	
bypassed	the	official	channels,	choosing	to	alienate	themselves	from	the	state	
—	 a	 non-confrontational,	 contentious	 approach.	 A	 research	 participant	
working	 for	a	non-registered	organization	asserted	 that	approval	processes	
and	 bureaucracy	 took	 too	 long	 and	 that	 they	 wanted	 to	 avoid	 political	
involvement.	This	organization	even	bypassed	the	 local	authorities.	 Initially,	
the	 authorities	 allowed	 direct	 implementation;	when	 registration	was	 later	
required,	many	 aid	 organizations	 left.	 For	 example,	 in	 Sindhupalchok,	 local	
authorities	estimated	that	around	200	organizations	 initially	came,	but	only	
103	were	later	registered	with	the	DDRC	(GOV2,	13	February	2017).	
This	 highlights	 the	 differences	 between	 the	 organizations	 and	 their	
approaches.	 Generally,	 national	NGOs	 felt	more	 capable	 of	 dealing	with	 the	
authorities	 and	 local	 political	 dynamics.	 Nepali	 workers	 in	 INGOs	 also	
discussed	 influencing	 local	 authorities	 as	 part	 of	 the	 response.	 National	
organizations	and	staff	members	with	more	local	personal	relations	knew	how	
to	work	 the	 system.	However,	 although	 they	were	able	 to	manoeuvre	more	
easily	within	the	state	system,	Nepali	NGOs	and	private	organizations	did	not	
find	 the	 humanitarian	 coordination	 mechanisms	 inclusive.	 Research	
participants	from	the	private	sector	and	other	new	responders	faced	the	most	
difficulties	 in	 navigating	 both	 the	 state	 and	 humanitarian	 structures,	 often	
avoiding	involvement	with	both.	Established	organizations	and	United	Nations	
(UN)	 agencies	 tended	 to	 see	 their	 legitimacy	 as	 more	 reliant	 on	 good	
relationships	with	state	institutions	in	a	development	and	post-conflict	context	








non-state	 actors	 to	 tactically	 manoeuvre	 either	 within	 or	 outside	 the	
established	 systems.	 Close	 relationships	 with	 the	 state	 were	 seen	 as	 very	























used	 to	 describe	 these	 groups.	 The	 Dalits	 were	 sometimes	 seen	 as	 a	 nuisance,	 always	






In	 my	 research	 encounters	 with	 the	 Dalits,	 it	 became	 clear	 that	 while	 the	 emergency	
response	might	have	included	those	groups	with	higher	needs	in	certain	areas,	the	long-term	
recovery	approach	has	left	marginalized	groups	feeling	more	excluded.	The	Dalit	research	
participants	 noted	 that	 it	 remained	 difficult	 for	 them	 to	 rebuild	 their	 houses	 with	 the	




















At	 the	VDC	and	ward	 levels,	 the	 one-door	policy	was	used	 as	 a	measure	 to	
control	 the	 distribution	 of	 aid.	 Research	 participants	 recounted	 many	
examples	of	creative	distribution:	if	aid	items	were	insufficient	for	a	whole	VDC	
or	ward,	 they	were	 stored	 locally	 until	more	 items	 arrived	 or	 divided	 into	
smaller	packages	and	distributed	to	everyone.	Community	members	in	both	
Gorkha	 and	 Sindhupalchok	 argued	 that	 conflicts	 regarding	 aid	 distribution	
were	 created	 when	 there	 were	 not	 enough	 aid	 items	 for	 the	 community.	

























new	political	 lines.	Needless	to	say,	 these	post-conflict	politics	also	 left	their	mark	on	the	















aid	 by	 holding	 back	 relief	 items	 or	 accepting	 aid	 in	 the	 VDC	 while	 actually	 living	 in	
Kathmandu	or	Pokhara.	Also,	anyone	with	suspected	political	allegiances	was	also	blamed;	










I	 arrived	 in	 one	 of	 the	 VDCs,	 I	 stumbled	 upon	 a	 heated	 discussion	 between	 youth	
representatives	and	the	NC.	When	asked	about	the	response,	 they	said	they	felt	excluded	
from	the	local	aid	governance;	they	wanted	more	responsibilities,	and	they	felt	the	aid	actors	
favoured	 collaborating	 with	 the	 politicians	 over	 the	 youth.	 They	 clearly	 distinguished	
themselves;	 ‘politics	 and	 social	work	 are	 different	 things’	—	political	 representatives	 do	
something	for	the	party	but	social	work	is	in	service	of	the	community.	In	contrast,	the	NC	
representative	 accused	 the	 youth	 of	 not	 distributing	 aid	 equally.	 In	 another	 VDC,	 these	
sentiments	 by	 the	 youth	 were	 shared	 and	 resulted	 in	 actively	 chasing	 away	 the	 VDC	
secretary	with	the	threat	of	violence.	Both	in	the	heated	discussion	and	in	the	critique	on	







regarding	 aid	 distribution	 through	 the	 local	 authorities,	 these	 acts	 mainly	
targeted	state	representatives.	In	one	Sindhupalchok	VDC,	the	VDC	office	was	
locked	up	by	a	group	of	protesting	widows	demanding	a	larger	share	of	the	aid.	
FGD	 participants	 believed	 the	 VDC	 Secretary	 to	 ‘always	 listen	 to	 powerful	
persons’,	and	many	blamed	politicians	for	corruption	(FGD3,	29	June	2017).	






Most	 accusations	 against	 the	 political	 parties	 concerned	 corruption	 or	
mismanagement,	either	during	the	aid	distribution	or	with	regard	to	incentives	
taken	from	organizations.	
In	 Gorkha,	 community	 members’	 stronger	 ties	 with	 ward-level	
representatives	 and	 social	 mobilizers	 resulted	 in	 these	 officials	 being	 less	
vulnerable	to	accusations,	but	political	leaders	were	still	viewed	negatively	and	
aid	 agencies	were	 criticized.	 In	 one	 VDC,	 the	 Secretary	was	 driven	 out	 and	
replaced	 with	 someone	 with	 better	 relations	 with	 the	 community.	
Additionally,	 some	 politicians	 involved	 in	 aid	 distribution	were	 threatened.	
Even	 without	 local	 authorities’	 involvement,	 unequal	 distribution	 between	
wards	caused	conflicts.	As	mentioned	above,	community	members	preferred	
aid	 to	 be	 delivered	 directly	 to	 the	 wards	 and	 distributed	 equally	 to	 avoid	
tensions.	 Especially	 in	 Barpak,	 the	 epicentre	 of	 the	 first	 earthquake,	
organizations	were	criticized	for	performing	assessments	and	taking	pictures	
rather	 than	providing	sufficient	aid.	 In	both	Gorkha	and	Sindhupalchok,	 the	
district-level	 authorities	 questioned	 the	 transparency	 of	 the	 responding	
organizations,	and	aid	agencies	had	to	negotiate	their	access.	
Non-state	actors	dealt	with	political	parties’	 influence	at	district	and	













In	 general,	 when	 the	 organizations	 noticed	 interference	 by	 political	
parties,	they	successfully	negotiated	with	them,	convincing	them	to	let	the	aid	
activities	continue.	Being	transparent	and	open	eased	political	pressure:	
[The]	 communication	 and	 sharing	part	 is	 very	 important.	That’s	 the	
best	way	to	deal	with	political	parties.	We	don’t	directly	deal	with	them,	
but	 we	 provide	 all	 the	 information	 through	 the	 DDRC	 and	 district	





Political	 influence	was	 evident	 at	 district	 and	 VDC	 levels,	with	 non-
state	 actors	 experiencing	 it	 in	 many	 different	 ways.	 Collaboration	 was	
generally	 regarded	 as	 easier	 in	 Sindhupalchok	 than	 in	 Gorkha,	 where	 an	
organization’s	reputation	depended	heavily	on	its	relationship	with	the	CDO	
and	 Local	 Development	 Officer.	 The	 research	 participants	 from	 aid	
organizations	regarded	Gorkha	district	authorities	as	more	politically	biased	
towards	 INGOs,	 compared	with	 those	 in	Sindhupalchok.	A	district	 authority	
representative	 in	 Gorkha	 stressed	 that	 controlling	 INGOs	 was	 important	
because	 ‘Everyone	wants	their	supremacy.	They	want	to	be	 in	the	spotlight.	
But	 we	 control	 them	 through	 mechanisms’	 (GOV28,	 11	 April	 2017).	 The	
authorities	 saw	 the	 organizations	 as	 lacking	 transparency.	 A	 faith-based	











created	 NGO	 guidelines	 and	 a	 code	 of	 conduct	 including	 monitoring	
mechanisms.	The	authorities	were	proud	of	the	‘Gorkha	Model’	as	an	example	







international	 humanitarian	 policies	 and	 practices.	 In	 2016,	 the	 World	
Humanitarian	Summit	and	the	Grand	Bargain	argued	for	a	more	inclusive	and	
participatory	 approach	 to	 aid	 governance,	 prioritizing	 national	 and	 local	
actors.	The	present	 findings	contribute	to	understanding	the	challenges	of	a	
locally	 led	 response	 in	 the	 post-conflict	 and	 post-disaster	 nexus,	 where	
compromises	 are	 made	 in	 social	 negotiations	 between	 state	 and	 non-state	
actors.	
When	 the	 disaster	 unfolded	 in	 Nepal,	 the	 post-conflict	 context	 was	
characterized	by	a	volatile	political	environment	and	a	large	influx	of	non-state	
actors.	The	Nepali	state	therefore	became	increasingly	controlling	during	the	
response,	 using	 ‘compliancy’	 to	 regain	 power.	 The	 tension	 between	
statebuilding	 and	humanitarian	objectives	was	primarily	 seen	 in	 the	 state’s	
blanket	 approach	 and	 one-door	 policy.	 Although	 the	 earthquake	
disproportionately	 affected	 marginalized	 groups,	 the	 blanket	 approach	
included	higher	classes,	who	generally	supported	elite	state	officials.	This	ran	
counter	to	the	humanitarian	imperative	of	targeting	the	most	vulnerable,	given	
limited	 resources.	 However,	 in	 the	 state’s	 view,	 the	 blanket	 approach	 was	











the	 local	 level,	 as	 well	 as	 the	 impact	 of	 the	 influx	 of	 aid	 on	 society–state	
relations.	 The	 resources	 coming	 to	 the	 VDCs	 and	 wards	 were	 sometimes	
insufficient	 for	 all	 community	 members,	 and	 the	 involvement	 of	 local	
politicians	in	aid	distribution	created	local-level	conflict.	For	the	communities,	
this	generally	resulted	in	negative	perceptions	of	the	state	and	its	legitimacy.	
These	 cases	highlight	 the	 challenge	of	 supporting	 a	decentralized	 response,	
which	resulted	 in	 the	politicization	of	aid	at	 the	 local	 level	and	complicated	
collaborative	 governance	 with	 non-state	 actors.	 In	 both	 Gorkha	 and	
Sindhupalchok,	state	and	non-state	actors	exhibited	mutual	mistrust	regarding	
transparency,	 influenced	 by	 the	 local	 personalities	 in	 charge.	 To	 overcome	
these	challenges,	aid	actors	accepted	a	certain	degree	of	political	influence	to	





Although	 this	 research	 has	 shown	 that	 all	 actors	 make	 compromises	 in	 a	
consensus-oriented	 approach	 to	 disaster	 response,	 misunderstandings	
surrounding	 underlying	 motives	 and	 politics	 persist.	 This	 encourages	
contentious	aid	tactics	and	negatively	impacts	responders’	 legitimacy.	These	




























































overcome	 the	 Ebola	 crisis,	 which	 left	 its	 mark	 on	 socio-political	 relations	
between	 different	 disaster	 response	 actors.	 With	 international	 disaster	
response	 frameworks	 increasingly	 shifting	 to	 local	 ownership,	 the	 national	
government	was	expected	to	assume	a	coordinating	role.	However,	 in	 ‘post-
conflict’	settings	such	as	Sierra	Leone,	intra-state	and	state–society	relations	
are	 continuously	 being	 renegotiated.	 This	 chapter	 aims	 to	 uncover	 the	
complexities	of	state-led	disaster	response	in	a	hybrid	governance	setting	at	





politics	or	 the	 complexity	of	 Sierra	Leone’s	hybrid	governance.	The	 chapter	
argues	 for	 a	 more	 nuanced	 debate	 within	 humanitarian	 governance	 and	
practice	 on	 the	 localization	 of	 aid	 in	 post-conflict	 and	 fragile	 settings.	 The	
findings	contribute	to	the	literature	on	the	disaster–conflict	nexus,	identifying	
paradoxes	of	localized	disaster	response	in	an	environment	with	heightened	


























al.,	 2008),	 increasingly	 emphasizing	 that	 disaster	 response	 should	 involve	
multiple	 actors.	 The	 internationally	 recognized	 preferred	 response	 model	
proposed	 in	 the	 Sendai	 Framework	 for	 Disaster	 Risk	 Reduction	 (UNISDR,	
2015a)	views	the	state	as	the	central	coordinating	body,	working	closely	with	
civil	society,	communities	and	other	non-state	actors	in	disaster	response	and	
disaster	 risk	 reduction.	 This	model,	which	 is	 generally	 reflected	 in	 national	
disaster	policies,	is	anchored	on	a	well-functioning	state;	this	chapter	asks	how	
this	plays	out	in	fragile	institutional	environments	such	as	Sierra	Leone.	
In	 countries	with	a	 recent	history	of	 conflict,	 state	 institutions	often	
lack	 the	 required	 resources	and	capacities	 to	 respond	 to	disasters.	Ongoing	
institutional	changes	and	socio-political	tensions	complicate	their	legitimacy	
to	 coordinate	 disaster	 response.	 Relations	 between	 different	 layers	 and	
domains	of	the	state	are	in	flux	and	are	impacted	by	state–society	relations.	
Furthermore,	post-conflict	states	are	usually	subject	to	a	strong	international	
presence	 engaging	 in	 programmes	 for	 statebuilding,	 peacebuilding	 and	
recovery.	
A	 key	 premise	 of	 this	 thesis	 is	 that	 disaster	 response	 models	 are	
translated	and	socially	negotiated	in	practice.	Although	different	parties	may	
agree	 on	 roles	 and	 responsibilities,	 how	 these	 work	 out	 in	 practice	 is	
negotiated,	 potentially	 with	 highly	 divergent	 outcomes.	 Therefore,	 it	 is	
important	 to	 use	 empirical	 case	 studies	 to	 explore	 how	 disaster	 response	





in	 Sierra	 Leone.	 As	 the	 case	 unfolded,	 our	 focus	 was	 drawn	 to	 the	 central	
importance	of	intra-state	competition	and	the	issue	of	vertical	linkages	in	how	
disaster	 response	 is	 translated	 from	 the	 national	 to	 the	 local.	 These	 issues	
underlay	many	mundane	contestations	over	aspects	of	the	response,	such	as	
the	registration	process,	the	introduction	of	cash	relief,	item	distribution	and	
the	 screening	 of	 internally	 displaced	 persons	 (IDPs)	 to	 determine	 camp	
eligibility.	
Our	study	thus	aimed	to	understand	how	state,	aid	and	societal	actors	






Sierra	 Leone	 is	 considered	 a	 post-colonial,	 post-conflict	 and	 post-disaster	





embodied	 many	 remnants	 of	 colonial	 relations.	 The	 country’s	 hybrid	
governance	 structure	 comprises	 continued	 interaction	 between	 the	 formal	
state,	Paramount	Chiefs,	ceremonial	chiefs	and	other	community	stakeholders.	
Authority	 rests	 on	 a	mix	 of	 state	 and	 traditional	 sources	 that	 have	 become	
mutually	 constitutive,	 but	 this	 has	 also	 resulted	 in	 a	 governance	 culture	 of	
distrust	and	resentment	(Albrecht	&	Moe,	2015;	Jackson,	2007;	Keen,	2005).	
In	 addition	 to	 formal	 recognition	 of	 their	 positions,	 the	 legitimacy	 of	 the	










The	 period	 after	 the	 civil	war	 redefined	 power	 relations	within	 the	









the	 roles	 and	 relations	 of	 ceremonial	 chiefs	 —	 customary	 leaders	 in	 the	
Western	Area	 including	Freetown.	Generally,	contention	continued	after	 the	
civil	 war,	 and	 young	 people,	 supported	 by	 the	 international	 human	 rights	














When	 the	 landslide	 and	 floods	 struck	 in	 2017,	 a	 relatively	 well-














although	 humanitarian	 agencies	 often	 seem	 to	 take	 control	 in	 disaster	
response	(Barnett,	2011;	Donini,	2012),	undermining	the	state’s	authority.	One	
challenge	of	post-conflict	disaster	governance	 is	 therefore	how	to	break	 the	
pattern	 that	evolved	during	conflict,	 in	which	 international	actors	dominate	
disaster	response	and	tend	to	bypass	the	state.	
	 The	 Sendai	 Framework	 and	 national-level	 disaster	 risk	 reduction	
frameworks	 and	 laws	 give	 prominence	 to	 the	 state	 in	 disaster	 response.	
However,	 post-conflict	 settings	 create	 many	 challenges	 for	 state-centred	
disaster	response	(Harrowell	&	Özerdem,	2018;	Melis,	2018).	Despite	the	focus	
of	 international	 policy	 on	 states,	 in	 practice,	 states	 are	 often	 bypassed	 by	
humanitarian	 donors.	 In	 the	 1970s	 and	 1980s,	 international	 disaster	 aid	
usually	consisted	of	budget	support	 to	 the	government,	but	 from	the	1990s	
onwards,	 international	 organizations	 increasingly	 took	 over	 disaster	
management	 (Harvey,	 2013b,	 p.	 153).	 In	 2017,	 only	 2.5	 per	 cent	 of	





different	 layers	 and	 parts	 of	 the	 state.	 The	 state	 does	 not	 equate	 to	 the	
government.	A	state	 is	made	up	of	different	 institutions,	and	leadership	and	
authorities	 can	 also	 be	 found	 outside	 the	 government	 (Miliband,	 2009).	 To	
some	extent,	 this	 is	recognized	 in	 the	Sendai	Framework’s	 inclusive	view	of	






central	 state	 system,	 finding	 that	 the	 state	 comprises	 different	 entities	 and	
hybrid	institutions	(Boege	et	al.,	2008)	competing	for	authority	and	legitimacy	
at	different	governance	levels.	At	national	level,	state	entities	are	part	of	post-
conflict	 statebuilding	 and	 the	 accompanying	 institutional	 changes	
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(Brinkerhoff,	2005).	At	local	level,	different	modes	of	local	governance	co-exist,	
particularly	 in	 states	 where	 traditional	 authorities	 function	 as	 mediators	
between	the	state	and	society	(Menkhaus,	2007;	Olivier	de	Sardan,	2011).	In	
patrimonial	societies	such	as	Sierra	Leone,	traditional	structures	occupy	both	




state	 and	 local	 authorities	 (Titeca	&	 de	Herdt,	 2011).	 Disconnects	 between	
parts	of	 the	state	may	be	more	pronounced	 in	post-conflict	 settings	 than	 in	









access	 to	 current	 information	 and	 made	 it	 possible	 to	 follow	 up	 on	 leads	
regarding	movements	by	responders	and	discussions	in	the	IDP	camps.		
Data	 were	 collected	 through	 interviews,	 focus	 group	 discussions,	
participant	 observation	 and	 attendance	 at	 a	 ‘lessons	 learned’	 workshop	
organized	by	the	ONS	and	the	 International	Organization	 for	Migration.	The	
semi-structured	 approach,	 multiple	 methods	 and	 variety	 of	 participants	
allowed	for	the	triangulation	of	data.	In	total,	88	semi-structured	interviews	
were	 conducted	 and	 audio-recorded	with	 37	 aid	 actors:	 nine	 national	 non-
governmental	organizations	(NGOs),	14	international	organizations	(IOs)	(e.g.	
donors,	 United	 Nations	 (UN)	 agencies),	 14	 international	 non-governmental	
organizations	 (INGOs),	 32	 community	 actors	 (27	 IDPs,	 two	 civil	 society	
organizations,	 three	 volunteers)	 and	 19	 state	 actors	 (nine	 ONS	







stakeholders,	 whereby	 a	 timeline	 of	 the	 response	 was	 created	 and	 the	
participatory	tool	of	ranking	and	scoring	was	employed.		
A	grounded	thematic	analysis	was	conducted	using	NVivo	qualitative	
data	 analysis	 software	 and	 centred	 around	 themes	 of	 actor	 relations,	
challenges,	discourses	and	response	practices.	Participants	were	categorized	
by	 type	 of	 responder	 (aid,	 state	 and	 societal	 actors)	 to	 allow	 for	 multiple	
perspectives	to	emerge	and	inter-actor	relations	to	be	further	analysed.		
A	research	assistant	living	in	an	IDP	camp	provided	translations	for	the	
community	 interviews.	 The	 communities	 of	 Mortormeh,	 Gbangbayila,	
Kamayama,	Kaningo	and	Pentagon	and	the	Juba	and	Old	School	camps	were	
visited	 frequently	 to	 collect	data.	The	 research	 assistant’s	 status	 as	 a	 flood-
affected	person	from	one	of	the	communities	risked	introducing	bias	but	also	
provided	 better	 access	 to	 the	 affected	 communities	 and,	 through	 close	
collaboration,	increased	our	contextual	understanding.	In	May	2018,	a	follow-
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The	 landslide	 and	 floods	 in	 Sierra	 Leone	 occurred	 in	 the	 capital	 city	 of	
Freetown;	as	a	result,	the	response	was	structured	in	a	relatively	simple	way,	





As	 the	 disaster	 unfolded,	 all	 departments	 and	 ministries	 relevant	 to	 the	
response	were	called	to	meet	in	the	situation	room	at	the	ONS.	The	sectoral	
response	 pillars	 that	 had	 been	 active	 during	 the	 Ebola	 response,	with	 dual	
governmental	and	 international	agency	 leadership	mirroring	 the	UN	cluster	
system,	were	reactivated.	However,	despite	the	discourse	of	unity,	competing	
interests	and	power	politics	within	the	state	and	in	collaborations	with	non-
state	 actors	 revealed	 how	 different	 authorities	 within	 the	 state	 socially	
negotiated	for	position	and	power	over	and	through	the	response.	
The	ONS	has	the	mandate	to	coordinate	emergency	responses.	As	an	
interviewed	 national	 state	 official	 asserted,	 ‘It’s	 like	 a	 sharp	 knife	 running	
through	a	ripe	banana’,	meaning	that	the	roles	were	clearly	defined	(GOV10,	
12	 January	 2018).42	 However,	 tensions	 between	 the	 different	 roles	 of	 the	
ministries	and	state	 institutions	continued	to	play	a	role.	One	national	state	
official	explained	the	sources	of	these	tensions:	
The	 issue	 is	 that	 of	mandates.	 Even	 though	 institutions	may	
have	the	responsibility,	for	example	that	of	social	welfare;	in	a	
normal	situation,	it’s	their	responsibility	to	seek	the	welfare	of	
all	 citizens,	 but	 when	 it	 becomes	 an	 emergency,	 the	
responsibility	of	coordinating	all	of	this	rests	with	the	ONS.	[…]	













National	 Security.	 Nobody	 should	 go	 there	 and	 give	 counter	 instructions’	
(GOV10,	12	January	2018).	
In	 terms	 of	mandates	 and	 capacity,	 confusion	 and	 contention	 arose	
especially	between	the	ONS,	the	Ministry	of	Social	Welfare	and	the	NaCSA.	In	
the	 initial	 days	 after	 the	 landslide,	 these	 institutions	 all	 began	 to	 register	
affected	households,	with	all	three	considering	this	to	be	within	their	mandate.	
The	NaCSA	was	 later	 informed,	with	 the	authority	of	 the	president,	 that	 the	
Ministry	 of	 Social	Welfare	 was	 in	 charge	 of	 registration.	 The	 tasks	 of	 each	
institution	then	became	more	defined.		
However,	 the	 legitimacy	 of	 the	 Ministry	 of	 Social	 Welfare	 was	 still	
questioned,	especially	because	it	was	thought	to	be	incapable	of	the	task,	as	
seen	 in	 the	 following	 comments	 from	a	 national	 state	 official:	 ‘With	 all	 due	
respect	to	their	commitment,	but	the	expertise	was	not	there	for	us	to	get	the	
kind	of	data	that	we	wanted.	So	it	affected	the	whole	intervention’	(GOV9,	10	
January	2018).	And	another	national	 state	official	 insisted,	 ‘We	 can’t	 accept	
them	anymore.	[The	Ministry	of]	Social	Welfare	cannot	handle	registration	in	
the	future.	They	cannot.	We	can	do	it	together’	(GOV8,	18	December	2017).		
Conversely,	 the	 Ministry	 of	 Social	Welfare	 felt	 that	 the	 ONS,	 as	 the	
leader	in	disaster	issues,	was	trying	to	control	everything	and	was	stepping	on	
its	turf.	A	national	state	official	explained,	‘There	has	been	some	amount	of	beef	
between	 the	 two	 institutions’43	 (GOV7,	 17	 December	 2017),	 referring	 to	
conflict	between	them.	As	a	symbol	of	protest,	the	Minister	of	Social	Welfare	
did	not	attend	many	coordination	meetings,	 and	 the	ONS,	as	a	 coordinating	
body,	was	unable	to	enforce	its	coordination	efforts	in	the	different	ministries.	
Although	tensions	were	highest	between	the	ONS	and	the	Ministry	of	
Social	 Welfare,	 challenges	 in	 intra-state	 coordination	 were	 also	 visible	
between	 different	 sectoral	 response	 pillars.	 Pillar	 leads	 from	 the	 different	
ministries	were	supposed	to	remain	in	the	ONS	situation	room	to	facilitate	all	















Social	Welfare	 to	 discredit	 each	 other	 and	 strengthen	 their	 own	 authority.	
Tensions	 were	 also	 built	 into	 the	 system	 because,	 although	 the	 ONS	 had	
authority,	they	lacked	resources,	which	remained	within	the	ministries.		





prevalent	 during	 the	 Ebola	 response.	 The	 intra-state	 bureaucracy	 and	
hierarchical	systems	led	to	delays	in	the	release	of	aid	items	so	that	by	the	end	
of	the	response	period,	only	a	fraction	of	the	donations	had	been	used.	Besides	
the	 friction	 this	 arrangement	 caused	 for	 the	 logistics	 pillar,	 which	 was	 in	
charge	 of	 the	 storage	 but	 did	 not	 have	 authority	 to	move	 the	 items,	 it	 also	
affected	 the	 ONS	 managers	 of	 IDP	 camps,	 who	 had	 to	 deal	 with	 the	
bureaucracy.	
To	complicate	matters	still	further,	a	hierarchical	decision-making	and	









level’	 found	 that	 decisions	 sent	 to	 the	 higher	 levels	 were	 often	 returned	
without	 a	 final	 answer.	 At	 the	 ‘bronze	 level’,	 policies	were	 not	 always	well	
understood,	and	responses	from	the	‘silver	level’	were	seen	as	slow,	with	some	












Aid	 actors	 seeking	 to	 support	 the	 state	 in	 the	 landslide	 response	 had	 to	
navigate	the	different,	conflicting	units	of	the	state.	They	had	to	determine	with	









The	Sierra	Leonean	civil	war	was	a	major	 risk	driver	as	 rapid	urbanization	 in	Freetown	
during	and	after	the	war	resulted	in	haphazard	construction	and	building	in	disaster-prone	






the	newly	 elected	 government	 vowed	 to	 clear	houses	 that	were	built	 in	 landslide-prone	
areas.	In	the	area	of	Regent,	Operation	‘Break	House’	was	launched	and	bulldozers	from	the	
Ministry	of	Lands	entered	 the	area.	However,	 this	attempt	was	stopped	when	one	of	 the	
officers	was	murdered	by	community	members	who	had	glued	the	officer’s	lips	together.	
When	 the	 APC	 regained	 power	 from	 2007	 to	 2018,	 they	 left	 matter	 of	 houses	 built	 in	

























transfers	 in	 emergency	 programming	 (IO14,	 26	 January	 2018).	 Discussions	
and	 negotiations	 were	 conducted	 at	 the	 pillar	 level	 between	 different	
organizations	and	state	institutions	to	design	a	cash	transfer	programme	that	







diplomat	 intervened.	 Resources	 were	 then	 shared	 directly	 with	 the	
international	 implementing	 partner	 —	 not	 the	 government	 —	 because,	












us,	 it	 actually	undermined	 every	 effort	we	 are	doing	 towards	 the	 response’	
(GOV10,	12	January	2018).	Some	of	the	NGOs	and	civil	society	organizations,	
especially,	 were	 less	 inclined	 to	 work	 closely	 with	 state	 structures.	 One	
national	NGO	set	up	a	small	project	to	support	individuals,	and	contacted	these	
people	directly	 to	avoid	 involving	the	state,	 including	the	chiefs.	Similarly,	a	
church	 hosted	 IDPs	 at	 its	 school	 and	 provided	 assistance,	 with	 limited	
collaboration	with	a	 local	state	representative.	These	organizations	believed	
that	 their	 power	 to	 influence	 the	 state	 was	 limited,	 as	 a	 civil	 society	











as	 a	 reason	 for	 maintaining	 control	 over	 aid	 items	 themselves	 to	 assure	
efficiency	 and	 accountability.	 The	 general	 consensus	 regarding	 direct	
assistance	 was	 that	 the	 state	 authorities	 had	 to	 be	 informed	 but	 that	
distributions	 could	be	 organized	by	 the	 organizations	 themselves,	 provided	
this	was	done	in	the	presence	of	state	representatives.	






response	 outcomes.	 Many	 organizations	 collaborated	 directly	 with	 their	
ministerial	 counterparts	 and	had	 little	 influence	 in	 the	overall	 coordination	
meetings.	Others,	especially	high-level	diplomats,	had	direct	 influence	at	the	
higher	state	levels.	Still,	the	‘big	voices’	were	not	always	decisive,	and	strong	
counter-discourses	 were	 also	 observed.	 The	 initial	 state–donor	 tensions	
subsided	over	the	course	of	the	response,	as	the	state	was	able	to	control	more	
of	 the	response.	As	an	 INGO	representative	elaborated,	 ‘In	 the	end,	as	 in	all	
disasters,	people	go	through	a	learning	phase	and	eventually	the	authorities	
became	 stronger	 and	 took	 their	 role.	 So	what	was	 happening	was	 that	 the	
authorities	 increasingly	 put	 their	 feet	 down	 and	 stated	 exactly	 what	 was	
permissible	and	what	not’	(INGO9,	16	January	2018).	
All	 interviewees	 agreed	 that	 the	 state	 should	 be	 in	 charge	 of	 the	
response.	Although	the	state’s	capacity	was	seen	as	inadequate,	the	authority	
and	 legitimacy	 to	 lead	remained	with	 the	state.	 In	 the	co-governance	of	 the	
response,	 everyone	 had	 a	 role	 to	 play,	 including	 international	 partners.	
However,	as	one	state	official	 remarked,	 ‘you	do	not	run	an	emergency	 in	a	
democracy’	(GOV8,	18	December	2017).	Some	international	donors	had	more	
power	 to	 influence	 the	 response,	 compared	 with	 other	 actors,	 and	 this	
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At	 the	 local	 level,	 some	 national	 issues	 were	 reproduced,	 with	 specific	










political	authorities	 representing	 the	youth	and	women’s	groups	 (e.g.	 chiefs	
and	 community	 stakeholders),	 and	 other	 community-based	 organizations,	
religious	 institutions	 and	benefactors.	The	 authority	of	 local	 structures	was	
recognized	 by	many	 organizations,	 which	 included	 them	 in	 their	 response.	
This	meant	 that	 these	 local	 structures	 functioned	 at	 times	 as	 a	 ‘gatekeeper	
state’,	 controlling	 access	 to	 aid.	 However,	 in	 the	 registration	 process,	 this	




the	 identification	 of	 affected	 people	 within	 their	 communities	 before	 the	
Ministry	 of	 Social	 Welfare	 arrived.	 However,	 when	 the	 official	 registration	
started,	 the	 community	 lists	were	not	 taken	 into	 account,	 and	 some	people	
were	excluded.	As	an	assistant	 to	a	chief	recounted,	 ‘When	[the	Ministry	of]	
Social	 Welfare	 came	 in,	 they	 said	 they	 are	 the	 eligible	 institution	 that	 is	






As	outsiders,	 the	 state’s	 registration	officers	were	not	 seen	as	 legitimate	or	
capable	authorities	to	identify	affected	community	members.	
The	tension	between	the	ONS	and	the	Ministry	of	Social	Welfare	was	
strongly	 felt	 at	 the	 community	 level.	 The	 authority	 of	 both	 chiefs	 and	 state	
officials	is	partly	derived	from	controlling	resources.	Although	the	ceremonial	
chiefs	 consider	 themselves	 the	 local	 state,	 their	 role	 is	 not	 completely	
formalized	and	remains	unclear.	Therefore,	both	chiefs	and	state	officials	had	
a	 lot	 at	 stake	 in	 the	 landslide	 response.	 Controlling	 the	 list	 of	 eligible	
beneficiaries,	 and	 thus	 directly	 or	 indirectly	 allocating	 resources,	 was	
important	for	their	political	standing.	Towards	the	end	of	the	Ebola	crisis,	the	
formal	and	informal	roles	of	the	chiefs	were	strengthened,	but	now,	the	state’s	
ONS	 and	 the	 Ministry	 of	 Social	 Welfare	 took	 full	 control,	 undermining	 the	
ceremonial	chiefs’	authority	 in	the	community	and	limiting	their	gatekeeper	
role.	
Chiefs	 form	 part	 of	 the	 internal	 state	 at	 local	 level	 as	 a	 hybrid	
institution,	but	they	are	often	viewed	with	scepticism.	In	the	interviews,	chiefs	
were	 accused	 of	 partisan	 behaviour	 by	 national	 state	 actors:	 ‘People	 were	
dishonest	 and	 the	 chiefs	 supported	 them’	 (GOV8,	 18	 December	 2017).	 In	
contrast,	 organizations	 that	 assisted	 after	 the	 landslide	 often	privileged	 the	
authority	of	community	stakeholders	to	identify	those	affected,	as	one	INGO	





strengthened	 and	 weakened	 chiefs’	 gatekeeper	 role,	 as	 these	 agencies	
preferred	 the	 chiefs’	 involvement	 and	 participation	 but	 also	waited	 for	 the	
state’s	official	list.	
Whereas	the	chiefs’	authority	in	relation	to	the	state	diminished	during	
the	 landslide	 response,	 their	 traditional	 authority	 persisted.	 To	 community	
members,	 the	 state’s	 control	 was	 an	 external	 infringement	 on	 their	 own	
patrons’	 authority.	 However,	 support	 for	 the	 role	 of	 the	 chief	 varied	 by	
community	 and	 depended	 on	 the	 chief’s	 relationship	 with	 the	 state.	 The	
manner	in	which	the	chiefs	handled	their	mediating	role	affected	the	part	they	
played	in	the	response.	
One	 chief’s	 role	 was	 considered	 very	 positively	 by	 community	
When	the	mountain	broke	 107	
members,	 neighbouring	 chiefs,	 state	 officials	 and	 organizations.	 In	 this	
community,	 local	 stakeholders	 were	 able	 to	 connect	 with	 national	 and	
international	responders	and	advocate	for	their	needs.	Nevertheless,	even	in	
this	 community,	 the	 stakeholders	 felt	 bypassed	 in	 their	 role	 as	 responders.	
Research	participants	asserted	that	the	state	institutions	did	not	include	the	
stakeholders	enough,	describing	this	as	though	a	right	had	been	taken	away	
from	 them.	 The	 stakeholders	 praised	 the	 chief’s	 transparency,	 which	 was	
welcomed	by	the	various	state	and	non-state	actors	who	collaborated	with	him	
in	 the	 response.	 However,	 taking	 away	 the	 responsibility	 for	 registration	
infringed	on	the	role	of	this	chief.	
In	 contrast,	 in	 a	 neighbouring	 community,	 the	 chief’s	 role	 was	
contested	 by	 the	 community	 members,	 state	 officials	 and	 organizations.	
Although	 this	 chief	 hosted	 internally	 displaced	 community	members	 at	 his	




Although	 chiefs	 of	 neighbouring	 communities	 usually	 collaborate,	 the	
neighbouring	community	 chiefs	 chose	not	 to	 cooperate	with	 this	 chief.	This	
chief’s	inability	to	control	his	community	members	reflected	negatively	on	him,	








In	 addition	 to	 affecting	 the	 chiefs’	 status,	 the	 state	 response	 also	
brought	the	national	state	closer	to	the	communities,	resulting	in	friction	and	
resistance.	This	was	mostly	seen	in	the	camps,	where	many	IDPs	asserted	that	











ONS,	but	 also	 some	 international	 organizations	who	 did	 their	 own	 identification.	 To	 be	
included	 on	 one	 of	 those	 lists	did	 not	mean	 that	 person	was	 officially	 registered,	which	
created	confusion.	When	the	Ministry	of	Social	Welfare	started	the	official	registration,	the	
government	decided	it	should	be	concluded	within	48	hours.	Although	a	brief	registration	
period	 was	 thought	 to	 prevent	 non-affected	 people	 from	 registering,	 it	resulted	
in	many	genuine	survivors	failing	to	register	and	others	being	accused	of	taking	advantage.			
	
‘After	 the	 incident	 I	was	so	 traumatized	 that	 I	did	not	have	a	 chance	 to	go	and	register.	
Because	I	was	crying	a	lot	because	of	the	loss	of	my	family.	After	I	recovered	from	the	tears,	
I	 felt	 sick.	 So	 that's	 why	 I	 failed	 to	 register’	 (IDP12,	 18	 November	 2017).	Survivors	
suffered	immense	trauma	from	the	disaster	and	many	people	recounted	that	they	were	not	
in	the	right	mind	to	be	able	to	register.	Others	immediately	went	to	family	in	the	rural	parts	







Social	 accountability	 within	 the	 community	 prevented	 some	 of	 these	 cases,	 as	 other	
community	members	were	asked	 to	verify	a	claim.	However,	power	dynamics	and	social	
cohesion	 also	 resulted	 in	people	not	 speaking	out	against	fraudulent	registrations.	And	 if	
someone	was	not	identified	by	a	community	stakeholder,	they	would	become	angry.	One	
chief	 recounted	 that	 during	 the	 registration,	 the	 chiefs	made	 a	 lot	 of	 enemies	 (FGD1,	 2	









and	 the	 IDPs	 in	 the	 two	 studied	 camps.	 Akin	 to	 the	 differences	 between	









in	 resistance	 and	 the	 non-acceptance	 of	 the	 representation	 of	 the	 state	








camp	management,	mostly	 reinforced	 a	 negative	 perception	 of	 the	 national	
state,	although	this	differed	between	the	camps.	This	shows	the	importance	of	
interactions	between	 local	 state	 structures	 and	 society.	The	outcome	of	 the	
protest	 reinforced	 the	 perceived	 illegitimacy	 of	 the	 role	 of	 the	 camp	
management,	 and	 therefore	 also	 the	 ONS	 and	 even	 the	 nation	 state	 by	
extension.	The	protesters	addressed	their	requests	directly	to	the	president,	
who	had	the	power	to	change	the	realities	of	the	response.	This	underscores	













2017	 landslide.	 This	 chapter	 has	 shown	 that	 the	 policy	 discourse	 of	 state	
uniformity	in	disaster	response	is	problematic	and	that	the	centralized	multi-
level	 governance	 setting	 affected	 state	 institutions	 in	 different	 ways,	 with	






as	 the	 responsible	 entity	 of	 the	 state	 in	 disaster	 response	 policies	 is	
particularly	 challenging	 in	 post-conflict	 states,	 where	 newly	 formed	
governance	 structures	 and	 governments	 are	 trying	 to	 consolidate	 the	
distribution	 of	 power.	 This	 invites	 power	 struggles	 not	 only	 between	 the	




the	 state-centric	 support	 discourse	 with	 space	 for	 their	 own	 interests	 and	
voices,	 raising	 the	question	of	which	state	constellation	 they	supported:	 the	
unified	one	in	the	policies,	or	the	divided	one	seen	in	practice.	The	hierarchical	










culminating	 in	 resistance.	 Our	 findings	 demonstrate	 that	 state–society	
relations	 are	 a	 crucial	 component	 of	 disaster	 response	 and	 that	 the	 lines	
between	these	two	entities	are	blurred.	
These	 findings	 are	 especially	 important	 in	 view	 of	 current	 shifts	 in	
international	aid	paradigms	(Hilhorst,	2018).	The	Sendai	Framework	accords	
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the	 central	 role	 in	 disaster	 response	 to	 states.	 In	 addition,	 since	 the	
Humanitarian	Summit	of	2016,	international	aid	actors	have	emphasized	the	
importance	 of	 national	 actors	 in	 emergency	 response,	 which	 further	
underscores	 the	 commitment	 to	 respect	 the	 central	 role	 of	 governments	 in	
disaster	 response.	 This	 thesis	 poses	 several	 pertinent	 questions	 regarding	
what	 this	 means	 in	 other	 post-conflict	 settings.	 The	 themes	 of	 intra-state	
competition	 and	 a	 lack	 of	 linkages	 between	 different	 response	 levels	 are	
relevant	 in	 all	 contexts,	 but	 especially	 in	 situations	 where	 state	 and	 other	
institutions	are	still	in	flux	and	the	international	community	has	a	large	role	to	
play.	 In	Sierra	Leone,	 intra-state	competition	allowed	 for	a	strengthening	of	
institutions	 after	 the	 landslide.	 However,	 the	 disarticulation	 between	 the	
national	 and	 local	 state	 levels,	 and	 state–society	 tensions,	 have	 not	 been	
adequately	addressed.	
This	chapter	has	demonstrated	 that	disaster	response	affects,	and	 is	
affected	 by,	 a	multi-layered	 state	with	 strong	 internal	 state	 power	 politics.	
Current	 disaster	 response	 policy	 directions	 are	 therefore	 not	 sufficient.	 A	
sensitivity	to	the	internal	divisions	and	competition	between	state	institutions	




































































































‘Localization’	 became	 the	 new	 buzzword	 after	 the	 World	 Humanitarian	
Summit	 in	 2016.	 Since	 then,	 however,	 the	 nature	 of	 the	 commitment	 to	
localization	has	 been	questioned.	What	 is	 ‘the	 local’?	How	does	 localization	
work	 in	 practice?	With	 little	 empirical	 research,	 generalities	 in	 theory	 and	
practice	have	prevailed,	preventing	a	nuanced	approach	to	conceptualizing	the	
local.	 This	 chapter	 aims	 to	 build	 a	 foundation	 for	 the	 understanding	 of	






multi-local	 dynamics	 challenge	 locally	 led	 disaster	 response	 in	 practice?	























of	 localization	 rose	 to	 the	 top	 of	 the	 humanitarian	 agenda	 following	 the	
Summit,	with	commitments	made	by	international	donors	and	humanitarian	
organizations	 towards	 increasing	 local	 leadership,	 building	 capacity	 and	
directing	 funds	 to	 local-	 and	 national-level	 actors	 to	 realize	 these	 goals,	
particularly	in	the	field	of	disaster	response.	
The	 prevailing	 usage	 of	 the	 term	 ‘localization’	 suggests	 that	 the	
international	is	the	default	setting	and	that	there	should	be	some	shift	to	the	
local,	or	the	national	as	local.	Even	the	criticisms	of	the	humanitarian	system	




and	humanitarian	 organizations	 act	 upon	 the	 localization	 commitment,	 this	
would	 mean	 a	 complete	 transformation	 of	 international	 humanitarianism.	
However,	given	the	lack	of	explicit	conceptualization	in	the	WHS	resolution	as	
to	 how	 more	 localization	 would	 improve	 aid	 effectiveness,	 there	 is	 much	







relations	 and	 the	 conceptualization	of	 the	 local	 itself	—	elements	 that	have	
often	escaped	debate	(Apthorpe	&	Borton,	2019;	Bennett	et	al.,	2016;	DuBois,	
2018;	Geoffroy	&	Grünewald,	2017;	Hilhorst	et	al.,	2010;	Kuipers	et	al.,	2019;	
Roepstorff,	 2020;	 Wall	 &	 Hedlund,	 2016).	 Nevertheless,	 two	 major	
shortcomings	 remain	 in	 the	 existing	 literature.	 First,	 there	 is	 minimal	













objective	 of	 challenging	 these	 notions	 on	 the	 basis	 of	 locally	 led	 disaster	
response	 experiences.	 The	 empirical	 section	 of	 this	 chapter	 focuses	 on	 the	
post-conflict	settings	of	Nepal,	Haiti	and	Sierra	Leone.	Given	 that	 the	aim	of	
international	actors	working	in	peacebuilding	and	development	is	to	support	





This	 chapter	 proposes	 a	 new	 concept:	 the	 ‘multi-local’.	 With	 this	





communications	 about	 localization	 will	 remain	 abstract	 and	 obscure.	
Examples	of	the	most	common	locals	include	a	level	in	a	hierarchy;	a	locale	or	
a	 location	 such	as	a	neighbourhood,	district	or	 region;	a	 locus	of	 ideological	






concept	 of	 the	 local	 is	 also	 included	 in	 the	 ideas	 of	 ‘local	 ownership’,	 ‘local	
government’,	 ‘act	 locally	 (but	 think	globally)’,	and	 ‘local	knowledge’,	each	of	
which	 itself	has	multiple	meanings,	 and	all	 of	which	differ	 from	each	other.	
What	 is	 best	 for	 the	 ‘national	 interest’	 is	 always	 contested	 or	 contestable	
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(politically	 and	 otherwise),	 and	 this	 is	 equally	 true	 for	 the	 ‘local	 interest’.	
Whereas	 the	 international	 is	 often	 seen	 by	 humanitarians	 as	 universal	 and	
scientific,	 the	 local	 is	viewed	conversely.	The	 local	also	 looks	different	 from	
below	 than	 from	 above.	 However,	 in	 much	 international	 humanitarian	
thinking	 and	 writing	 about	 intervention	 and	 aid,	 the	 local	 is	 increasingly	
portrayed	 as	 uniform,	 and	 ‘local’	 and	 ‘national’	 tend	 to	 be	 used	
interchangeably.	
This	 chapter	 aims	 to	 contribute	 to	 answering	 the	 following	 two	
questions:	 1)	 What	 are	 the	 underlying	 assumptions	 about	 the	 local	 in	





deconstruction	 and	 empirical	 application	 of	multiple	 interconnected	 ‘locals’	
centres	on	 those	 that	are	crucial	 in	disaster	response,	namely	 the	 local	as	a	










This	 section	 presents	 a	 critical	 discussion	 of	 the	 different	 dimensions,	 or	




The	 first	 dimension	 of	 the	 local	—	 the	 local	 as	 locale	 or	 locality	—	
involves	 boundary-setting	 for	 the	 localization	 debate.	 This	 dimension	
represents	an	ostensibly	pragmatic	approach	looking	at	geographic	locations,	






mediated	 by	 local	 actors	 (van	 Voorst	 &	 Hilhorst,	 2017,	 p.	 24).	 For	 actors	
outside	the	locale,	relating	to	this	dimension	provides	a	sense	of	being	‘on	the	
ground’	or	‘in	the	field’,	references	that	signify	the	level	closest	to	the	affected	
location.	 Localization	 in	 this	 regard	 looks	 at	 the	 locale	 and	 the	 actors	
associated	with	 it	 from	a	 top-down,	external	perspective;	 it	 strengthens	 the	





overlooks	 differentiation	 within	 the	 local	 and	 thus	 neglects	 important	
questions	regarding	who	is	(and	who	is	not)	considered	part	of	the	local.	This	
essentialization	 of	 the	 local	 (Bräuchler	 &	 Naucke,	 2017)	 gives	 rise	 to	 the	
problem	 of	 representation	 (Appadurai,	 1988).	 There	 is	 a	 risk	 that	 this	
understanding	of	the	local	could	legitimize	(mis)representation	of	local	people	
by	 locals	who	 are	 actually	 viewed	 as	 outsiders.	 For	 example,	 local	 elites	 or	
authorities	may	be	individuals	who	are	able	to	capture	power	despite	the	fact	
that	they	do	not	speak	for	others	in	the	locale	(Pouligny,	2005).	Previous	work	
has	 shown	 that	 insider/outsider	 status	 is	 not	 based	 solely	 on	 geographical	
‘rootedness’	 in	 the	 local	 or	 international	 locales	 and	 that	 a	 single	 actor	 can	
simultaneously	be	both	 an	outsider	 and	an	 insider	 (Roepstorff	&	Bernhard,	
2013).	Visoka	(2018)	has	demonstrated	that	these	identities	are	fluid,	socially	
constructed	 and	 changing	 over	 time.	 This	 also	 relates	 to	 how	 international	
actors	are	viewed	by	locals	 in	a	particular	 locale.	Some	external	actors	have	





actors	 are	 shaped	 by	 relations	 outside	 the	 locale.	 A	 historical	 view	 of	
international	 relations	 demonstrates	 that	 colonial,	 imperial	 and	 conflict	
histories	have	contributed	to	the	production	of	disaster	vulnerability	on	both	




(Hameiri	 &	 Scarpello,	 2018).	 The	 interface	 between	 the	 local	 and	 the	








This	 is	 encouraged	 by	 a	 state-centric	 governance	 (Harvey,	 2013).	Here,	 the	
ambitions	of	localization	are	to	decentralize	disaster	governance,	to	be	more	
inclusive	(Zyck	&	Krebs,	2015),	to	support	local	ownership	(Wall	&	Hedlund,	
2016)	 and	 to	 increase	 accountability	 (IFRC,	 2015).	 A	 crucial	 element	 in	
accomplishing	 these	 aims	 is	 the	 local	 and	 national	 non-governmental	










settings	 where	 governance	 arrangements	 are	 in	 flux	 (Melis,	 2018).	
Furthermore,	although	national	and	local	governance	levels	are	both	included	
in	 the	 local	 in	 localization	 initiatives,	 these	 levels	may	be	at	odds	with	each	
other.	 The	 focus	 on	 national	 governance	 in	 disaster	 response	 becomes	
problematic	when	this	level	of	governance	is	seen	as	illegitimate	or	when	local	










included	 or	 excluded.	 When	 the	 selected	 scale	 of	 governance	 remains	 at	
national	 level,	 it	 often	 excludes	 actors	who	 are	 not	 traditionally	 seen	 to	 be	
involved	 in	governance,	 such	as	other	public-	 and	private-sector	actors	and	
religious	 institutions	 that	 are	 important	 response	 actors	 (Cook	 et	 al.,	 2018;	
Gingerich	et	al.,	2017;	Jean-Louis	&	Klamer,	2016;	Nurmala	et	al.,	2018).	
The	reason	the	local	is	essentialized	and	romanticized	by	international	
actors	 is	 illustrated	 by	 the	 third	 dimension:	 the	 local	 as	 (de)legitimation.	











been	 argued	 that	 this	 pattern	 is	 part	 of	 ‘structural	 relations	 of	 colonial	
difference’,	focusing	on	the	‘incapacity’	of	local	actors	(Buba,	2019).	Setting	the	
agenda	 and	 dominating	 the	 production	 of	 knowledge	 is	 a	 type	 of	 power	
(Foucault,	1984;	Maldonado-Torres,	2017;	Mignolo	&	Escobar,	2010;	Quijano,	
2000),	 and,	 in	 the	 case	 of	 these	 external	 capacity-building	 interventions,	
capacities	 are	 pushed	 to	 conform	 to	 the	 norms	 of	 the	 international	 system	
(Fast,	2017).	In	this	process,	discourses	matter.	The	prevailing	discourse	of	the	




as	 being	 used	 as	 a	 source	 of	 power	 for	 top-down	 paternalistic	 endeavours	
(Barnett,	 2017).	 The	universalist	 approach	 affects	 the	 relationship	between	
humanitarian	and	local	actors.	National	and	local	authorities,	in	particular,	are	
often	portrayed	by	humanitarian	actors	as	political,	and	thus	non-neutral,	and	




These	 three	dimensions	of	 the	 local,	while	not	 exhaustive,	 show	 the	









of	wider	 theory	on	 locally	 led	disaster	 response	governance	 in	post-conflict	















a	 number	 of	 outcomes	 resulting	 from	 the	 analysis	 of	 the	 interactions,	
observations,	 perspectives	 and	 opinions	 expressed	 by	 the	 research	














from	 the	 data.	 The	 themes	 addressed	 the	 main	 actor	 relations,	 challenges,	





















responses	 and,	 viewed	 superficially,	 international	 and	 national	 actors	 have	
supported	their	efforts.	However,	 the	case	studies	showed	that,	beneath	the	
surface,	there	was	contestation	over	roles	and	legitimacy	within	and	between	
the	national	and	 local	 levels,	 complicating	 locally	 led	responses,	 challenging	
the	uniform	understanding	of	‘the	local’	and	showing	different	expressions	of	
‘the	local’	in	practice.	







metaphorical	—	 rather	 than	 physical	—	 distance	 between	 themselves	 and	
















viewed	 as	 having	 a	 large	 role	 in	 the	 response	 because	 international	 non-





international	 actors	 increased	 their	 legitimacy	 with	 community	 members,	
whereas	 another	 informal	 leader,	 who	 was	 seen	 as	 corrupt,	 was	 quickly	
replaced.	
In	 the	 locally	 led	 responses	 in	 the	 three	 cases,	 a	 myriad	 of	 local,	
national	and	international	actors	socially	negotiated	aid	outcomes,	leading	to	
a	 relatively	 complex	 understanding	 of	 the	 local	 as	 governance.	 This	
understanding	 underscores	 how	 intra-national	 and	 local–national	 strife	
challenges	 the	notion	of	a	uniform	 local	 that	 takes	 the	 lead	 in	 the	response.	
 
52	The	following	codes	are	used	to	describe	the	country	and	actor	type	for	individual	interviews:	N:	Nepal,	H:	
Haiti,	 SL:	 Sierra	 Leone,	 SOC:	 societal	 actor,	 GOV:	 state	 actor,	 NGO:	 non-governmental	 organization,	 INGO:	










tensions	were	 primarily	 felt	 at	 the	 local	 governance	 level,	 where	 local	 and	




or	 by	 implementing	 initiatives	 without	 permission.	 In	 Sierra	 Leone,	 state	
institutions	at	the	central	level	were	in	competition	with	each	other	over	the	
division	 of	 response	 roles,	 which,	 in	 turn,	 led	 to	 local	 authorities	 feeling	
excluded.	 In	 Haiti,	 tension	 was	 seen	 between	 the	 local	 authorities	 in	 the	
communities	 and	 the	 municipality,	 with	 the	 local	 authorities’	 legitimacy	
largely	 shaped	 by	 the	 extent	 to	 which	 they	 were	 able	 to	 withstand	
politicization.	 There	 was	 also	 a	 schism	 between	 the	 municipality	 and	 the	
central	 state	 regarding	 their	 respective	 power,	with	 the	 central	 state	 being	
seen	as	providing	limited	space	for	local	initiatives.	In	all	three	cases,	authority	
was	 continuously	being	negotiated	within	 the	 state	 at	 different	 local	 levels;	
therefore,	from	the	point	of	view	of	local,	informal	authorities,	what	would	be	
seen	 as	 a	 more	 locally	 led	 disaster	 response	 differed	 from	 the	 national	
responses	that	were	supported	by	international	actors.	
In	 each	of	 the	 case	 studies,	 international	 actors	 collaborated	 closely	
with	 the	 state,	 but	 the	 humanitarian–state	 coordination	 mechanisms	 were	
experienced	as	exclusionary	by	 local	actors	who	are	not	usually	 involved	 in	
governance.	 A	 multitude	 of	 local	 actors,	 such	 as	 traditional	 authorities,	




example,	played	a	major	role	 in	the	response	 in	Nepal.	 In	Haiti,	participants	
from	the	private	sector	saw	their	strength	as	providing	aid	more	effectively,	
compared	 with	 INGOs,	 ‘as	 INGOs	 would	 be	 bothered	 by	 the	 bureaucracy	
behind	 it	 because	 they	 work	 with	 government	 agencies’	 (H-SOC1,	 14	 May	
2019).	 For	 this	 reason,	 the	 private-sector	 actors	 reported	 that	 they	mostly	
engaged	with	local	authorities	rather	than	with	national	authorities.	
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In	 terms	 of	 governance,	 co-governance	 as	 such	 was	 not	 seen	 as	
sufficient	 to	 achieve	 a	more	 locally	 led	 response.	 International	 actors	were	
described	as	often	using	their	power,	supported	by	their	resources,	to	shape	
the	 response.	 State	 actors	 had	 trouble	with	 collaboratively	 determining	 the	




funding	 schemes,	 noting	 that	 these	 organizations	 only	 covered	 direct	
implementation	 costs	 and	 not	 overheads.	 One	 participant	 asserted	 that	 the	
financial	structures	‘don’t	prioritize	the	local	organizations.	They	prioritize	the	
internationals’	(H-NGO3,	10	May	2019).	Although	locally	led	disaster	response	








state	 actors,	 division	 between	 the	 perspectives	 of	 the	 state	 and	 community	
members	also	surfaced.	At	times,	the	legitimacy	the	state	drew	from	the	local	
was	 accomplished	 by	 discrediting	 the	 local.	 In	 Sierra	 Leone,	 state–society	
mistrust	was	especially	pronounced,	with	one	state	official	explaining,	‘Some	
community	 people	 were	 very	 deceptive.	 They	 were	 never	 straightforward’	









conflictual.	 Particularly	 in	 Haiti	 and	 Sierra	 Leone,	 NGOs	 experienced	




response.	However,	NGOs	were	also	able	 to	 collaborate	 relatively	well	with	
authorities,	especially	local-level	authorities,	which	set	them	apart	from	some	
of	their	international	counterparts.	A	research	participant	from	an	NGO	in	Haiti	
recounted	 that	 ‘several	 organizations’	 responses	 were	 led	 by	 emergency	
response	 teams	 from	 someplace	 else.	 That	 would	 not	 facilitate	 that	
relationship	 [between	 aid	 and	 state	 actors].	 So	 it	 is	 much	 easier	 for	 us	 to	





Ambitious	 claims	 made	 for	 localization	 and	 critical	 commentary	 on	 these,	
share	 the	 common	 characteristic	 of	 speaking	 of	 ‘the	 local’	 as	 a	 singular	
phenomenon.	But	as	illustrated	in	this	chapter,	localization	is	far	from	being	a	
singular	idea.	Rather	it	comprises	multiple	spheres	of	senses	and	references,	







strengthening	 communication	 and	 cooperation	 between	 national	 and	 local	








Although	 ‘the	 local’	 is	 imbued	with	 historical	 power-narratives	 and	





















































































































When	 I	 started	 this	 research	 in	 February	 2016,	 humanitarian	 policies	 and	
practices	were	at	 a	moment	of	 significant	 change.	The	World	Humanitarian	
Summit	was	planned	for	May	that	year,	which	represented	a	major	milestone	
in	 mainstreaming	 notions	 of	 resilience	 humanitarianism	 (Hilhorst,	 2018).	
Although	there	was	a	general	recognition	that	humanitarian	governance	does	
not	 operate	 in	 a	 vacuum	 (as	 seen	 in	 the	 localization	 agenda	 and	 the	
humanitarian–development	 nexus),	 the	 commitments	 continued	 to	 be	






Contrary	 to	 the	 traditionally	 aid-centred	 approach	 of	 humanitarian	
governance,	 both	 post-conflict	 governance	 arrangements	 and	 disaster	
governance	policies	have	a	state-centred	approach	and	a	long-term	vision	for	
change.	Post-conflict	governance	is	often	guided	by	a	paradigm	of	statebuilding	
(Brinkerhoff,	 2005;	 Chandler,	 2013;	 Heathershaw	 &	 Lambach,	 2008)	 and	






their	 own	 routines,	 rationales	 and	 structures,	 and	 when	 humanitarian	












governance	 in	 post-conflict	 settings;	 their	 contrasting	 visions,	 competing	
mandates	 and	 different	 governance	 arrangements	 come	 together	 in	 a	
particular	way.	This	has	formed	the	basis	for	the	construction	of	a	post-conflict	
scenario	of	disaster	response;	not	one	that	is	‘the	best’	or	‘most	effective’,	but	
one	 that	 is	 typically	 evolving,	 one	 that	 can	 be	 expected	 to	 be	 present,	 to	







in	 a	 post-conflict	 scenario?	On	 the	way	 to	 answering	 this,	 a	 number	 of	 sub-
questions	aimed	to	provide	the	necessary	insights	into	the	workings	of	disaster	
governance	in	a	post-conflict	scenario:	1)	What	are	the	roles	of	different	aid,	
state	 and	 societal	 actors	 involved	 in	 post-conflict	 disaster	 response	
governance?	2)	What	are	the	main	points	of	tension	between	these	actors	in	
the	governance	of	the	response?	3)	How	are	the	points	of	tension	manifested	




what	might	 happen	 in	 the	 future	 given	 what	 our	 research	 indicates	 in	 the	
present’	(Kirshbaum,	2019,	p.	11).	Besides	the	theoretical	contribution	to	the	
post-conflict	 and	 post-disaster	 nexus,	 this	 scenario	 can	 be	 used	 as	 an	
educational	tool	for	humanitarian	practice.		
Let	me	first	recapture	the	previous	chapters	of	this	thesis.	Chapters	1	
and	3	provided	a	 foundation	and	 framework	 to	better	understand	 the	main	
elements	and	challenges	of	the	post-conflict	and	post-disaster	nexus.	I	set	the	
scene	contextually	by	asking	what	disaster	governance	and	post-conflict	mean	
in	 theory	 and	 practice	 and	 how	 humanitarian	 governance	 defines	 the	
parameters	 of	 disaster	 response.	 A	 literature	 review	 on	 post-conflict	 and	








control	 away	 from	 the	 state.	 Throughout	 the	 case	 study	 research,	multiple	
constructions	were	found	beyond	what	the	‘fragility’	lens	alone	could	reveal	of	




response	 in	 the	 post-conflict	 settings	 of	 Nepal,	 Sierra	 Leone	 and	 Haiti,	
illustrating	 the	 way	 that	 different	 aid,	 state	 and	 societal	 actors	 socially	
negotiate	 and	 navigate	 the	 everyday	 politics	 of	 disaster	 response.	 Using	 an	
interpretive	form	of	constructivism,	it	was	important	for	me	to	understand	the	




the	same	research	questions	 to	guide	 the	study.	With	 this,	 the	 research	has	
created	 a	 structured	 focus	 on	 components	 that	 reflect	 tendencies	 of	 post-
conflict	disaster	governance.		
In	 Nepal,	 the	wheeling	 and	 dealing	 by	 aid	 actors	 vis-à-vis	 the	 state	
became	a	central	 issue	 in	a	post-conflict	context	 that	 is	undergoing	political	
reforms	 and	 has	 been	 struck	 by	 a	 large-scale	 disaster.	 The	 main	 point	 of	
friction	 I	observed	was	 in	 terms	of	 contradictory	paradigms	of	post-conflict	
statebuilding	 and	 international	 humanitarian	 response.	 As	 the	 state	 took	
measures	to	reclaim	control	over	the	response,	aid	actors	adapted	in	different	





The	 second	 case,	 Sierra	 Leone,	 provided	 an	 opportunity	 to	 better	
understand	these	internal	state	dynamics,	as	the	response	was	more	localized	
and	 state-led,	with	 the	 state	 now	 also	 shaping	 the	 framework	 in	which	 the	
response	 was	 implemented.	 The	 main	 challenge	 here	 revolved	 around	 the	









aid	 actors.	 The	 power	 of	 societal	 actors	 to	 socially	 negotiate	 the	 response	
outcomes	 was	 seen	 in	 the	 way	 they	 resisted	 certain	 aid	 practices,	 and	 the	











local	 contributed	 to	 understanding	 why	 it	 has	 been	 difficult	 to	 break	 the	


















has	 shown	 is	 that	 both	 the	 post-conflict	 and	 the	 humanitarian	 governance	
contexts	share	a	characteristic	of	volatility	and	a	transitional	nature	that	opens	
up	the	political	space	in	which	response	actors	compete	over	disaster	response	
roles,	 which	 often	 leads	 to	 an	 overt	 politicization	 of	 the	 response.	 The	 post-
conflict	 environment	 embodies	 a	 space	 with	 ‘shifting	 local-global	
relationships’	 (Heathershaw	 &	 Lambach,	 2008,	 p.	 270),	 forcing	 actors	 to	
continuously	renegotiate	authority	and	legitimacy.	
First,	the	case	studies	have	shown	that	the	role	of	aid	actors	in	a	post-





a	 neoliberal	 fashion	 (Nepal),	 are	 internalized	 in	 the	 practices	 and	 power	
relations	 that	 different	 actors	 have	 to	 negotiate	 in	 the	 response.	 Both	 the	
conflict	and	colonial	histories	 therefore	strongly	shape	 inter-actor	relations,	




in	 the	 response	 are	 increasingly	 contested	 by	 the	 very	 actors	 they	 aim	 to	
support.	 In	 a	 context	 where	 policies	 have	 solidified	 commitments	 towards	
bottom-up	 approaches	 that	 support	 local/national	 NGOs,	 power	 is	
continuously	renegotiated	in	practice.	The	diversity	amongst	aid	actors,	each	
with	their	own	mandates,	make	this	even	more	challenging.	The	case	studies	




international	 aid	 mechanisms.	 One	 of	 the	 tension	 points	 lies	 between	
development	and	humanitarian	staff,	either	within	an	organization	or	between	
organizations;	development	practitioners	normally	have	strong	relations	with	













hybrid	 agents	 operating	 on,	 and	 between,	 different	 levels.	 I	 found	 that	was	
particularly	striking	in	Sierra	Leone,	where	traditional	authorities	are	part	of	
the	 state	 but	 played	 an	 intermediary	 role	 that	 was	 characterized	 by	
contentious	politics.		
In	 this	 research	 I	 found	 that	 the	 state’s	 response	 is	 shaped	by	post-
conflict	 politics	 and	 power	 relations	 that	 have	 developed	 over	 decades	 of	
external	 interventions.	 This	 was	 very	 clear	 in	 Haiti,	 where	 post-colonial	
discourses	 are	 internalized	 and	 shape	 the	disarticulation	between	 the	 state	
and	society.	 In	 responding	 to	disasters,	 the	 state	 is	 further	 reshaped	by	 the	
contention	and	collaboration	between	authorities	and	institutions	on	multiple	
local	 governance	 levels	 and	 by	 the	 disarticulation	with	 societal	 actors.	 The	
effects	of	competition	on	the	state’s	horizontal	power	relations	impact	in	turn	
on	the	vertical	power	relations	that	influence	the	ways	in	which	local	or	non-




Third,	 the	 role	 of	 societal	 actors	 is	 overshadowed	 by	 the	 centrality	 of	
international	aid	and	national	state	actors.	Societal	actors	are	often	presented	
in	 the	 literature	 as	 either	 being	 victims	 or	 as	 deploying	 their	 ‘victimcy’	 to	
increase	 access	 to	 humanitarian	 aid	 (Utas,	 2005).	 Contrary	 to	 the	 good	
intentions	of	the	international	humanitarian	community,	the	case	studies	have	












challenging	 the	 legitimacy	 of	 the	 state	 and	 humanitarian	 governance,	 and	
socially	negotiating	power	in	multi-local	politics.	The	multitude	of	local	actors,	







the	previous	 section	 create	 points	 of	 tension	between	 response	 actors.	 The	
second	step	 in	creating	 the	scenario	 is	 to	answer	my	second	and	 third	sub-
questions	that	identify	typical	points	of	tension	between	actors	and	show	how	




capacity	 of	 the	 state	 to	 respond	 to	 disasters	 (related	 to	 contested	 internal	
authority	and	 limited	 resources),	 corruption	within	 local	 structures,	 limited	
accountability	 and	 tensions	 in	 the	 communities	 following	 aid	 distributions.	
Although	 these	 issues	were	 also	 seen	 in	 the	 case	 studies,	 I	 aimed	 to	 delve	






The	 literature	 review	 at	 the	 beginning	 of	my	 project	 already	 revealed	 that	
contestation	 over	 the	 response	 between	 aid	 and	 state	 actors	 would	 be	
common.	Following	disaster	governance	policies	and	the	aim	of	strengthening	
the	post-conflict	institutional	context,	the	discourse	in	a	post-conflict	disaster	
response	 scenario	 centres	 around	 ‘supporting	 the	 state’	 and	 ‘the	 state	 is	 in	
charge'.	 Aid	 actors	 describe	 their	 ideal	 scenario	 as	 one	 in	 which	 the	
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government	 is	prepared	and	 takes	 the	 lead	 if	 a	disaster	 strikes;	 the	 case	of	
Sierra	Leone	was	being	considered	by	some	aid	actors	as	a	pilot	to	test	a	more	
locally	 led	 response.	 But	 after	 explaining	 this	 policy,	 aid	 actors	 often	
immediately	went	on	to	stress	the	state's	incapacity,	lack	of	transparency	and	
potential	 corruption.	 By	 foregrounding	 these	 issues,	 aid	 actors	 are	 able	 to	
legitimize	their	control	of	aid	resources,	and	this,	 in	turn,	 leads	to	increased	
decision-making	 power	 for	 aid	 actors	 to	 determine	 the	 conditions	 of	 the	
response.		




control	 measures	 by	 the	 state,	 and	 aid	 actors	 experienced	 this	 as	 an	
obstruction.	While	many	chose	to	work	creatively	with	the	state,	such	as	taking	
a	 blanket	 approach	 in	 a	 targeted	 area,	 or	 purposefully	 sharing	 information	
with	one	 state	 institution	 rather	 than	another,	 others	 chose	 to	bypass	 state	
structures	completely.	In	Sierra	Leone,	a	large	donor	who	collaborated	closely	
with	 the	 state	 was	 able	 to	 press	 for	 a	 change	 in	 the	 parameters	 of	 cash	
assistance	in	the	response.	Other	examples	saw	aid	actors	bypassing	the	state	




country,	 many	 aid	 organizations	 did	 work	 with	 and	 through	 the	 state	
structures.	Nevertheless,	with	approval	from	the	central	level	of	the	state,	aid	
actors	 still	 circumvented	 the	 local	 state	 actors,	 negatively	 affecting	 the	
authority	of	the	latter.		
From	 the	 perspective	 of	 the	 state,	 this	 implies	 the	 need	 to	 regain	




actors	 does	 not	 result	 in	 strengthening	 of	 the	 state's	 response.	 The	 control	
exercised	by	aid	actors	 is	experienced	differently	by	state	actors	at	national	






aid	 organizations	 being	 accused	 of	 not	 being	 transparent	 and	 of	 not	
understanding	Nepal's	 culture.	State	actors	maintained	 their	 image	of	being	
strong	 enough	 to	withstand	 foreign	 influence,	 but	 nonetheless	 experienced	
increased	external	control	as	time	went	by.	In	Sierra	Leone,	while	the	narrative	
by	the	state	was	more	positive,	stressing	the	partnership	with	international	aid	








measures	 are	 often	 presented	 as	 apolitical,	 but	 are	 challenged	 for	 being	
political	in	nature.	They	can	therefore	be	seen	as	a	strategy	by	the	state	to	not	
only	increase	control	and	strengthen	legitimacy,	but	also	to	use	aid	for	political	
gain.	 In	Nepal,	 this	took	the	form	of	restrictions	through	a	 ‘one-door	policy’,	
insisting	 on	 a	 blanket	 distribution	 instead	 of	 targeting	 the	 aid	 response	 to	









uniform	entities,	which	produces	a	discourse	of	 ‘the	 local	as	governance’,	 in	
which	the	national	and	 local	governance	 levels	are	treated	as	equals	 in	a	—	
desired	 —	 decentralized	 response.	 The	 differences	 and	 the	 hybridity	 that	
characterize	 both	 national	 and	 local	 actors	 in	 post-conflict	 societies	 are	
generally	 ignored.	However,	 intra-national	 and	 local–national	 strife	 directly	
challenges	 this	 understanding	 in	 practice.	 While	 intra-state	 relations	 are	




—	 as	 in	 Nepal	 and	 Haiti	 —	 the	 coordination	 of	 the	 response	 was	 largely	
decentralized	as	part	of	the	post-conflict	statebuilding	agenda.	In	Nepal,	intra-
state	 tensions	 were	 primarily	 felt	 at	 the	 local	 governance	 level,	 where	
politicians	needed	to	establish	their	legitimacy	and	contended	with	—	and	put	
pressure	on	—	village	development	committees	(VDCs).	But	tensions	were	also	
evident	 between	 the	 local	 and	 central	 state	 levels:	 while	 the	 national	
government	retained	central	control	regarding	response	conditions,	the	local	
authorities	 tried	 to	 negotiate	 their	 authority	 by	 going	 on	 strike	 or	
implementing	 operations	 without	 permission.	 In	 Sierra	 Leone,	 state	
institutions	at	the	central	level	were	in	competition	with	each	other	over	the	





limited	 space	 for	 local	 initiative.	 In	 the	 post-conflict	 scenario,	 authority	 is	
therefore	 continuously	 being	 negotiated	 within	 the	 state	 on	 different	 local	
levels.		
Within	the	 local	 level	of	 the	post-conflict	disaster	response	scenario,	
the	 relationship	between	 the	 state	and	societal	 actors	 is	 largely	patriarchal.	
While	the	discourse	suggests	that	‘communities’	have	the	legitimacy	to	know	
what	is	best	for	their	members,	in	practice,	state	actors	claim	that	people	at	the	
local	 level	 try	 to	 take	 advantage	 or	 do	 not	want	 to	 follow	 instructions	 and	
therefore	need	to	be	more	strictly	controlled.	In	Nepal,	the	discourse	focused	
on	‘dependency’,	with	the	state	fearing	that	people	would	become	dependent	
on	 (external)	 aid.	 In	 Sierra	 Leone,	 the	 state–society	 mistrust	 was	 more	
pronounced,	and	societal	actors	would	be	portrayed	as	‘deceptive’	and	‘taking	
advantage’.	 In	 Haiti,	 this	 type	 of	 language	was	 less	 prevalent,	 but	 the	 state	











community	members	 in	 their	 response.	 But	 again,	 this	 varied	 between	 the	
cases	due	to	the	different	relationships	of	aid	actors	with	certain	local	actors	
over	others.	In	Nepal,	it	was	important	that	the	selection	of	aid	recipients	was	












While	 there	was	 a	 large	 societal	 response	 to	 the	 earthquakes	 in	Nepal,	 and	
communities	 in	 Sierra	 Leone	 and	 Haiti	 quickly	 mobilized	 to	 support	 their	
neighbours	 and	 families,	 the	 role	 of	 societal	 actors	 in	 the	 formal	 disaster	
governance	 structures	 and	 mechanisms	 —	 where	 decisions	 are	 made	 —	












to	 take	advantage	of	 the	 response	 to	 serve	 their	own	personal	and	political	
goals,	the	former	stealing	aid	resources	and	the	latter	using	the	disaster	to	win	
votes	in	the	upcoming	elections.	But	there	were	also	different	perspectives,	as	
those	with	 stronger	 ties	 to	 these	 political	 figures	 provided	 a	more	 positive	
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view.	In	Nepal,	I	observed	a	similar	dynamic	between	local	politicians	and	VDC	
authorities.	 The	 widespread	 belief	 that	 local	 politicians	 are	 corrupt	 and	
influence	VDCs	affected	their	 legitimacy	 in	a	negative	way.	Local	authorities	
had	diverging	legitimacy	in	all	cases,	depending	on	the	extent	to	which	they	
liaised	with	other	actors	 to	 increase	access	 to	aid.	 In	Sierra	Leone,	 this	was	
particularly	 visible	 in	 the	 way	 that	 different	 communities	 supported,	 or	
stopped	supporting,	their	leaders	based	on	how	they	perceived	their	leaders'	












resistance	 is	 a	 way	 to	 renegotiate	 the	 centre	 of	 power	 through	 bottom-up	




distributions	 that	 led	 to	 the	 deaths	 of	 a	 number	 of	 young	 people	 and	 the	
protestors’	demands	were	directed	at	the	mayor's	office.	In	Sierra	Leone,	while	
internally	 displaced	 persons	 (IDPs)	 were	 dissatisfied	 with	 a	 state	
representative	of	one	of	the	camps,	their	organized	protest	was	directed	at	a	
higher	 state	 level,	 namely	 the	 president.	 These	 differences	 in	 the	 object	 of	
claim-making	 can	 be	 explained	 by	 the	 perceived	 or	 experienced	 distance	
between	these	state	levels	and	the	communities.		








coordination	 systems.	 In	 practice,	 people	 often	 feel	 excluded	 and	 aid	 is	 not	
always	 seen	as	 appropriate.	 In	Nepal,	 affected	 communities	were	especially	
disappointed	by	international	NGOs	supporting	existing	power	inequalities	by	
involving	corrupt	politicians	in	aid	distributions,	by	aid	items	which	were	at	




was	 a	 stark	 difference	 in	 the	 number	 of	 aid	 actors	who	were	 active	 in	 the	
affected	communities,	with	aid	centring	around	the	IDP	camps.	The	sense	that	
aid	is	unequally	distributed	is	therefore	a	powerful	thread	in	the	scenario;	this	






final	 step	 in	 constructing	 a	 post-conflict	 scenario	 of	 disaster	 response;	
answering	my	main	 research	 question	 on	how	aid,	 state	 and	 societal	 actors	
socially	negotiate	the	governance	of	disaster	response	in	a	post-conflict	scenario.	
As	 Colebatch	 (2014,	 p.	 314)	 explains,	 ‘governing	 involves	 many	 hands,	 is	
grounded	 in	 interaction	 rather	 than	 direction,	 and	 is	 a	 continuing	 process	
marked	 by	 indeterminacy	 and	 ambiguity.’	 In	 the	 humanitarian	 arena,	 the	





practices	 that	 are	 expressed	 in	 ‘subtle	 acts’,	 and	 I	 identified	 three	 social	
negotiation	 tactics	 that	 are	 used	 in	 the	 humanitarian	 arena	 of	 post-conflict	
disaster	 response;	 namely,	 tactics	 of	 contention,	 collaboration	 and	
compromise.	In	their	interrelationships,	actors	contest	each	other,	collaborate	
with	each	other,	and	make	compromises	 to	 their	goals	and	roles	 in	disaster	






Given	 their	 large-scale	 presence	 and	 conflicting	 humanitarian–
development	mandates	in	a	post-conflict	scenario,	it	is	not	surprising	that	both	
collaboration	and	contention	can	be	witnessed	between	aid	actors.	There	 is	
considerable	 collaboration	 in	 the	 different	 mechanisms	 and	 consortia	 that	
have	 a	 long-term	 commitment.	 But	 there	 is	 competition	 between	
humanitarian-oriented	 INGOs,	 who	 often	 ‘parachute’	 in	 for	 short-term	
humanitarian	 governance	 after	 a	 disaster,	 and	 development-oriented	
organizations	that	have	an	ongoing	presence	in	the	country	to	develop	post-
conflict	governance.	Within	the	aid	mechanisms,	actors	compete	over	limited	
resources.	 Local	 and	 national	 NGOs	 may	 be	 portrayed	 by	 international	
organizations	 as	 having	 weak	 capacities	 or	 being	 corrupt,	 following	 the	
institutional	changes	that	the	post-conflict	context	brings.	However,	this	can	
also	be	seen	as	a	 contentious	 tactic	 to	 retain	control	over	 the	humanitarian	
response.	 Nevertheless,	 compromises	 can	 be	 and	 often	 are	 made	 by	 both	
international	 and	 local/national	 NGOs	 in	 the	 partnerships	 in	 which	 they	
engage	so	as	to	share	control	over	the	division	of	resources.		
Both	 international	 and	 national/local	 NGOs	 emphasize	 their	





state	 structures	 and	 competing	 over	 legitimacy	 of	 the	 response.	 Here,	 the	
discourse	 of	 a	 weak	 state	 capacity	 is	 used	 to	 increase	 control,	 choosing	
humanitarian	over	statebuilding	goals.		
The	 contention	 between	 the	 aid	 and	 state	 structures	 results	 in	 the	
exclusion	 of	 society-based	 structures,	 such	 as	 religious	 institutions	 or	 the	
private	sector,	in	disaster	governance,	even	though	a	more	locally	led	response	
is	sought	after	in	a	post-conflict	scenario.	The	strict	conditions	of	the	response	
limit	 the	 space	 for	 societal	 actors	 to	 access	 aid	 or	 renegotiate	 the	 terms	 of	
engagement.	One	collaborative	tactic	employed	by	aid	vis-à-vis	societal	actors	
is	 to	 intervene	directly	at	 the	 level	of	 the	 community	and	 to	 stress	 that	 the	
‘community	knows	best’.	Within	the	framework	of	more	locally	led	responses	




increases	 the	 legitimacy	 of	 aid	 actors’	 role	 in	 the	 response.	 Between	 the	
exclusion	 of	 societal	 actors	 in	 aid	 governance	 and	 collaboration	 at	 the	
community	level,	compromises	are	made	to	include	community	stakeholders	




sanctions,	while	 the	 lack	 of	 transparency	 of	 the	 aid	 system	 is	 stressed	 as	 a	





the	 post-conflict	 scenario	 and	 can	 be	 affected	 by	 long-term	 historical	
relationships,	such	as	in	a	post-colonial	setting.		
Amongst	 state	 actors,	 and	 between	 state	 and	 societal	 actors,	
contentious	politics	are	observed	where	different	institutions	clash	over	roles	
and	 mandates.	 On	 a	 sub-national	 level,	 this	 leads	 to	 competition	 over	 aid	
resources	 with	 the	 affected	 population,	 the	 politicization	 of	 aid	 and	 elite	
capture.	To	legitimize	this	contention,	communities	and	local	state	officials	are	





processes.	 Compromises	 within	 the	 state	 structures,	 and	 on	 different	
governance	levels,	are	made	when	roles	and	responsibilities	are	redistributed;	
but	compromises	with	societal	actors	often	only	follow	after	acts	of	protest	and	
resistance.	 Within	 the	 post-conflict	 scenario,	 there	 is	 space	 for	 all	 this	
contention	 and	 renegotiation	 to	 openly	 take	 place,	 as	 part	 of	 the	 changing	
institutional	context.	
The	 diversity	 of	 societal	 actors	 is	 also	 seen	 in	 the	 use	 of	 different	
tactics;	some	choose	primarily	contentious	ways	to	strengthen	their	legitimacy	




organizations,	 or	 community-based	 groups	 that	 reach	 out	 to	 the	 affected	
communities	 through	solidary	structures	or	 to	aid	and	state	actors	via	 local	
leaders.	 Negotiating	 compromises,	 meanwhile,	 often	 necessitates	 accepting	





with	other	actors,	 it	became	clear	 that	 contentious	 tactics	are	mostly	 found	
between	aid	and	state	actors	and	that	compromises	tend	to	be	limiting	for	state	
and	societal	actors.	Consensus-oriented	governance	thus	risks	benefiting	those	
actors	 that	 have	 greater	 authority	 and	more	 resources,	 strengthening	 their	
position	in	contentious	aid	politics	and	reproducing	power	relations.		
Following	 the	 findings	 and	 resonances	 between	 the	 different	 cases,	 a	
generalization	can	be	made	 for	 the	post-conflict	 scenario:	 response	goals	of	
different	 international,	 national	 and	 local	 responders	 often	 collide	 or	 are	
politicized,	 and	 bottom-up	 and	 top-down	 governance	 is	 continuously	
(re)negotiated.	State-led	or	locally	led	responses	that	centre	around	national	
and	 local	 actors	 may	 result	 in	 a	 more	 inclusive	 disaster	 governance	 and	
improved	response	capacities,	but	can	also	strengthen	existing	intra-state	and	




conflict	 scenario	 need	 to	 reconcile	 the	 different	 visions	 of	 locally	 led	
governance	 that	 both	 the	 shifting	 aid	 policies	 and	 the	 post-conflict	 period	




















































































































































































	 The	 literature	 on	 post-conflict	 settings	 has	mostly	 focused	 on	 three	
aspects:	the	‘risk’	within	these	settings	for	a	return	to	violent	conflict	(Collier	







after	 the	 Cold	 War	 led	 to	 certain	 external	 interventions	 and	 long-term	
assistance,	based	on	a	premise	of	 ‘fragility’,	which	have	 left	 their	 imprint	 in	
post-conflict	societies.	I	believe	it	is	time	to	question	what	‘post-conflict’	means	
in	 this	 decade	 and	 beyond,	 but	 that	 does	 not	 diminish	 the	 validity	 of	
understanding	it	as	a	separate	context.	Post-conflict	can	be	understood	as	an	





As	 a	 case	 in	 point,	 a	 number	 of	 findings	 shared	 in	 the	 case	 study	
chapters	challenge	what	‘vulnerability’	to	disasters	means	in	this	context	and	
contribute	 to	 the	 critical	 literature	 on	 vulnerability	 in	 disaster	 studies	
(Bankoff,	 2001;	 Blaikie	 et	 al.,	 1994;	 Hilhorst,	 2004;	 Wisner,	 2016).	
Vulnerability	is	not	a	property	of	a	society,	state	or	system,	but	is	created	by	










(Oliver-Smith,	 1994),	 such	 vulnerabilities	 are	 also	 reproduced	 in	 the	 post-
conflict	 environment.	 A	 volatile	 political	 context	 in	which	 power	 sharing	 is	
socially	 negotiated	 —	 often	 between	 parties	 previously	 in	 conflict	 —	




This	 vulnerability	 was	 reproduced	 in	 the	 response	 in	 all	 three	
countries	through	post-conflict	politics	(see	vignettes	2,	3,	and	5);	with	a	strong	
focus	on	decentralization,	national	and	local	authorities	negotiated	their	role	
in	 the	 response,	 leaving	 certain	 authorities	 behind.	 Further,	 the	 open	
politicization	 of	 aid	 (especially	 with	 elections	 on	 the	 horizon)	 led	 to	 the	
widening	 of	 the	 gap	 between	 state	 and	 society	 when	 partisanship	 in	
distributions	 was	 observed.	 However,	 this	 disarticulation	 in	 the	 wake	 of	
disaster	cannot	be	equated	to	the	‘critical	juncture’	for	socio-political	change	
that	 Gawronski	 and	 Olson	 (2013)	 have	 suggested.	 Much	 like	 Siddiqi	 and	
Canuday	(2018)	have	shown,	 the	social	contract	 is	quite	resilient	and	state-
society	 relations	 were	 reproduced	 rather	 than	 transformed.	 When	




The	 question	 is	 how	 post-conflict	 disaster	 response	 practices	 and	
policies	can	be	adjusted	in	such	a	way	that	the	tensions	discussed	in	section	
8.3.2.	 may	 be	 resolved	 or	 used	 to	 advance	 the	 agenda	 of	 peacebuilding	 by	
balancing	 statebuilding	 with	 humanitarian	 action	 (see	 chapter	 4),	
understanding	state	hybridity	and	the	multi-local	(see	chapters	5	and	7),	and	




First,	 the	 construction	of	post-conflict	 ‘fragility’	needs	 to	be	overcome.	






legitimizes	 external	 interventions.	 Fragility	 is	 socially	 constructed	 by	 the	
response	actors	as	 the	 inability	 to	effectively	respond	to	and	coordinate	the	
response,	 or	 the	 corruption	 that	 is	 attributed	 to	 national	 and	 local	 actors.	
However,	the	research	found	that	fragility	lies	both	externally,	in	the	continued	
inequality	between	the	power	of	international	aid	actors	and	the	state,	which	
requires	 international	 actors	 to	 practise	 their	 power	 differently	 for	 a	more	
inclusive	response	(regarding	the	levels	of	governance,	material	resources	and	
authority	 to	 decide	 how	 to	 use	 these);	 and	 internally,	 in	 the	 relationship	
between	 the	 state	 and	 societal	 actors	 that	 requires	 more	 downwards	
accountability	 from	 the	 state	 to	 open	 the	 space	 for	 increased	 societal	
collaboration.		




of	 continued	dependence	on	 international	 assistance	and	domination	of	 the	
response	 by	 powerful	 donors.	 Local,	 national	 and	 global	 disaster	 response	
arrangements	 (in	 laws	 and	 policies)	 could	 better	 clarify	 the	 roles	 for	 the	
different	response	actors,	or	at	least	set	a	framework	for	collaboration	that	is	
agreed	upon	in	advance,	after	which	practices	are	communally	evaluated.		
However,	 simply	 negotiating	 these	 mandates	 is	 not	 sufficient;	 they	
have	 to	 be	 accompanied	by	 the	 appropriate	 resources	 and	decision-making	
power.	 A	 temporary	 humanitarian	 takeover	 negatively	 affects	 development	
processes	and	long-term	relationships	between	aid	and	state	actors	that	are	












giving	 contested	 state	 actors	 a	 greater	 political	 advantage	 (see	 for	 example	
vignette	3).	This	also	directly	limits	the	power	societal	actors	have	to	respond	
to	disasters,	as	they	are	constrained	by	their	disarticulation	with	the	state.		
As	 described	 earlier,	 the	 humanitarian	 field	 is	 also	 changing;	 from	
being	 centralized,	 with	 a	 short-term	 vision,	 and	 focused	 on	 international	
interventions,	 it	 is	becoming	decentralized,	 embracing	a	 longer-term	vision,	
with	an	emphasis	on	responses.	However,	 the	case	studies	have	shown	that	
this	 decentralization	 is	 socially	 negotiated	 on	 multiple	 local	 levels.	 In	 this	
process,	aid	actors	are	being	pulled	in	different	directions,	with	humanitarians	
legitimizing	their	role	by	emphasizing	the	humanitarian	principles	and	multi-





global	 needs	 to	 be	 transcended.	 Within	 the	 humanitarian	 arena	 of	 disaster	
response,	different	governance	systems	encounter	each	other,	and	actors	need	
to	 socially	 negotiate	 their	 roles	 and	 legitimacy	 while	 reconciling	 their	
differences.	 Yet,	 a	 tension	 remains	 between	 authoritative	 and	 material	
resources:	 authoritative	 resources	 are	 shifting	 towards	 national	 and	 local	
actors	in	the	response	due	to	the	current	state-centred	disaster	policies	and	
humanitarian	 localization	 agenda,	 but	 material	 resources	 often	 remain	
centralized	in	the	international	aid	system.	The	power	imbalances	between	the	
local,	national	and	global	actors	have	not	been	redressed	in	practice.	In	the	end,	
the	 blurred	 definitions	 of	 the	 state	 and	 the	 local	 as	 governance	 constructs	
enable	the	wheeling	and	dealing	of	aid	and	prevent	power	relations	from	being	
truly	transformed.	
As	 shown	 in	 chapter	 7,	 the	 usage	 of	 the	 different	 ‘locals’	 is	 a	
legitimation	strategy	that	is	deployed	by	all	response	actors,	where	a	discourse	
of	 supporting	 societal	 actors	 —	 and	 the	 perceived	 ‘closeness’	 to	 them	 —	
legitimizes	the	role	of	other	actors	in	the	response.	The	post-conflict	scenario	
is	 characterized	 by	 contentious	 collaboration	 between	 and	within	 different	
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governance	 levels	 and	 actors.	 However,	 the	 national	 and	 the	multiple	 local	
levels	 are	 often	 seen	 as	 one.	 If	 these	 paradoxes	 of	 post-conflict	 disaster	
governance	are	not	 addressed	by	 integrating	multi-level	hybrid	 governance	
arrangements	in	disaster	response,	there	is	a	risk	that	unequal	power	relations	
between	 local	 and	 global	 scales	 will	 continue	 to	 be	 reproduced.	 The	
implications	 of	 these	 discourses	 and	 practices	 are	 likely	 to	 inhibit	 the	




Relationships	between	 the	binary	 ‘local’	 and	 ‘global’	are	constructed	
and	 reproduced	 in	 everyday	 discourses	 and	 practices.	 The	 localization	 of	
humanitarian	 governance,	 in	 its	 current	 form,	 is	 therefore	 inherently	
contradictory;	to	‘localize’	is	a	top-down	and	non-local	action	targeting	those	
‘local’	actors	that	(are	made	to)	fit	within	a	global	system,	regardless	of	how	
different	 local	 governance	 structures	already	 function.	What	 is	needed	 is	 to	
recognize	 and	 listen	 to	 voices	 from	 outside	 of	 the	 system.	 Practices	 of	
downward	accountability	can	provide	spaces	for	transformational	contention,	
where	policies	and	practices	can	be	reconfigured	by	the	people	whose	lives	are	
most	 impacted	 by	 disasters	 and	 the	 response	 to	 them.	 Only	 when	 these	
contradictions	are	redressed,	can	further	steps	be	taken	to	transcend	the	local–
global	 divide	 and	 turn	 the	 humanitarian	 system	 upside	 down.	 In	 order	 to	





The	 ways	 in	 which	 post-conflict,	 disaster	 and	 humanitarian	 governance	
interact,	and	actors	socially	negotiate	the	conditions	and	outcomes	of	disaster	
response,	constitute	a	broad	topic	that	does	not	restrict	itself	to	the	findings	
and	 conclusions	 presented	 above.	 Due	 to	 the	 high	 incidence	 of	 disasters	 in	
conflict-affected	settings,	and	the	continued	lack	of	scholarly	attention	to	post-
conflict	settings	in	particular,	further	research	remains	crucial.		
First,	 in	 order	 to	 operationalize	 the	 findings	 of	 this	 thesis,	
humanitarian	 actors	 could	 research	 and	 develop	 differentiated	 response	






Second,	 more	 research	 on	 the	 cross-cutting	 theme	 of	 disaster	 risk	
reduction	(DRR)	is	warranted.	During	my	research,	it	became	clear	that	DRR	
and	disaster	 response	share	similar	 challenges	 in	 the	post-conflict	 scenario.	
Delving	more	deeply	into	this	topic	was	beyond	the	scope	of	the	thesis,	which	
focused	 on	 the	 specificities	 of	 disaster	 governance	 after	 disaster	 happens;	
nevertheless,	 vulnerability	 to	 disasters	 is	 highly	 impacted	 by	 the	 socio-
economic	and	political	environment.	We	must	deepen	our	knowledge	of	these	




Third,	 acknowledging	 that	 disasters	 affect	 social	 groups	 in	 different	
ways	can	better	inform	the	response	to	disasters.	In	many	countries,	women	
are	still	excluded	from	decision-making	processes,	such	as	in	state	institutions,	
even	 though	 women	 are	 well	 represented	 in	 the	 international	 aid	
environment.	Marginalized	groups	are	similarly	excluded,	and	might	not	even	
find	 a	 place	 at	 the	 governance	 table	 with	 international	 organizations.	 This	
could	seriously	affect	the	way	that	disaster	response	is	governed.	Therefore,	
including	a	focus	on	gender	or	particular	marginalized	groups	could	provide	






as	 the	 BRIC53	 countries	 or	 Gulf	 states),	 neighbouring	 countries,	
philanthropists,	other	civil	society	organizations	and	the	media,	for	example,	
play	a	large	part	in	the	response	to	a	disaster.	However,	these	actors	are	often	
excluded	 from	 (or	 play	 a	 smaller	 role	 in)	 international	 and	 state-centred	
response	mechanisms.	 A	 broader	 integration	 of	 these,	 and	 other,	 response	









the	 voices	 of	 affected	 communities	 and	 societal	 actors.	 This	 requires	 a	
restructuring	of	humanitarian	studies.	In	future	research,	I	would	also	strongly	
advocate	 for	 exploring	 alternative	 forums,	 outside	 of	 the	 formal	 aid–state	
response	structures,	and	finding	ways	to	better	connect	the	formal	with	the	
informal	aid	structures.		
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